Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

69. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 2, 1979

SUBJECT

• My Trip to Algiers, December 28–30, 1978² (U)

The strongest conclusion I would draw from my brief visit to Algiers is that we have an opportunity in the next several months to influence positively the course of U.S.-Algerian relations. While this is not a top-priority foreign policy issue, it is worth doing, particularly at a time when our position in the Middle East is undergoing a number of changes. (S)

Boumediene’s Funeral. The Algerians made the funeral a very dignified occasion. Our delegation was treated extremely well—greeted by three cabinet ministers on arrival and given the best accommodations. We had no significant opportunities for official contacts, but there were no signs of hostility. (S)

Bouteflika delivered a very moving eulogy, with relatively little overt political content. The honored guests at the funeral were Asad, Qadhafi, and Arafat. The PLO fielded the strongest delegation of all. The Soviets were not particularly well represented. (S)

Succession Maneuvering. I managed to pick up a few fragments of information from my Algerian friends about likely successors. No one knows for sure how things will work out, but it is widely believed that the leadership is divided into at least two major factions. (S)

One group favors a measure of liberalization and would be less militant on foreign policy issues. The outspoken head of this faction is Colonel Ben Cherif, former head of the Gendarmerie. He is not particularly bright, but he is ambitious and has a following. He could probably count on the support of Colonels Bendjedid and Belhouchet, regional military commanders; of Bouteflika; and possibly of Minister of Interior Abdelghani. There is no doubt in my mind that this is the group that we will find it easiest to work with. (S)

The other faction is headed by Colonel Yahyaoui, head of the party, former head of the military academy, and an officer trained in the Soviet Union at Frunze. The Soviets are clearly betting on him, despite his reputation as something of a Muslim puritan. He has a reputation for honesty, but is no great intellect, and may be easily manipulated by others in his faction seeking to recoup some of their former powers, such as Ministers Draia (former head of security and intelligence, now Minister of Transport), and Larbi, the ineffective head of the Agricultural ministry. (S)

I am not sure that we can do much in the next month or so to affect the succession struggle, but we should be prepared to step up contacts with the new leadership at an early date. At a minimum, we need to get to know the new cast of characters. We should consider some of the following steps:³ (S)

—Presidential message of congratulations to new President when he is chosen in February.⁴ (We might want to reextend the invitation to visit Washington later in the year.) (C)

—Visit by a science and technology team headed by Frank Press. (Our technology is avidly sought). (C)

—Visit by Secretary Bergland to discuss agricultural development. (The Algerians know we are good in the agricultural area; their socialist experiments have been a disaster; at the right moment, this might be very much welcomed). (C)

—Invite head of Algerian Air Academy to visit USAF Academy at Colorado Springs. (He has expressed an interest, is friendly to the U.S., and has hinted that Algeria would like to replace AN–12s with C–130s and to acquire some T–34 trainers). (S)

—Vance meeting with Bouteflika sometime in spring in Europe or in Algeria. (S)

—Visit by Saunders and/or myself to Algeria in the spring. (C)

—Maintain our present posture on the western Sahara and on Moroccan arms requests for the time being. (S)

Jordan/Iraq. While in Algiers, I also had a useful talk with Jordanian Royal Court Chief Sharaf.⁵ We reviewed the negotiations and I was fairly blunt in telling him that we saw little merit in the Baghdad Summit⁶ or in the Jordanian ideas about going to the Security Council or Geneva. I strongly urged that Jordan not tie its hands and that it get ready to join the next phase of negotiations. He was unconvinced, but I think he took seriously what I said. A fuller report is at Tab A.⁷ (S)

Since the Iraqi delegation was headed by the token Kurdish Vice-President and did not contain the Foreign Minister, I made no attempt to talk directly to the Iraqis. In the course of my conversation with Sharaf, who was very impressed by the new Iraqi line, I said that we were interested in normalizing relations with Iraq. He said that Saddam Hussein was planning to visit Jordan in the near future and that he would suggest that the King urge the Iraqis to reestablish diplomatic relations with us. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77–11/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: “WQ, good. Need memos to Vance, Brown with actions. ZB.”
2. Quandt was part of the official delegation, which was headed by Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, to Boumediene’s funeral. Boumediene died on December 27.
3. Inderfurth wrote in the left-hand margin: “ZB, I think you should send these recommendations to Vance under your signature. Rick.” See Document 70.
4. See Document 71.
5. In telegram 14 to Amman, January 1, the Department summarized Quandt’s meeting with Sharaf. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790001–0208)
6. The Arab League Summit was held in Baghdad November 2–5, 1978.
7. Not attached.