Office of the Historian

48. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, October 17, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Decision on our North African Policy (U)

The issue we face is whether and to what extent our present arms supply relationship with Morocco should be changed, as a means both 1) of helping King Hassan cope with an increasingly difficult military and political situation deriving from the Western Sahara conflict; and 2) of encouraging him (and other parties directly concerned) to seek a negotiated settlement. (C)

Our policy has been under review since the summer, a move precipitated by Polisario strikes within the internationally recognized frontiers of Morocco proper. Since then other key developments have occurred, including:

—Moroccan annexation of the portion of the Western Sahara relinquished by Mauritania; (U)

—Detailed consultations between State and relevant subcommittees of Congress on the direction our North Africa policy should take; (U)

—Growing evidence that Hassan may not be survivable in the absence of some military or political success within the near future; (C)

—Cy’s consultations with concerned parties at the UNGA, including the French, Saudis, and Egyptians (who forcefully reaffirmed the view that we urgently need to do more to help Morocco); (C)

—An explicit Saudi appeal for bilateral cooperation to assist Morocco militarily (they would finance Moroccan arms purchases from us). (C)

[Page 132]

Against this background Cy chaired yesterday’s PRC, which developed three sharply differentiated policy options. To ensure the fairest and most accurate presentation of these options, I asked each “sponsoring” agency to provide its own language, included at Tabs 1, 2, and 3 respectively.2 (C)

Despite differing viewpoints, there is general agreement on four major concerns: 1) we want to help Hassan; 2) we see no prospect of a military solution by either of the contending parties; 3) we wish to promote a negotiated settlement; and 4) whatever policy we formulate should be accompanied by word to Hassan that we expect him to move actively toward negotiations. (C)

The question thus becomes one of which US policy option stands the best chance of contributing to a negotiating process. In that connection, I am impressed by French, Saudi, and Egyptian assertions that unless Hassan receives help which he himself, as well as his adversaries, considers significant, there will be little incentive for Algeria and the Polisario to negotiate (our experience with the Egyptians and Israelis suggests that both sides feel confident and stable—which is not Morocco’s case at present). I also believe that continued deterioration of Morocco’s politico-military position will merely promote conditions of increasing instability in a strategic corner of Africa which will be inimical to our interests. (C)

Accordingly, I believe that option 1 is totally inadequate, and option 2 is a typical slicing of the pie in the middle, which satisfies no one and is not effective. We simply have to choose whether we are prepared to support Morocco and with it Saudi Arabia and Egypt, or whether we are prepared to watch the situation deteriorate further and perhaps even see Hassan fall from power. If we help Hassan, we are in a better position to create a stalemate, and on that basis to press him to negotiate with the Polisario and the Algerians. If Hassan does not obtain help, neither the Polisario nor the Algerians have much incentive to compromise. If the argument is that Steve Solarz won’t like it, we should be prepared to take him on, and not have our foreign policy made for us by individual congressmen. You have done him a lot of favors, but if he doesn’t help us then we can stop doing him favors. The Senate is likely to support us—for example, Birch Bayh would be prepared to go to the mat for us. Frankly, I think State is using congressional opposition to justify a recommendation that is timid and unresponsive. In brief, I think the time has come for us to fish or cut bait insofar as [Page 133] the moderate Arabs are concerned, and I strongly support Harold Brown and the JCS in option 3.

Your Decision3

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum.↩
  2. Tabs 1, 2, and 3 are not attached, but the policy options are printed in the attachment to Document 49.↩
  3. Carter checked “Option 3” and initialed beneath the decision.↩