Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

32. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 5, 1978

SUBJECT

• PRM/NSC–34: North Africa

At Tab A is the inter-agency study on North Africa that we requested. It focuses on Morocco, Algeria, the Sahara conflict and our policy choices regarding arms for Morocco, recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara, and the prospects for encouraging political settlement of the Sahara conflict. Present U.S. policy is well-summarized on pages 15 and 16 of the attached study.² The options are a bit artificial, and I recommend below a somewhat different course of action combining elements of both. (C)

Why Consider Changes in Policy?

It can be argued that our present low profile in North Africa is appropriate in light of our limited influence and limited interests. There is no impending crisis in either US-Moroccan or US-Algerian relations, although there are some problems in each case. Nor is the Sahara conflict likely to lead to another Horn of Africa situation. (C)

The argument for seriously considering some adjustments in our policy is based on the belief that preventive diplomacy now may keep minor problems from becoming significantly larger. There are signs of impending difficulty if we do not revise some of our policies, as well as hints of opportunities to encourage a peaceful settlement of the Sahara dispute. (U)

The Key Choices

Virtually everyone agrees that we should at some point respond positively to the Moroccan request for 24 Cobra helicopters worth approximately $100 million.³ The questions revolve around timing, conditions and context:

—King Hassan is looking for visible evidence that we value our relationship with Morocco. This is a long-standing concern of his, but it is presently intensified because of Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa.

—While King Hassan states that he does not need the Cobras in the Sahara, we must anticipate that they will be used there if the armed conflict persists.⁴

—Our reading of the US-Moroccan 1960 Defense Agreement has precluded use of US-supplied arms in the Sahara.⁵ There is also some Congressional opposition (Clark, Fraser, Diggs) to selling arms to Morocco which would be used in the Sahara.⁶

—We have indicated a willingness to allow the Moroccans to use US-supplied arms in Mauritania, provided the Mauritanians make such a request. (This would follow the French pattern of helping Morocco and Mauritania, but not using French aircraft in the Sahara itself.)

—Hassan has been very stubborn on the Sahara issue, as has Boumediene. There are, however, some faint indications that a dialogue may have begun. We might try to use the supply of Cobras in order to encourage a political settlement of the Sahara dispute. There is a risk, however, that Hassan will not show more flexibility and that Boumediene will also react negatively, thereby complicating the situation.

—The Algerians may react to the sale of Cobras to Morocco by stepping up their support of Polisario and buying more arms from the Soviets. (S)

A Strategy

We are primarily confronted with decisions which have symbolic political importance, but which are not driven by military necessity. The Saharan situation is essentially a military stalemate. (S)

If we move abruptly and decisively toward a more pro-Moroccan stance, this will be seen as consistent with a firm anti-Soviet stance in Africa. It will be appreciated, but will raise expectations and requests for assistance, on the part of other pro-Western Africans. If we move more cautiously, we risk disappointing King Hassan, but may succeed in maintaining some useful ties to the Algerians⁷ which will help to reduce Algerian proclivities for trouble-making. Our professed interest in a North-South dialogue and in dealing constructively with regimes of various persuasions would also be enhanced by a somewhat more cautious approach. (S)

Our long-term interests in North Africa are best protected if we can remain on relatively good terms with both Morocco and Algeria. Only the Sahara conflict, and policy choices related to it, calls into question the kind of balanced posture that has served us well in the past ten years. We should not fall into the simplistic trap of labeling Algeria a “radical” Arab state and thereby placing it in the same category as Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen. Algeria is closer to Syria, in the sense that we have some common interests, the makings of a modest political dialogue, as well as serious disagreements on numerous issues. Boumediene, like Assad, is capable of being quite pragmatic and rational and is wary of excessive Soviet influence in his country. (S)

My conclusion is that we should try to encourage a political settlement of the Sahara conflict through some quiet diplomacy, including frank talks with both Hassan and Boumediene. Meanwhile, we should begin the process of responding positively to Hassan’s request for the Cobras by consulting with Congress. The Cobras have a normal delivery lead-time of about two years. We do not have to come to grips with where the helicopters will be used until nearer the delivery date. This gives us a little bit of leverage with both sides. With the Moroccans, we could say that we cannot permit use of US arms in the Sahara unless Morocco can go some distance in meeting the UN provision for consultations with the population of the Sahara to determine their political preferences.⁸ We will, however, continue normal military supplies for use in Morocco and Mauritania. At the same time, the Algerians might conclude from our decision on the Cobras that a military approach to the Sahara problem is not going to pay off and they might show greater interest in negotiations. Our basic interest is to avoid a full-scale Moroccan-Algerian confrontation, which would draw the Soviets more deeply into Algeria. We have legitimate concerns on both sides of this dispute, and thus we have reason to try to promote a settlement, not to exacerbate existing tensions. (S)

Recommended Course of Action

The PRC should be encouraged to recommend the following steps:

—Plan to proceed with the sale of 24 Cobras to Morocco. Congressional leaders would be consulted, especially potential opponents such as Clark and Fraser.⁹

—Establish basic policy guidance that we should strengthen relations with Morocco, but with due attention to the effect on US-Algerian relations. We have an interest in keeping the Soviets from becoming more deeply involved in Algeria.

—Leave in abeyance for the moment the question of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara. Take position that this is an issue for the OAU and UN to resolve. For the moment, allow use of US-supplied arms in Morocco and Mauritania, but not in the Sahara.

—Authorize Newsom mission to Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, and Paris, either in July or September, for political discussions.¹⁰ Quietly seek to determine interest in political settlement in Sahara. (Newsom is well-known in North Africa and is highly regarded).

—Prior to Newsom’s departure, we should have tentative dates to suggest for Hassan,¹¹ Boumediene and Nouira visits to Washington in late 1978 or early 1979. (S)

Apart from an early decision on Cobras, we do not have to proceed rapidly in our North Africa policy. What is required is a general sense of purpose to guide the actions of the bureaucracy as it makes its day-to-day recommendations. A simplistic pro-Morocco, anti-Algeria framework is inadequate. We need a greater appreciation for nuance. This should be reflected in the PRC discussion. It can then be used to direct our actions over the next several months. Your contribution can be to provide the philosophical underpinnings for a balanced policy in North Africa which will protect our interests both in Morocco and Algeria. Vance will be more inclined to focus on specific decisions such as the stationing of F–5s in Mauritania and the sale of Cobras to Morocco. These are important decisions, which you can support, but they need to be put in a somewhat broader context of our Africa, Middle East, and US-Soviet strategies. (S)

Attachment

Interagency Paper¹²

Washington, undated

Update to PRM–34 Background Paper

The second Shaba crisis has focused attention on Morocco’s willingness to respond militarily to threats to at least one African moderate regime. King Hassan has sent 1,000 combat-experienced soldiers to Zaire where they will form the core of the Africa peace-keeping force.

Morocco’s delight that the U.S. is responding more positively to the second Shaba incursion is tempered by disappointment that the U.S. still is unwilling to sell Morocco weapons for use in the Sahara and Mauritania against the Polisario. While Saudi financing may eliminate any need for U.S. replacements, the situation may become even more awkward if we were to replace equipment taken by Moroccan units to Shaba but insisted that such equipment could not be used in the Sahara and Mauritania.

Recent efforts to break the Moroccan/American deadlock on use of F–5 aircraft in the western Sahara and Mauritania have not been successful.¹³ In a demarche to the Moroccan Ambassador, Under Secretary Newsom said the Administration will have to report to the Congress a violation of our bilateral military assistance agreement and wants to be able to state that the F–5s are being withdrawn.¹⁴ King Hassan replied through the Ambassador that he considers his use of the F–5s in the Sahara and Mauritania within the scope of the bilateral agreement, as the purpose of their employment in these areas is to defend the Kingdom of Morocco.¹⁵ We have told the French we might authorize use of the F–5s to defend Mauritania (excluding that portion of the Sahara annexed by Nouakchott),¹⁶ provided we have official requests from the Moroccans and Mauritanians. The French have said they can arrange for the Mauritanian request whenever we wish.

The nature of the Moroccan arms request changed with the King’s decision that he is not interested for the moment in the OV–10 aircraft but would like only Cobra helicopters.¹⁷ Secretary Vance, to whom the King’s preference was communicated by Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta May 25, promised a thorough examination and prompt response.¹⁸ The Moroccans are keenly aware that the Middle East arms package has survived Congressional challenge and now expect Administration action on their arms requests.

In a newspaper interview King Hassan showed some flexibility on the status of the western Sahara, when he allegedly said he could foresee some limited United Nations role.¹⁹ We currently are seeking clarification of his thinking on this important point. In a May 25 conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Saunders, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika would not say if there have been direct Algerian/Moroccan negotiations but hinted that a compromise involving something less than self-determination might be possible.²⁰ While maintaining that Algeria would be open to American mediation, he did not make any such request or show great interest in the possibility. He did express appreciation for U.S. neutrality in the conflict, while seeking half-heartedly U.S. restraint on French military intervention.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 69, PRC 062, 6/13/78, North Africa. Secret. Sent for information.
2. Attached; printed as Document 31. An update to the paper is also attached and printed below.
3. Inderfurth highlighted this sentence in the left-hand margin.
4. Inderfurth wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Why not seek assurances on their use?”
5. See footnote 3, Document 223.
6. See Documents 153, 219, and 220.
7. Inderfurth highlighted this part of the sentence in the left-hand margin.
8. See footnote 5, Document 31.
9. Inderfurth underlined “Clark and Fraser.”
10. Inderfurth circled this sentence. Newsom visited Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat. See Documents 101, 102, and 203.
11. Inderfurth underlined “Hassan” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “most important. Rick.”
12. Secret.
13. An unknown hand underlined “Moroccan/American deadlock on use of F–5 aircraft in the western Sahara and Mauritania have not been successful.”
14. In telegram 117714 to Rabat, May 9, the Department reported on the May 3 meeting between Newsom and Bengelloun. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196–0742)
15. An unknown hand underlined “King Hassan replied through the Ambassador that he considers his use of the F–5s in the Sahara and Mauritania within the scope of the bilateral agreement.” In telegram 126109 to Rabat, May 18, the Department reported on Bengelloun’s May 16 meeting with Veliotes in which the Ambassador presented Hassan’s views. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0972)
16. An unknown hand underlined “We have told the French we might authorize use of the F–5s to defend Mauritania (excluding that portion of the Sahara annexed by Nouakchott).”
17. See Document 156. Inderfurth underlined this sentence.
18. An unknown hand underlined “prompt response.” Telegram 136040 to Rabat, May 29, reported on Vance’s meeting in New York with Boucetta. The two were attending the UN Special Session on Disarmament. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–0376)
19. An unknown hand underlined “King Hassan” and “he could foresee some limited United Nations role.”
20. An unknown hand underlined “Bouteflika” and “hinted that a compromise involving something less than self-determination might be possible.” In telegram 135959 to Algiers, May 27, the Department reported on Saunders’s May 25 meeting with Bouteflika. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–0036)