18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Urgent Military Assistance to Chad
Chadian Vice President Djime is in Washington on very short notice to make a personal request for military assistance. He saw the Secretary of State today at 3:00 p.m., who conveyed our sympathy and promised to carefully consider his request. No commitment was made. He is scheduled to see Vice President Mondale tomorrow, July 15, at 2:00 p.m.
Chad is fighting two insurgencies which are supported by Libya, who most probably hopes to establish permanent control over northern Chad. Libya has occupied a disputed strip in northwest Chad since 1973. Thanks to Libyan support, the situation in northern Chad has now seriously deteriorated.
Chad has requested combat and transport aircraft, with crews, equipment to outfit 1500 reserve infantrymen, combat rations and fuel. They have been informed that the USG will not provide personnel.
France is providing technical assistance and spare parts; Egypt and the Sudan have sent military missions to study Chad’s needs; Morocco has expressed sympathy but made no commitments. President Sadat sees the situation as Libyan/Soviet expansionism which may well be aimed at him and the Sudan. He requested urgently that you receive Djime. We have informed him that the Vice President will do so.
The rebellion does not yet directly affect the survival of the government; if insurgent successes continue unchecked it will soon do so.
I believe it is in our interest to provide at least some military assistance to Chad in this situation. State has divided on the issue and effectively expressed no opinion.
Arguments against doing so include the fact that Chad’s northern territory is probably already lost, other governments are assisting, and it would perhaps be undesirable to inaugurate a new US military supply commitment.
But the stronger arguments, in my opinion, lie on the side of giving minor assistance. Chad has been a friend of the USG; it has a good human rights record; there is here a direct threat to its territorial integ [Page 36] rity; our assistance would be consistent with our emerging policy of aiding moderate African states. Further, to give limited military aid would preserve some USG influence and credibility on an evolving range of problems in the Western Sahara, and preserve our influence in the Chadian government. It would help contain Libyan expansionism in the area and in that light be viewed favorably by Egypt and probably Morocco and the Sudan. As in Zaire, indigenous rebels backed by a neighboring country have attempted to acquire effective control over territory. This situation is more blatant in that Libya not only openly supports the rebels but has militarily occupied Chadian territory. Other than the Soviet Union being Libya’s largest arms supplier, we have no evidence of Soviet involvement in this situation.
It would enhance the above interests if Vice President Mondale could send Djime back to Chad with at least a conditional commitment by the USG conveyed in his meeting tomorrow.2
If you agree it is desirable to give limited military assistance to Chad, the following are possible:3
1. We could immediately note to the Chadians our readiness to license the export of equipment purchased from commercial sources. However, Chad almost certainly cannot afford such equipment at commercial prices, and therefore this action would probably be regarded by them as an empty gesture.
2. We could provide them with military equipment of US origin by a third country transfer, perhaps from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or possibly Morocco. This requires a determination by the Secretary of State that it will strengthen the United States and promote world peace, and 30 days prior notification to Congress. It is a public determination. Egypt and Senator Javits have expressed interest in such an arrangement.
3. Chad could be made eligible for Foreign Military Sales. This is perhaps the quickest way to provide assistance. You must publicly determine that such sales would contribute to the national security of the United States. For sales exceeding $7 million, Congress must be consulted 30 days in advance. State is inclined against making Chad eligible, arguing that this would be the first determination of FMS eligibility of the present Administration and would strain the credibility of our arms [Page 37] transfer policy. In favor of such a determination is the fact that it would enable us to transfer both lethal and nonlethal equipment on credit terms. Also, over seventy countries, including Mauritania, are now on the FMS list. One difference between the Zaire and the Chadian situations is that we already had a substantial FMS program underway in Zaire and were able to reprogram available funds to meet the Zairian request.
4. We could expand existing economic aid to Chad if it could be made relevant.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Pres approved in discussion.”↩
- In telegram 166506 to Ndjamena, July 16, the Department summarized Mondale’s July 15 meeting with Djime. “Vice President Mondale said matter had been discussed at President’s weekly breakfast meeting this morning. President had stated we believed in the territorial integrity of Chad and of every other nation, and we will help in restoring Chad’s. Vice President Mondale said we were studying ways to proceed toward this end and hoped to give Chadians a fuller response soon through Ambassador Bradford.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770254–0187) See Document 19.↩
- There is no indication or approval or disapproval of any of the options, but see footnote 1 above.↩