6. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
6378. Subj: Fahmy on Libya. Ref: Cairo 6369.2
1. When meeting with Fahmy today, I alluded to current Egyptian-Libyan strains and asked for his latest assessment of Libyan situation.
2. Fahmy claimed Egyptian burning of Libyan Relations Office in Alexandria was in direct retaliation for Libyan action against Egyptian Public Relations Office in Benghazi. He also acknowledged that Libyan diplomatic officials had been forbidden to leave Egypt until Egyptian officials in Libya were allowed to leave. Judging from latest information available to MFA, Libyans are now allowing Egyptian officials to leave. However, relations between Egypt and Libya are tense and likely to remain so. Border, while not formally closed, is tightly controlled.
2. GOE, Fahmy emphasized, has no intention of involving the United States in the Egyptian-Libyan dispute. GOE will take care of [Page 13] Qadhafi by itself. It is determined to get rid of Qadhafi and is moving to achieve this. Decision has been made to topple him “in best interests of everyone.” GOE will try to get rid of him in any way it can. Whether it is able to do so or not, Fahmy observed, remains to be seen.
3. Noting Cairo press reports that GOE is submitting a letter to the Arab League about Qadhafi, Fahmy stated that he had included in that letter a statement charging Qadhafi with plotting terrorist activities against “certain Embassies in some Arab countries” and that Egypt will at the appropriate time provide details. In this connection, Fahmy stated that he may at some time leak the Libyan threat against me.3
4. I noted that there continues to be sensitivity in Washington about disclosure and urged that he not do so without first consulting US. Fahmy responded that Egyptian security officials have now obtained the whole story from the original source. He reiterated his frequently expressed concern that USG is “soft” on Qadhafi and seems to be trying to protect him. I told him that, as he should know from talks in Washington, the USG is fully alive to the danger Qadhafi represents and is in no way seeking to protect him. As he also knew, we have been skeptical of Qadhafi’s overtures and have thus far refused Libya’s suggestions to exchange Ambassadors, release C–130’s and take various other measures which Libya wants. Our Egyptian friends must recognize, however, that we must handle our relations with Libya in a manner which we consider will best serve US interests.
5. Comment: I fear some of our recent actions vis-a-vis Libya, including the demarche I was instructed to make just before Sadat’s departure for the US,4 our unwillingness publicly to disclose the Libyan threat against me, has persuaded senior GOE officials to believe that, regardless of what we say, we are in fact seeking to protect Qadhafi. Our protestations to the contrary are greeted with skepticism and even Sadat’s talks in Washington have not allayed that concern.5 We should not be surprised at this, since Egyptians are by nature suspicious and prone to read into things implications which are in no way intended. So long as this impression persists, however, we may find the Egyptians [Page 14] somewhat more closemouthed in telling us about their plans vis-a-vis Qadhafi and Libya.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0249. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tripoli.↩
- Telegram 6369 from Cairo, April 16, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0257.↩
- See Document 86.↩
- In telegram 5161 from Cairo, March 27, Eilts reported on his meeting with Sadat, during which Sadat declared his intention to discuss with Carter Libya’s “subversive” activities in the Middle East and Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2156, N770002–0201)↩
- Sadat was in Washington April 3–6. For the memoranda for conversation of his meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 25–27.↩