199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1
73047. Subject: Ambassador Hedda’s Call on Under Secretary Newsom March 20.
1. (C) Entire text.
2. Prior to his departure for Tunisia to participate in the Joint Commission meeting, Ambassador Hedda called on Under Secretary Newsom. The Ambassador raised three main issues: (a) Tunisian expectations that there will be a substantial increase in U.S. assistance to Tunisia as a result of the highly successful Nouira visit and the Joint Commission meeting; (b) the FY 1979 and 1980 reduction in FMS credits for Tunisia; and (c) the possible sale of Boeing 747s to Libya as reported in the U.S. press.2
3. Ambassador Newsom began by noting that the U.S. has spoken of phasing out aid to Tunisia for a number of years, but for valid reasons we have committed ourselves to assistance through the end of the current five-year plan. Through the Joint Commission meeting and with the participation of Mrs. Kreps, we hope to move into an effective relationship built on trade and investment. Although he did not exclude the possibility of further economic assistance, Newsom indicated that the U.S. would like to use the Joint Commission meeting as a vehicle to find other ways to cooperate. Bishop mentioned the possibility of PL 480 funds after 1981. Hedda noted that the Secretary [Page 481] had been encouraging about additional assistance for the central Tunisia rural development project during the Nouira visit.3 He also said that aid levels to Tunisia are ridiculously low when compared to aid figures recently publicized in the press. Newsom concluded the discussion of aid levels by noting that he had never before this year of extreme budgetary constraint seen senior U.S. Government officials dealing with allocations of such modest amounts of money.
4. In response to Hedda’s remarks on FMS credit to Tunisia, Newsom indicated that he hoped the 10 million dols reinstated by the Solarz subcommittee would be sustained but that, in any case, we would try to provide in future years the total figure mentioned by then Under Secretary Habib in 1976.4
5. Finally, Ambassador Newsom indicated that the issue of selling 747s to Libya remains under study. We sold the Libyans 727s with the understanding that they would not be used for military purposes. If it were proven that the 727s were now being used in Uganda, it would affect our decision as to whether or not to sell 747s to Libya. In any case, the situation is far from settled. Hedda asked whether this proposed sale indicated any change in Libyan policy or in U.S. policy toward Libya. He also noted that 747s are too big to be used commercially in North Africa. Newsom responded that the situation with Libya is a difficult one for the U.S. Although the Libyans have made several approaches to the U.S. in an effort to improve relations, to the extent Libya supports international terrorism, it will be very difficult to normalize relations. In response to a question from Newsom, Hedda indicated that Tunisia sees little, if any, change in Libyan policy.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0993. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Tripoli. Drafted by Pudschun; cleared in NEA/AFN, NEA, M/CT, EB, and D; approved by Newsom.↩
- In a March 3 article in the Washington Post, the Associated Press reported that Libya was granted permission to purchase three Boeing 747s and two Boeing 727s. (“State Dept. Approves Sale of Jumbo Jets to Libya,” Washington Post, March 3, 1979, p. A6)↩
- Telegram 305925 to Tunis, December 3, summarized Vance’s November 30 luncheon meeting with Nouira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0969)↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 124.↩