Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, April 20, 1979, 1543Z

5416. Subject: (S) North Africa: Todman-Haynes-Parker Meeting in Madrid.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. Summary: Three Ambassadors have had very useful exchange of views both inhouse and with Spaniards. Situation in North Africa growing out of Saharan struggle poses serious risks for Spain as well as US. Saharan conflict, if it continues, risks bringing down Moroccan regime and/or sparking Algerian-Moroccan war.² Possibilities for solution depend to large degree on factors beyond our control or influence: (a) Algerian intentions vis-a-vis Morocco, (b) Moroccan internal stresses, (c) Polisario willingness to accept compromise and (d) Mauritanian intentions.

3. There was agreement among Americans that parties know each other better than we do, and that there is no need for a moderator to establish direct contact.³ There may be useful role for someone like Spanish or French, however, to help parties understand dangers more fully and rise above polemics in search for realistic, lasting peaceful solution. Spanish appear interested⁴ in such a role but say they would not do it alone. We should support them, but not try to do it ourselves. End summary.

4. Ambassadors Todman, Haynes and Parker met in Madrid April 18–20 and held series of discussions on North Africa, including luncheon with Foreign Minister Oreja Aguirre and Foreign Ministry Director General for Africa and Asia Lopez Aguirrebengoa, and tea with Javier Ruperez, UCD International Secretary. Discussions particularly useful for Parker and Haynes, and each found the other’s perspective very educational. Following are some of more pertinent conclusions and observations.

5. Algeria:⁵ Ambassador Haynes described developments internally and in our bilateral relations since demise of Boumediene.⁶ He described Sahara as outstanding international issue in minds Algerians, who regarded it as vital question. He foresaw little possibility Algerians would change their position and noted that while there may have been degrees of personal pique in Boumediene’s position, Sahara and Polisario now had dynamic of their own and could not simply be turned off. More importantly, he believes Algerians see Sahara as means to bring about downfall of monarchy in Morocco and hope this will further their goal of asserting hegemony over Maghreb.⁷

6. Morocco: Ambassador Parker described current difficulties being encountered by Hassan’s experiment in democracy. Austerity measures necessitated by expenditures of Sahara campaign, expense of massive military modernization program, drop in phosphate prices and withdrawal of Saudi subsidy, together with demographic factors, have complicated already pressing economic and social problems.⁸ He noted that unity created by Green March was showing cracks and speculated that serious military reverses in the Sahara, or abandonment of the Moroccan claim there, could lead to overthrow of Hassan and installation of military regime which would be more obstinate than Hassan on questions affecting Algeria. He asked if Algerians did not recognize dangers this would pose to their interests, and said that, given Benjedid’s record of pragmatism, he was convinced latter would change Algerian policies on Sahara. If he did not, sooner or later there would be war between Morocco and Algeria, because Hassan would fight rather than quit.⁹

7. Ambassador Haynes said we must not expect Algerians always to react logically, and we should bear in mind that Boumediene had had to restrain Benjedid, then commander of the western military region, from undertaking rash military action against Morocco in 1975 at the time of the Green March.

8. Various solutions were discussed, and it was agreed there was little give in the position of the parties.¹⁰ Ambassador Parker suggested that only solution which seemed to have remote chance of acceptance was creation of Polisario state in Tiris al-Gharbia, perhaps in federation with Mauritania.¹¹ Ambassador Haynes did not believe this would settle issue, since Polisario would continue attack against Saguia al Hamra from this base. Ambassador Parker noted that this would be much more difficult for sovereign state, than for a provisional government, and pointed out that no Polisario state could function as such in Western Sahara against armed opposition of Morocco. Ambassador Todman remarked that we should not confuse functioning with existence. Provisional government could operate, and be given recognition, even if it did not carry out all the functions of a sovereign state in its own sovereign territory. Coming into being of independent Polisario state might not be inevitable, but it was likely. He was impressed with dynamic qualities Polisario leadership. Ambassador Haynes agreed.

9. Mediation: Ambassador Haynes noted that there were already clandestine contacts between Moroccans and Algerians, who knew each other far better than we ever would.¹² He did not think there was any need for a mediator to establish contact or to convey the views of the opposing parties. If the two wanted to meet, they would do so and had no need of outsiders. Ambassador Parker agreed. Ambassador Todman, however, felt a mediator could play a useful role and might provide a framework to help the parties rise above invective and polemics.¹³ He believed the Spanish might like to play such a role. Ambassador Parker noted that his staff doubted Spanish suitability for that role, but agreed they might be wrong.

10. The question was raised with Lopez Aguirrebengoa after lunch. He said Spanish would not be able to do it alone.¹⁴ Similar answer was given by Ruperez. At same time, it seems evident Spaniards would like to try the role. Ruperez said, in fact, that Prime Minister’s trip to Algeria and FonMin’s to Nouakchott had been timed to precede Juan Carlos’ trip to Morocco first week in June in hopes they would produce something for latter to say to Hassan about problem.

11. Spanish reiterated their impression Algerians wanted to avoid war but unable to explain why they not showing more interest in peace if that was the case. Lopez Aguirrebengoa claimed Libyans provided 85[%] of financial support received by Polisario and speculated at length on possibility playing on Mauritanian or Saharan elements in Polisario as way to find compromise. Ruperez claimed Polisario position not as hard as it seemed and expressed concern at Cuban connections of Bokhari, Polisario representative in Madrid. He advised us to establish direct contact with organization, but he and others denied Spanish had any, other than those maintained by UCD and other parties. Ruperez said Polisario not seeking to bring down Hassan, whom they regarded as foil to Algerians and whose presence necessary to keep them from being dominated by latter.

12. Ambassador Todman thought that King Juan Carlos and the Spanish Government would be watching closely the degree to which we support King Hassan, who they consider to have been a staunch American friend over the years. Any Spanish perception that we fail to support him in a time of need—as they believe we failed the Shah—would be certain to affect the Spanish view of whether they can count fully on the U.S.¹⁵

13. Without in any way tilting toward Algeria, our Spanish informants displayed a considerable measure of irritation with Hassan for creating this mess by taking advantage of Spanish preoccupation with the demise of Franco in the fall of 1975. There was a strong hint in their analysis that the only key to a possible solution involved Mauritania. The Spanish felt that, notwithstanding some assessments to the contrary, the new Mauritanian Government is continuing its behind-the-scenes talks with the Polisario with the probable aim of ceding Tiris al-Gharbia to them as their independent state. In this connection, they feel that the Polisario is acting independently of Algeria.¹⁶

14. Oreja said he had just spoken with the Mauritanian Ambassador to Madrid, who is closely related through personal and family ties to the new Mauritanian leadership. The Ambassador had said that the recent change of government in no way represented a change in Mauritania’s policy of seeking peace with the Polisario. The Mauritanian Foreign Minister was to go to Libya at the end of this week and would discuss possible peace moves with Qadhafi. Ambassador Haynes speculated that he might also have in mind meeting with Polisario representatives in Libya.

15. Soviet arms: Ambassador Parker briefed Ambassador Haynes on current intelligence regarding Morocco’s possibly turning to the Soviets for arms. He noted that Moroccans already had more conventional arms than they presently able maintain, and it would not make much sense to turn to the Soviets for more of those, nor would more of them make much difference in the Sahara. He did not know whether Soviets might be able to supply aircraft which would significantly improve Moroccan capabilities. Ambassador Haynes felt that there was validity in the view expressed to him at the Quai that, given their failure to date to bring Algeria into their orbit, or to get navy facilities there, the Soviets might very well turn to a more vulnerable Morocco as a riper field for exerting its influence in the Maghreb.

16. Conclusions: It seems clear that there is little hope of a mediated solution to the Sahara problem if the parties themselves are not ready for it. If it is true that the Algerians are determined to get Hassan, and are not interested in compromise, and if it looks as though they may succeed, Hassan will eventually strike at Algeria and the Algerians will respond in kind. Similarly, if the Moroccans are not prepared to make concessions, which they have so far resisted, there seems little possibility of interesting the Polisario. All agreed, however, that we should bear in mind the Arab ability for quick turn-arounds, and that a settlement was not out of the question.

17. Meanwhile, unhealthy Moroccan internal situation is likely create pressure on Hassan for radical policies in one direction or another, i.e. either to suppress dissent or distract it with international preoccupations. While internal pressures in a sense militate for political settlement of the Sahara problem, they also impose severe limits on the nature of that settlement. The King cannot give up the territory and survive.¹⁷

18. Soviet intentions are not clear, but we believe they could very well decide to supply arms to Morocco on liberal terms (a) to embarrass U.S., (b) to impress the Algerians and (c) to gain a strategic foothold in the region. While this would not mean the death of our republic, it could have serious implications for our military relationship with Morocco and for our broader national security interests in the Mediterranean.

19. Policy: For the time being we should maintain our present posture and watch the players go through their respective acts until such time as we see a well-defined limited-risk role for the USG to play that would lead them all to a negotiated settlement. That time has not yet come.

20. After considerable discussion, the three Ambassadors agreed that there was an obvious lack of clear policy for North Africa. We feel we are drifting. Some hard decisions must be taken and if they are not taken the consequences for our national interest will be serious. We should decide once and for all what we are going to do about arms for Morocco. We should decide whether we believe the collapse of the Moroccan position in the Sahara is inevitable. If so we should start making arrangements to establish relations with those who are coming after. Alternatively, if we believe the collapse is avoidable, we should decide how we can support more fully the Moroccan position. In the same vein we should decide how important Algerian oil and natural gas are to us in the face of a worsening American energy crisis and what effect more support for a Moroccan position may have on our access to them. Likewise we should make an urgent determination of whether any one of the countries in North Africa is likely to occupy a position of dominance in the regeion for the foreseeable future and how we protect our interests in that event.

Todman

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Moscow, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Tripolic, Tunis, USUN, USDOCSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.
2. An unknown hand underlined and highlighted this sentence.
3. An unknown hand underlined “no need for a moderator to establish direct contact.”
4. An unknown hand underlined “Spanish appear interested,” and highlighted this sentence.
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6. Boumediene died on December 27, 1978. See Document 67.
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8. An unknown hand underlined “Austerity measures necessitated by expenditures of Sahara campaign,” and highlighted this sentence.
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10. An unknown hand underlined “little give in the position of the parties.”
11. An unknown hand underlined “Parker” and “only solution which seemed to have remote chance of acceptance was creation of Polisario state in Tiris al-Gharbia, perhaps in federation with Mauritania.”
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16. An unknown hand underlined “Spanish,” placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to the second sentence, and underlined “the new Mauritanian Government is continuing its behind-the-scenes talks with the Polisario with the probable aim of ceding Tiris al-Gharbia to them as their independent state” and “Polisario is acting independently of Algeria.”
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