67. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Algeria After Boumediene (U)

Boumediene’s death will bring to an end an era in Algerian politics marked by surprising stability, militancy on Third World and Palestinian issues, entanglement in an unpopular war over the Sahara, and a heavily statist, but nonetheless impressive, social and economic policy. Based on what I know of the likely successors, I would predict: (S)

—a period of preoccupation with internal problems. Great care will be taken to maintain law and order. Vivid memories exist of the near-civil war after independence. (U)

—some relaxation of the socialistic economic system, which has not been popular or particularly effective. (U)

—continued commitment to rapid social-economic development and a hawkish stand on oil prices. (C)

—a non-aligned foreign policy. I do not anticipate closer ties with the Soviets. We may be able to develop fairly good relations with the new leadership. (S)

—a gradual disengagement from the Sahara conflict through a negotiated solution. (C)

The risks in the period ahead are that the hard-won stability and unity of the country, which was Boumediene’s greatest achievement, may be lost. Weak leadership or a crisis of authority could open the way for a more pro-Soviet group, or for reliance on an aggressive foreign policy to foster domestic unity. This is clearly not in our interest. (S)

Assuming that real power rests in the hands of Colonels Yahyaoui (head of the Party), Ben Ahmed (Interior Minister), Ben Djedid (head of the western military district), and to some extent Bouteflika (Foreign Minister), we should be able to develop relatively good relations. But we do not at present know anyone except Bouteflika among these leaders, and he is the least influential. Nor do we have a particularly aggressive Ambassador in Algiers. (S)

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We may want to think of a series of visits simply as a way of getting to know the new leadership. For example, Newsom, Kreps, Blumenthal, Schlesinger, Frank Press, Saunders, and I could all find reasons to go over the next year or so. At a time when we are not doing very well keeping old friends in the Middle East, we should not pass up the chance to get off to a good start with the new Algerian leadership. We do not have much to offer them concretely—although our private sector does—but we nonetheless have interests in the area that will be served by better U.S.-Algerian communications.2 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1977–1978. Secret. Sent for information.
  2. Quandt wrote at the bottom of the page: “P.S. State will provide its analysis by c.o.b. Monday.” See Document 68.