204. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State1
778. Subj: Commando Raid in Tunisia: GOT Request for Emergency Military Equipment. Ref: A) Tunis 0741; B) Tunis 0765.2
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Dept please pass AmEmbassy Tripoli.
3. It is still difficult to assess the real nature and magnitude of the immediate security threat faced by Tunisia. However, we can draw certain preliminary conclusions based on the briefings given me by Prime Minister Nouira and Defense Minister Sfar, the GOT’s public statements, and supplemental information we have been getting from local sources.
4. It is evident that the attack on military and police installations in Gafsa was carried out by a trained, relatively well-armed force. There was little, if any, active support for the attackers from the Gafsa populace. Reports in numbers of the attacking group range from 30 to 300. But whatever the number they were able to inflict considerable damage and, despite GOT statements to the contrary, may still not have been completely suppressed.
5. While most, or even all, of the attackers were Tunisian, the attack was in all likelihood organized and supported from outside Tunisia, probably from Libya. The group apparently did come in from Algeria, but the role, if any, of Algerian authorities is unclear.
6. There have been some mild labor disturbances over recent price increases elsewhere (bus drivers in Tunis, rail workers in Sfax, etc.). But there is currently no evidence these are likely to become serious or that they are directly linked to events in Gafsa.
[Page 495]7. Nouira and Defense Minister Sfar claim to have convincing evidence that the attack in Gafsa is not an isolated, one-time event. In my judgement, they may be reading whatever intelligence they have in the most alarming possible light, but they are not simply crying wolf. They are sincerely worried. We have first-hand reports of substantial troop movements from the north to the south and we expect similar movements are taking place into northwest Tunisia as well.
[8.] In fact, we judge it unlikely—although perhaps not inconceivable—that Libya, with or without any Algerian acquiescense is preparing to launch a full-scale invasion. However, if Col. Qadhafi has decided he wants seriously to destabilize Tunisia, he can probably achieve that result through a series of Gafsa-type attacks, carried out with more of the Tunisians he is believed to have recruited and trained from among the 80,000 Tunisians working in Libya. Tunisia, with its long frontiers, is vulnerable to such attacks. The GOT’s self-confidence would begin to falter and eventually we might well see a breakdown of public order and even military defections.
[9.] This is the situation within which we must structure a response to the urgent GOT request for assistance in the form of helicopters and APC’s. The request seems appropriate in military terms. Our judgement is that the lack of adequate surveillance and transport capabilities is one of the Tunisian military’s most glaring weaknesses in trying to cope with events such as that in Gafsa.
[10.] More importantly, a US failure to respond effectively and credibly to the Tunisian request will almost certainly have a profound impact on our overall bilateral relationship and quite possibly on Tunisia’s basic international orientation. Even if the Tunisian assessment of the current situation proves to have been exaggerated, a demonstrated US reluctance or inability to provide assistance when Tunisia perceives an acute, immediate threat to its national security cannot help but influence future GOT decisions on matters of fundamental importance to the US.
[11.] At the same time, however, I recognize that the Tunisian request for equipment, modest as it might seem to them, will be difficult to satisfy, particularly within the time period they expect. (I assume that any such equipment would probably have to be drawn from DOD inventories.) Also, it would be useful to gain a bit more time to obtain a more complete assessment of the events in Gafsa and the short-term threat of further such incidents. Moreover, we would need in any event much more detailed information concerning the specifics of the desired equipment, etc., before we could respond.
[12.] Therefore, I recommend that I be authorized to respond to Nouira’s request on an interim basis by saying that (a) we are seriously concerned by the apparent threat to Tunisian security and are actively [Page 496] considering the GOT’s request for emergency assistance and (b) that we would propose to bring in quietly, but quickly a small team of experts to review Tunisia’s immediate needs in the areas they have highlighted and determine how we can be most helpful.
[13.] We may find that with the additional time this procedure would give, the currently acute Tunisian concern will moderate to the point at which we can credibly respond to their request on a less urgent basis by, for example, restructuring and perhaps accelerating pending FMS credit purchases (e.g. early delivery of APC’s (is) now scheduled for 1981, etc.) However, realistically we will also have to be prepared to follow through with at least some equipment on the emergency basis which underlies the procedure we have proposed.
[14.] The Country Team concurs unanimously in the analysis and recommendations contained in this message.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0817. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, London, Paris, and Rabat. Sent for information to DIA, CINCEUR, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, USAREUR, INR, NEA, USCINCRED, DIRNSA, and several additional military offices in Europe and the United States.↩
- In telegram 741 from Tunis, January 28, the Embassy made a preliminary report on the commando attack on government installations in Gafsa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0078) In telegram 765 from Tunis, January 28, Bosworth reported on the briefing he received from Nouira regarding the Gafsa attack and Tunisian charges that it was “the first step in a full-scale Libyan move against Tunisia. Nouira said the commando group of 100 (Tunisians and non-Tunisians) came into Tunisia from Libya via Algeria. He said he has no precise indication of the GOA role in the incident, but fears that ‛some Algerian agencies’ must have at least known the attack was coming.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0396)↩