36. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
24272. Exdis distribute as Nodis. Subject: USG Attitude re Possible Egyptian Move Against Libya. Ref: State 280929.2
1. I will speak to Sadat soonest to raise Libyan matter with him. Next few days are not likely be propitious, however, since Boutros Ghali will be here urging what is likely to be a reluctant Sadat to agree to accept our treaty language on various disputed points. Injecting Libyan issue while this internal debate is going on will only make Boutros’ job here more difficult.
2. Sadat will unquestionably resent our intercession on Libyan matter, especially if sole purpose of my call is to hector him on this point. It might ease the blow a bit if I had some other important issue to discuss with him on which my request for a meeting could be pegged. Libyan matter could then be tacked on to general discussion. If Dept has any more positive elements that it wants raised with Sadat in near future, please let me know in next few days. If not, I will make the demarche solely in terms of the Libyan affair.
3. I note UnderSec Newsom raised subject with Shawkat. There is nothing wrong with having raised it with Shawkat, but doing so is lecturing to the converted. Shawkat has long told us that he is opposed to Libyan venture and his advice to his immediate superiors has been on the impractical nature of such a caper in terms of logistic and other problems. But Shawkat has no direct input to Sadat.
4. Apart from Sadat, the man who will have the most input into question of whether such an Egyptian military operation should take place is now in Washington. I refer to MinDefense LTG Kamal Hassan Ali. It is Hassan Ali who in his previous position of Director of General Intelligence regularly sent Sadat, via Mubarak, reports suggesting an operation into Libya would be no problem. Gamasy’s opposition to such a move, supported by Shawkat’s estimates, was one reason for the former MinWar’s dismissal. It might be assumed that Shawkat will report Newsom’s demarche to Kamal Hassan Ali, but we should not [Page 87] rely on this. Shawkat and Hassan Ali have for past several years been competitors in the intelligence purveying business and Shawkat now finds himself in the uncertain position of being subordinate to the man whose estimates he consistently denigrated. In the circumstances, Shawkat is not likely to beard Hassan Ali too strongly. Since Hassan Ali is in Washington, it would seem to me that the simplest thing to do would be for the Secretary or Secretary Brown to have a heart-to-heart talk with Hassan Ali on the subject. Doing so would also facilitate any demarche that I make here, since Sadat will never understand why I am raising the issue with him when no one in Washington has raised it with his Minister of Defense and principal planner.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2758. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Tripoli. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.↩
- Telegram 280929 to Cairo, November 4, instructed Eilts to meet with Sadat to discuss Libya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
- Telegram 281969 to Cairo, November 4, instructed Eilts to defer the meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2392)↩