26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad1
217502. Subject: Chadian Ambassador’s Meeting With Assistant Secretary Moose, September 9. Refs: (A) State 212134 (B) State 212135 (Notal)2 (C) State 166506 (Notal).3
1. Summary: Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chadian Ambassador to inform him of Presidential Determination making Chad eligible for FMS program (ref A). Chadian Ambassador forcibly stated his disappointment that he could not see President Carter, asked when U.S. assistance would arrive, and concluded by saying he thought Chadian Vice President had been offered trucks and fuel on grant basis. End summary.
2. Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chadian Ambassador Pierre Toura Gaba on September 9. AF/W Director and Chadian Desk Officer attended. Purpose of meeting was to present original of letter from President Carter to President Malloum (ref B).
3. Mr. Moose opened meeting by saying that the President was very occupied with the Panama Canal Treaty and regretted that he could not personally meet the Ambassador as the Ambassador had requested. Noting that Chad, and in a limited sense Egypt, were the only countries made eligible for FMS by the Carter administration, Moose emphasized that this favorable determination was a significant step for the United States. While the Carter administration placed great emphasis on restraining military assistance programs, he said this decision reflected U.S. support for the territorial integrity of African states within their colonial boundaries—a policy which has been reaffirmed in a number of instances, and was in the spirit of earlier assurances to Chadian Vice President Djime. Moose said efforts were being made to assure congressional support for the decision.
4. Moose noted that under the FMS program we could (A) allow the sale of U.S. military goods and services, and (B) permit the transfer [Page 50] of US-origin goods from other countries. Moose noted that both the U.S. and Chad had made preliminary soundings in friendly countries about possible third country transfers. He said Chad should now contact these capitals with specific requests for equipment transfers or financing to purchase equipment under FMS. (Later in the conversation, Moose pointed out that, as a matter of policy, the U.S. would not approve of sales or transfer of attack aircraft, helicopters or light tanks.)
5. Ambassador Toura Gaba thanked Mr. Moose for receiving him, but quickly expressed his disappointment that a meeting with President Carter could not be arranged. The Ambassador admitted that he still had a good deal to learn about U.S. bureaucracy, but noted that he had been waiting several weeks to pass on a message to President Carter from President Malloum. He said that this message was short: Chad needed to know when it could expect the U.S. assistance it had been promised.
6. The Ambassador said that Libya, supported by “other great powers,” was massing troops and military materiel in the area, and that time was against Chad. He alluded to Chad as a dying patient and said that a good doctor would not expect the proper medicine to be located elsewhere. He noted that FonMin Kamougue had visited African capitals to explain the situation and request aid. Yet, for the time being, he said Chad was in urgent need of trucks and gasoline and needed some idea when it could expect them from the United States.
7. Moose said he sympathized with the Ambassador’s difficulty in securing an appointment with President Carter. However, he was meeting with the Ambassador to make the President’s decision, and our intentions, clear to Chad at the earliest possible date. AF/W Director pointed out that the recent Presidential Determination is in the spirit of Vice President’s commitment to aid Chad. Referring to Toura Gaba’s use of the word “grant”, he emphasized that grant military assistance was reserved for a small group of traditional U.S. allies. He recommended that Chad begin to search for sources of financing for the purchase of U.S. equipment, said we were prepared to support Chad, and would agree to reasonable requests for sales and approvals of transfers.
8. Ambassador Toura Gaba reiterated his disappointment with the limited nature of our assistance. He said that Chad had been expecting at least some grant assistance on trucks and gasoline on the basis of Vice President Djime’s meeting with Vice President Mondale last July. He said: quote: Djime had insisted on seeing the President (Carter), but the President had no time. But he (Djime) was promised—and that promise was repeated by Vice President Mondale—that the trucks and gasoline would be forthcoming. Unquote. The Ambassador said Djime and the Chadian Government had since been expecting the trucks and gasoline ASAP.
[Page 51]9. Moose explained that if Chad has expected trucks and gasoline on a grant basis, there had been a serious misunderstanding. Such grant assistance, he said, was not possible. Moose reminded the Ambassador that a special briefing had been arranged for Djime and the Ambassador last July with PM Deputy Director (Ericson) to avoid any possible misunderstanding of the law. He regretted that there appears to have been a major misunderstanding and repeated that Chad could not rpt not expect any assistance on a grant basis. At the same time, the U.S. would try to assist Chad as much as possible in arranging expeditious purchases or transfers of US-origin military equipment.
10. At this point the Ambassador arose and somewhat regretfully noted that further discussion would achieve little more at this time. He thanked Moose for the extensive talk.
11. Comment: In his meeting (ref C) with Djime July 15, Vice President Mondale made no specific promises (e.g., trucks or gasoline) in reply to Chadian request for military assistance. Department believes that Ambassador Toura Gaba was mistaken in his memory of the meeting. Ambassador Bradford may wish to make certain this misunderstanding is not widespread in Chadian circles, and assure GOC understands that such direct assistance is not possible. End comment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770329–0077. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Eaton; cleared in AF/I; approved by Moose.↩
- In telegram 212134 to multiple posts, September 3, the Department informed posts that Carter signed the Determination making Chad eligible for foreign military sales. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320–0963) See Document 24. Telegram 212135 to Ndjamena, September 3, transmitted the text of Carter’s letter to Malloum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323–1094) See Document 25. ↩
- See footnote 2, Document 18.↩