27. Telegram From the Embassy in Chad to the Department of State and Other Recipients1
3176. Subject: Military Assistance to Chad. Ref: Ndjamena 3169.2
1. Summary: During our conversation at the time of the delivery of the letter to President Carter (see reftel), President Malloum made the following points:
A) Libyan aggression in northern Chad was being carried out at Soviet instructions; B) while Chad greatly appreciated the assistance we have offered to date, he hoped we would reconsider the matter of helicopters and bombers; and C) he offered to conclude some sort of formal military agreement with the U.S. for training and equipment similar to that in existence with French. I did not comment on Soviet involvement with Libya. I cautioned him that I thought bombers were out of the question, but did agree to re-raise the possibility of helicopters, and I told him in cases like Chad, we seldom enter into a full scale military agreement arrangement but that we would need close cooperation, particularly in training.
2. In delivering his letter to President Carter, President Malloum again stressed the urgency of the present case, stating that enemy forces were continuing to mass in northern Chad. He went on to explain that in the present circumstance, Libya was merely acting on behalf of the Soviets and the purpose of seizing Tibesti was to outflank Egypt and eventually isolate it. He said that once this was done and these Soviet gains were consolidated with those in the Horn of Africa, Soviet efforts would be turned to a similar isolation of Morocco. He went on to point out that it was strongly in the U.S. interests as well as those of Western Europe and other African states, to halt the Soviet thrust in northern Chad before it gathered momentum. I made no comment on the scenario, but it is clear that President Malloum has talked himself into believing it.
[Page 53]3. I took occasion of our interview to re-explain in detail the nature of our proposed assistance to Chad as well as the unusual nature of our entering into a new relationship. President Malloum was appreciative of what we were prepared to do and was under no illusion about the nature of our commitment. I particularly pointed out that the nature of our procedures made it impossible for us to undertake any direct grant of military assistance. Despite his appreciation for our proposed program, Malloum reiterated the Soviet threat to the north and made a strong plea for reconsideration of the inclusion of bombers and helicopters in our program. I told him that I honestly thought bombers were completely out of the question, but that I would re-raise the question of unarmed helicopters with Washington. However, before doing so I wanted to be sure that the French were not prepared to augment their present force [garble—in?] helicopters as it seemed redundant introducing a new type of aircraft into the limited Chadian maintenance scene. Malloum seemed satisfied with this suggestion but did, however, want to raise both points so that Washington could be giving them further consideration.
4. The President then went on to say that in view of the nature of our new relationship, he wondered if we should not have a military accord similar to that between Chad and France. I told him that normally, in programs such as those on which we were about to embark in Chad, we did not go into a full scale military agreement arrangement. However, I added that close cooperation would be necessary in determining the types of equipment covered and arranging for appropriate training.
5. Our meeting was most cordial and President was obviously most appreciative of President Carter’s letter and his recent determination on the eligibility of Chad to purchase American equipment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335–0122. Confidential. Also sent to Cairo, DIA, Khartoum, Paris, Rabat, and Tripoli.↩
- In telegram 3169 from Ndjamena, September 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of Malloum’s September 12 letter to Carter which reads in part: “We wish that you could, because of your role as a great power responsible for peace and international security, use all necessary means to make Libya listen to reason, because we have reasons to fear that what is happening in Tibesti could degenerate into a situation similar to that of the Ogaden. It is because of this situation that we have judged indispensable and necessary to appeal to certain friendly countries such as the United States to help us assure the security and defense of our territorial integrity.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335–0552)↩