253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania1
89873. Subject: Meeting With Polisario Representative.
1. (C) Entire text.
2. Summary: NEA/AFN Director Coon and Deputy Director Smith met Polisario representative Majid Abdullah at Coon’s house April 3. Abdullah took standard Polisario position and indicated no flexibility at his level. He did emphasize that Polisario did not claim any portion of what USG considers Morocco proper. Coon explained U.S. policy and overriding U.S. interest in encouraging all parties to move toward peaceful compromise solution of Western Sahara conflict. He expressed USG concern about attacks in Morocco proper and said future contact would be difficult in context such attacks. End summary.
3. Meeting, which was first full exchange between Department representatives and Polisario, opened with both sides expressing pleasure that contact had finally been established. Majid noted importance Polisario attached to USG position and hoped that meeting would be followed by other contacts. He acknowledged that he was not in a position to go beyond his organization’s standard policy and suggested it would be helpful for future contacts to include higher-level Polisario representatives. Coon did not react specifically to this but did return to subject later, noting difficulty future contacts when Polisario attacking in Morocco proper (see below).
4. Majid presented Polisario as national liberation movement. He emphasized territorial as opposed to tribal base for organization. It was losing its young men in the fighting but was willing to continue the struggle. Morocco, he argued, was the aggressor, and the Polisario’s objective was to keep it from winning. It was not opposed to the regime in Morocco and did not claim any of Morocco proper. It recognized the need to “save face” for King Hassan. However, he had taken a harder line following the U.S. arms supply decision. Morocco was no longer willing to meet with the Polisario, although such a meeting had occurred a year ago in Bamako, where Gen. Dlimi and Royal Counselors Reda Guedira and Bensouda had represented Morocco.
5. Coon emphasized USG view that compromise solution would be necessary. Purpose of our arms supply decision was to encourage [Page 621] movement toward such solution. Earlier policy had not visibly helped improve situation, and in addition had harmed U.S. interests in Morocco and our ability to communicate with highest level of Moroccan Government. We had therefore changed our position in an effort to re-establish our ability to make our views known to Morocco. We had also decided to visit Western Sahara and to have official contact with Polisario. We had not, however, changed our position on substance of the problem. We continued to be neutral on eventual status of territory. We did not recognize Moroccan sovereignty. Also, we did not recognize Polisario claims to the territory (and meeting with Majid did not indicate recognition of those claims).
6. Coon continued by noting that we believed neither side could win a military victory. He drew Majid’s attention to Assistant Secretary Saunders’ January 24 congressional testimony,2 for which Majid had been present. U.S. did not believe Morocco could win a military victory. On other hand, we did not believe Polisario could win either, in view of Morocco’s much larger population and resource base. Also, Polisario victory would have destabilizing effect in region which would not serve interests of anybody, including Polisario. It could lead to overthrow of King Hassan, which would probably result in military, more hawkish Moroccan regime. (Majid disputed this point, arguing that Polisario felt Moroccan military was more realistic about situation than was the King.)
7. USG, Coon explained, did not claim to have more expertise on the subject than the parties themselves, and it was for them to work out modalities for negotiations and for a compromise solution. We believed a real compromise was necessary, but we would not offer suggestions on how that might be achieved. Negotiations might be possible with the Polisario as a member of the Algerian delegation, but it was really for the parties to work out the “shape of the table”. We wanted to do what we could to encourage the parties but would not rpt not serve as mediators ourselves. The dispute was not of our making; we wished to get on the business of cooperating with all of the peoples and governments of the region in pursuit of shared goals of economic and social development.
8. USG position in the future would be influenced by degree of flexibility shown by the parties to the conflict.
[Page 622]9. Coon then pointed out that a second reason for our policy review last year3 had been Polisario attacks in Morocco proper. Polisario should understand that attacks in Morocco proper significantly changed the situation, bringing into play historic U.S. friendship and support for Morocco. Polisario should be aware of how widely this view was held within the United States.
10. In particular, Coon continued, whole question of his meeting with Majid had been thrown into doubt by recent very large scale fighting in southern Morocco. Future contacts would not be automatic and were not guaranteed. They would be difficult in the context of such attacks.
11. Majid replied by reiterating that Polisario did not claim territory in what USG considers Morocco proper, but it considers there is military justification to pursue attacks there. Polisario believed that colonial frontiers were best left unchanged, and it did not claim Tarfaya Province, which had become part of Morocco in 1959. However, Morocco had important bases within Morocco proper used for military operations in the south. He named specifically Tan Tan, Zaag, Ngueb, Zagora, Agadir and Goulimime. Moreover, Morocco did not recognize any distinction between Morocco proper and the Western Sahara. Therefore, Polisario felt it fully justified to attack in the southern part of Morocco proper. He added, that in the case of the latest fighting Morocco had taken the initiative, not the Polisario.
12. Meeting concluded amicably but with clear understanding that as far as U.S. concerned, future meetings were not guaranteed.
13. For Rabat: Although we made no commitment to do so. We believe we should inform Moroccans contact has taken place. Suggest this be done through Ambassador Bengelloun, who is now in Rabat and who was channel we used originally to tell Morocco we would be talking to Polisario. In view of our desire not to get in middle, we should only tell Bengelloun that Majid repeated standard Polisario line.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800171–0648. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Madrid, and USUN. Drafted by Smith; cleared in NEA and AF/W; approved by Newsom.↩
- For text of Saunders’s statement and testimony, see Proposed Arms Sale to Morocco: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, January 24 and 29, 1980, pp. 2–28. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980)↩
- See Documents 41, 42, and 46–49.↩