Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
Washington, undated
Discussion Paper for PRC
Meeting
Tuesday, March 27, 3:00 p.m.
Morocco’s Value to the U.S.
Morocco is of value to us because of its strategic location, its key
role as a backer of President Sadat within the Arab camp, and its support for
African moderates.
Location: Morocco’s geographic position is of
strategic importance because Morocco is a gateway to Africa and the
Mediterranean for ships and aircraft coming from North America. We
want continued access to Morocco’s ports and airfields for U.S.
ships, including nuclear-powered vessels, and our military aircraft.
One of VOA’s two African
transmitters is located outside Tangier. The King has agreed in
principle but is delaying further action on construction of an Air
Force deep space surveillance station. The station must be placed in
Morocco, Spain or Portugal to complete a worldwide network.
Middle East:
Hassan continues to back
Sadat even though there
is domestic opposition to this policy and in spite of the costs in
terms of loss of radical Arab support for Morocco’s position in the
western Sahara. Hassan
supports Sadat because he
believes this is the best way to stem Soviet inroads in Africa and
the Middle East. This support may be crucial as we and Sadat seek to dampen adverse Arab
reaction to the Egypt/Israel agreement.
[Page 89]
Africa: Moroccan troops were vital in
reestablishing Zairian government control in Shaba in 1977 and 1978.
Morocco provides logistical support for both its troops and for the
other African contingents. The King has expressed willingness to
deploy his troops elsewhere in Africa to protect western
interests.
Morocco in Difficulty
Serious economic problems have begun to undermine the national
consensus which Hassan
created by the Green March6 and his vigorous Saharan policies.
Paradoxically Moroccans remain united in support of their
government’s claim to sovereignty in the Sahara, but they blame the
Sahara conflict for the economic problems they are encountering. The
Government also is criticized by a populace which ignores Algeria’s
superiority in military equipment for not striking at Polisario
bases in Tindouf after the February attack on Tan Tan (50 miles
within Morocco’s 1975 borders).7 Political opponents who benefited from
liberalization measures the King implemented in the past three years
have begun to criticize the monarch. Strikes and student protests
are becoming more frequent.
Since the Tan Tan attack the Government has been forced to stop
pretending that it has the military situation in the Sahara under
control. Actually there has been no recent sharp deterioration in
the situation on the ground. But the Polisario has fought the
Moroccans to a stalemate. The guerrillas have established staging
bases within the Sahara, and Moroccan control does not extend beyond
urban centers. A critical lack of spare parts and hesitant
leadership preclude vigorous counterinsurgency measures. A
pro-Moroccan coup in Mauritania would make it more difficult for the
Polisario to continue to use staging bases in the Mauritanian Sahara
to mount attacks against Moroccan forces to the north. But the
breakdown of the ceasefire between Mauritania and the Polisario
would force the Moroccans to engage again in the active defense of
Mauritania. Poor military morale reflects war weariness and
frustration at not being able to strike at the Polisario’s
sanctuaries in Algeria. Although Hassan has taken elaborate precautions to protect
himself against a military coup, the possibility of one cannot be
excluded.
[Page 90]
Unless the Saudis resume payment of the $500 million annual subsidy
provided Morocco during the first two years of the Sahara conflict,
the King will have to continue his unpopular austerity measures in
the economic sphere and he will be unable to purchase new weapons
for his army. It probably will be at least two years before
retrenchment restores Morocco’s economic health.
The King feels beleaguered. With characteristic political skill he
has turned the Tan Tan attack to his political advantage, forming a
National Defense Committee and nominating to it the leader of the
principal opposition group. But he recognizes this tactic offers
only partial and momentary protection from the rising groundswell of
domestic discontent. The King has a propensity for the dramatic
which could lead him to decisions as dangerous as an attack on
Tindouf, which could make his position ever more insecure.
The King feels let down by several of his more important foreign
friends. Termination of the Saudi subsidy was a heavy blow. Payment
problems have interrupted the flow of French weapons and spare
parts. Hassan feels the U.S.
has been particularly unhelpful. From his perspective our public
rejection of his claims to sovereignty in the Sahara (which occurred
in response to Congressional inquiries) undermined his diplomatic
position. Moroccans feel that our refusal to sell them new weapons
to use in the Sahara, while Soviet arms deliveries to the Algerians
continue without interruption, has put them at an unfair
disadvantage in Morocco’s struggle with the Polisario. As we look to
Hassan for support on
our Middle East policy, we find him full of resentment for our
apparent insensitivity to his needs.
Stated below are several options which the U.S. could implement to
take some of the current strain out of our relations with
Morocco.
A. Sell the Moroccans
Weapons to Defend the Sahara
The U.S. recognizes that Morocco shares responsibility for
administrative control of the Sahara with Mauritania by virtue of
the Madrid Accords. The U.S. does not recognize the claims of
Morocco and Mauritania to sovereignty in the Sahara, and neither
does any other nation. Apart from the British, who are not
significant arms suppliers, the U.S. is Morocco’s only arms supplier
to insist that the weapons it furnishes not be used to defend the
Sahara. This U.S. position has been based on the provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act which authorize U.S. sales only for
legitimate self-defense and internal security. The U.S.-Moroccan
Military Assistance Agreement of 1960, which implements the Act,
limits uses of American-furnished weapons to the defense and
internal security of the Kingdom of Morocco.
We have given our permission for the Moroccans to use U.S. weapons
elsewhere, e.g., collective defense measures in Shaba, thus effec
[Page 91]
tively amending the
bilateral. However, we have not been willing to amend the bilateral
to authorize use of American weapons for the defense of the Sahara
because Morocco is not only defending the territory but seeking to
consolidate its claim to sovereignty in the territory.8 An interpretation of the relevant U.S.
legislation that would allow use of American weapons to defend the
Sahara would be subject to Congressional challenge. Some Members of
Congress would oppose Moroccan use of American weapons to defend the
Sahara on the grounds that (1) it would be inconsistent with U.S.
support for Saharan self-determination; (2) that it would violate
U.S. law; (3) it would involve the U.S. in an African conflict; and
(4) it would damage U.S. relations with Algeria.9
The Moroccans probably are most interested in the OV–10 aircraft, six
of which might be available on short notice. They also have said
they want to purchase anti-tank helicopters. Supplying U.S. military
equipment to Morocco would not be likely to end the military
stalemate in the Sahara. Its principal benefit would be improved
U.S.-Moroccan relations at this time. There is an outside chance
that such a demonstration of U.S. support for Morocco might persuade
the Algerians to negotiate a settlement.
B. Further
Demarches
The U.S. has consistently counseled the Moroccans and Algerians to
seek a negotiated settlement. We called the Algerians’ attention to
the conciliatory tone of Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta’s February 1 letter
suggesting bilateral negotiation.10 We also told the Algerians we thought
Polisario attacks on Moroccan cities, e.g., Tan Tan, did not improve
peace prospects. The Algerians’ discouraging response to Boucetta has been cited by
Hassan as the reason he
must search for other means, presumably military, to end the
struggle in the Sahara.
We could repeat our demarches, perhaps escalating them to the
Algerians by having the Secretary call in the Algerian Ambassador to
urge reconsideration of Boucetta’s suggestion for negotiation. We could urge
Hassan to be more
patient and to tell him of our further approach
[Page 92]
to the Algerians. There is no reason not
to try such demarches. But there is little reason to believe they
would be effective, and Hassan would regard them as an inadequate U.S.
response to his problems.
C. Economic Aid to
Support a Settlement
More concrete U.S. support for a peaceful solution would be an
American offer to provide economic assistance as part of a
settlement formula. U.S. aid either could be extended to a Polisario
state in the Mauritanian Sahara, or perhaps to a supranational
entity created to provide assistance on a regional basis to all
parties involved in the conflict. Congressional attitudes probably
would be sympathetic but it is unlikely that a pledge of U.S. aid in
itself would give much impetus to a peace process. Any such U.S.
offer would have to be coordinated closely with the Moroccans to
avoid misunderstanding.
D. U.S. Mediation
At one time or another, both Morocco and Algeria have asked us to
mediate the Sahara dispute. However, what each state actually had in
mind was U.S. pressure on its opponent, and neither appeared ready
to make the concessions required for a compromise. We declined to
mediate because the basis for agreement seemed absent, and because
we thought it preferable to avoid superpower involvement. We also
believed various Arab and African governments, as well as the French
and the Spanish, were better qualified to serve as mediators.
We have given consistent support to the mediation efforts of others.
Most recently, we encouraged President Nimeri to exercise the
mandate given him by the OAU, and
we voted for a UNGA resolution last fall supporting his efforts. We
have told both the French and the Spanish we would collaborate
diplomatically in any peace process they might be able to initiate.
(The French have not been interested in our cooperation in their
abortive efforts, and the Spanish never had been able to get an
initiative underway.)
Mauritania’s new leaders obviously want an end to the war. They and
the Polisario have participated in a de facto
ceasefire since July 1978. However, the Mauritanians so far have
been unwilling to negotiate a separate peace with the Polisario,
realizing this would invite retaliation by their Moroccan allies.
Boucetta’s February 1
letter to his Algerian counterpart suggested rescheduling of the
summit meeting which Hassan
and Boumediene were to have
held at Brussels in September 1978 but had to be cancelled due to
Boumediene’s illness.
Bouteflika replied that
there could be no discussion of a solution to the Sahara conflict
without the Polisario, knowing the Moroccans would not agree to sit
down with a movement they insist is an Algerian creation.
Hassan cannot abandon
Morocco’s portion of the Sahara without grave risk to his throne.
The Algerians say they will settle for any
[Page 93]
arrangement satisfactory to the Polisario. The
latter, whose degree of independence from the Algerians is not
clear, insist that they must have the entire western Sahara. Clearly
the chances for successful mediation are slim. Any offer of
mediation would give rise immediately to the question of the
Polisario’s participation in the mediation process. Pressure on the
Moroccans to deal with the Polisario would be strongly resented in
Rabat.
Algerian Reaction
The Algerians would react negatively only to the option of permitting
the Moroccans to use U.S. military equipment to defend the Sahara.
No matter how qualified this permission, the Algerians would
criticize our “abandonment of neutrality” and publicly claim that
our action was motivated by our desire to guarantee Hassan’s support for our Mideast
peace process efforts. If we gave Hassan unqualified permission to acquire American
arms, the Algerians probably would discriminate against U.S. firms
in the award of new construction and import contracts. The injury to
our economic and commercial interests might be less if we permitted
the Moroccans to acquire only new systems of a primarily defensive
or transport nature, e.g., sensors or additional C–130s. Any change
in U.S. policy on arms would put strain on our political relations
with Algeria, which though never intimate, have been improving in
recent months. A decision of this nature also could have an
unwelcome influence on the foreign policy orientation of Algeria’s
new government.
