Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

50. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 22, 1979

SUBJECT

• Status of President’s Morocco Arms Sales Decision²

The President’s October 19 decision contained two conditions: first that the whole arms package is contingent on King Hassan’s agreement to negotiate, and second that OV–10 deliveries should not occur until negotiations have actually begun.

We believe that, while we must continue to press hard for a firmer, and more explicit commitment than we have received so far from Hassan, it will not be practical to withhold action on this initial package pending such a commitment.³ The basic intent of the Presidential decision would be preserved by constant review of the arms supply relationship with Morocco in the context of progress by Morocco on the negotiating front. The initial package will be of limited military value, and we should consider future sales in light of progress toward a negotiated solution. Furthermore, we will still retain the option of holding up deliveries of items in the initial package.⁴

Congressional Notification

The informal notification was sent to Congress on November 16. The formal notification might have been sent on December 6. However, technical details had not been completed by DOD and explicit funding commitments had not been received from Saudi Arabia.⁵ We, nevertheless, held open the possibility of an extraordinary breach of normal notification procedures to permit the 30 day formal notification to run substantially into the Christmas recess. If Hassan had gone to the Monrovia OAU meeting⁶—which could have been regarded as at least an opening move toward real negotiations—we could have sent the formal notification to Congress this month. His abrupt decision not to attend, however, removed the excuse we would have used with Congress to justify pushing a notification during this period. The Moroccans were aware that this was possible and probably interpret the fact that we did not move forward as a signal of how serious we are about the need to negotiate.⁷

Congressional Views

We explained the situation to Senator Stone. Stone reportedly told Ambassador Duke in a meeting on December 3 that the Moroccan failure to go to Monrovia made it seem unwise to expedite the procedure. Stone was apparently embarrassed, however, when this judgment was reported back to the Moroccan Ambassador.⁸ Senator Stone subsequently repeated his concern for prompt movement, both orally to the Moroccan Ambassador and in writing to the Secretary on December 11.⁹ Stone was aware of the technical and funding questions and told the Saudi Ambassador that it was partly the Saudis’ fault that the case had not been moved in December. In his latest conversation with us, Senator Stone said that he hoped the case would move as soon as possible, January if necessary, and that his letter of December 11 was not meant to force our hand beyond that. This seems to conflict with conversations he and his staff have had with others in the Administration, and we are unable to explain the apparent difference.¹⁰

In its letter of September 21 the SFRC indicated support for military sales to Morocco in the context of Moroccan willingness to seek a peaceful settlement.¹¹ Ambassador Duke will be talking to King Hassan and other Moroccan leaders in the weeks ahead; and we expect that as a result of these exchanges we will be able to confirm to the Committee Moroccan willingness to move to a negotiated settlement. With that confirmation, we believe the Committee would support the sales.¹²

In the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the equation is different. At the present time, Steve Solarz probably has the support of Lee Hamilton for a resolution of disapproval of the proposed sales. Another nod toward peace by the Moroccans will change that equation, and Solarz is beginning to waver because of some constituent concern that he is being overly hard on Morocco. In the final analysis, even if the House Foreign Affairs Committee should pass a resolution of disapproval, a defeat of a resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would permit us to go forward with the sale.¹³

Composition of Package

Clarification of the composition of the initial package has been complicated by problems in releasing equipment from U.S. inventory and by somewhat conflicting Saudi and Moroccan objectives, with the Saudis more concerned about when equipment will be available and the Moroccans focusing more on the type of equipment.¹⁴ The attached chronology summarizes communications on this project. DOD is now determining what items we can release from our inventories, and DOD/ISA and STATE/NEA have prepared a telegram instructing Rabat and Jidda to approach the Moroccans and Saudis for a firm decision on what they want in the package. Although desirable to have such a decision before formal notification to Congress, we could if necessary transmit the formal notification in the same form as the informal notification, i.e., providing for six OV–10s, eight F–5E/F aircraft and either 12 Cobras or 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters.¹⁵

Saudi Financing

The Saudis have told us that they will in principle finance a package of the type covered in the informal notification. Because of problems with Saudi financing of purchases for other countries, both we and DOD have considered it important to get a Saudi commitment in writing on the Moroccan package.¹⁶ First, however, we need agreement on the composition of the package. The telegram to Jidda and Rabat now being prepared (see above) will contain language for a letter of commitment from the Saudis, which would precede the actual LOAs.

This memorandum has not been cleared with DOD.¹⁷

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁸

Washington, undated

Actions Taken on Composition/Financing of Moroccan Arms Package

October 19—Presidential decision.

October 22—Instructions to Rabat and to Jidda to inform Morocco and Saudi Arabia of substance of decision.

October 30—Deputy Secretary Christopher tells the King specifically what items we are willing to provide, and later same day Moroccans request 24 OV–10s, 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters, and 20 F–5E/F aircraft.

November 10—State 294014 instructs Jidda to discuss with Saudis a package of six OV–10s, 20 F–5E/F aircraft and either 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters or 6–12 Cobras. Because of earlier Saudi interest in only items which are available immediately, emphasis is put on delivery times, which appeared long for both F–5E/F aircraft and Hughes 500 MD helicopters.

November 15—Saudis agree in principle to package as described. They do not react against the aggregate cost but do ask questions showing a concern that the package provide an appreciable and early military capability at the estimated prices.

November 16—Informal notification to Congress on six OV–10s, eight F–5E/F aircraft (replacements for F–5A/B aircraft Morocco has lost), and either 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters or 12 Cobras.

November 16 to Present—While contingency instructions have been prepared to pin down composition of package with Rabat and Jidda, the complicated process of determining whether Cobras can be released from active U.S. inventories and whether delivery times for Hughes 500’s could be accelerated had to run its course.

December 7—MUSLO (MAAG) Chief Rabat reports that Moroccan Air Force Chief says he is not clear on helicopter choices available to him and requests dispatch of a U.S. Army team to assist him in making a decision. Moroccan Air Force Chief also reiterates desire for 20 instead of only eight F–5E/F aircraft. (U.S. agrees in principle that a team could be sent.)

December 21—DOD decision on availability of Cobras and TOW sights for Hughes 500 MD is about to be made. Implementing instructions will be sent immediately to Jidda and Rabat and would include readiness to send a U.S. team to Rabat.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Secret. Sent to Brzezinski under a December 26 covering memorandum from Rentschler.
2. Rentschler underlined the subject line. In a December 18 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson expressed concern over the delay in implementing the October 19 decision regarding arms sales to Morocco. The Department was instructed to prepared a detailed status report that addressed formal congressional notification, the composition of an arms package, and Saudi financing. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81)
3. Rentschler underlined “it will not be practical to withhold action on this initial package pending such a commitment,” and wrote “that’s right!” in the right-hand margin.
4. Rentschler highlighted the last three sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin “o.k.”
5. Rentschler underlined this and the previous sentence.
6. See footnote 4, Document 45.
7. Rentschler underlined “The Moroccans” and “probably interpret the fact that we did not move forward as a signal of how serious we are about the need to negotiate,” and wrote “maybe” in the right-hand margin.
8. Rentschler underlined this and the previous sentence.
9. Not found.
10. Rentschler underlined “we are unable to explain the apparent difference,” and placed an exclamation point in the left-hand margin.
11. See Documennt 177.
12. Rentschler underlined “we expect that as a result of these exchanges we will be able to confirm to the Committee Moroccan willingness to move to a negotiated settlement. With that confirmation, we believe the Committee would support the sales.”
13. Rentschler underlined this sentence.
14. Rentschler underlined this sentence.
15. Rentschler underlined “we could if necessary transmit the formal notification in the same form as the informal notification, i.e., providing for six OV–10s, eight F–5E/F aircraft and either 12 Cobras or 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters,” and wrote below the paragraph: “State instructed to use this option if necessary.”
16. Rentschler underlined this sentence.
17. Rentschler underlined this sentence and placed an exclamation point in the right-hand margin.
18. Secret.