51. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Egypt and Libya
Because of the recent exchange of rhetoric,2 I called a working level meeting this afternoon (DIA, OSD, CIA—State declined) to review the situation on the border and to get a better feel for the kind of contingencies we might face. The session was informative. The following are the major points of interest:
—There has been no major buildup by either Egypt or Libya over the past year. Egypt has a two division equivalent force in place in the Western Military District which could move on very little notice. The Egyptians outnumber the Libyans by three to one.
—Both sides have concentrated on improving their defenses over the past year, with Egypt putting much more money and attention into manning and maintaining a credible force than the Libyans.
—Egypt has forces in place which could take eastern Libya within a week. The major impediments to an Egyptian attack are: (1) the [Page 142] difficulties of sustaining a military operation over very long lines of communication and supply; and (2) concern that Libya will be able to find expatriate pilots to man their sophisticated aircraft and air defenses.
—The Egyptians took advantage of the Qadhafi speech to rectify an oversight.3 When Sadat lifted martial law, he should have left the military in charge of the border region since civil authority is not up to the massive job of patrolling. In fact, the military had probably continued to perform this task in the interim since May, and the Qadhafi speech provided the excuse to formalize the arrangement.
—There is no eagerness on the part of the Egyptian military to clash with a neighboring Arab state unless there is a clear and persuasive case of provocation, where Egypt is seen as the aggrieved party and where an operation is seen as defending Egyptian honor and security.
—There have been no tangible acts by either side to date which would put substance behind the heated exchange of words.
General Conclusion. Although Egypt is technically capable of launching an attack on Libya with virtually no warning, such an attack will almost certainly not be launched without a prior escalation of provocations considerably beyond the present rhetorical posturing. The movement of ground attack aircraft (Mirages/F–4s) to the Egyptian border would be an indication that they were preparing to act, but that is not strictly essential. The intelligence community is aware of our interest and will be watching closely for any signs of hostile intentions.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–8/80. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “DA has seen.”↩
- Not further identified.↩
- In telegram 13419 from Cairo, June 16, the Embassy reported on Qadhafi’s speech marking the tenth anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. bases in Libya: “While focus of address is on US-Egyptian military cooperation, with Qaddafi alleging establishment of U.S. bases on Egyptian-Libyan border, there is significant escalation of Libyan rhetoric in Qaddafi’s call for Egyptian Army to mutiny and overthrow Sadat government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800294–0091)↩