198. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Nouira of Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

  • President Jimmy Carter
  • Vice President Walter Mondale
  • Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
  • Hon. Edward Mulcahy, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
  • Mr. Stephen Bosworth, Ambassador-Designate
  • Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
  • Mr. Jerrold Schechter, NSC Staff
  • Mr. Alec Toumayan, Translator
  • H.E. Hedi Nouira, Prime Minister
  • H.E. Mohammed Fitouri, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • H.E. Hassan Belkhodja, Minister of Agriculture
  • H.E. Mustafa Zannouni, Minister of Planning
  • H.E. Ali Hedda, Ambassador to U.S.

President Carter: I want to welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister. We have had close relations for many years and I want to thank you for the advice, counsel and support which you have offered us. Your visit here provides the opportunity for discussing the situation in the Middle East and Africa, as well as our bilateral relations, which will grow stronger as a result of your visit to our country.

Prime Minister Nouira: I want to renew my expression of gratitude and thanks for your hospitality. President Bourguiba hopes to see you someday in Tunisia. He wants to express to you the longstanding friendship between our two countries and the esteem he has for your efforts for peace and your efforts to create a more livable world. The cooperation between our two countries is important both practically and in terms of quality of the relationship. Tunisia is a small country with few resources. We are just emerging from a state of underdevelopment. We are trying to build our idea of development on two humanistic ideas: work and the right of man to enjoy the results of the process [Page 476] of economic growth. We think we have had good results. We are among the most successful countries in the developing world and our per capita income is increasing. We apply the maxim that if we help ourselves, our friends will then help us. Thirty percent of our GNP is invested, and we use taxes to reallocate our revenues.

Tunisia is an old civilization, but we have a young population. Fifty percent of the population is under thirty years of age. This places lots of demands on the government. European influence is strong and people want western standards of living. Two-thirds of our investments are directly productive for the population. The rest goes to infrastructure and so forth. Twenty percent of our total population is in school at one level or another. Eighty percent of our students receive financial support. The result of our previous four-year plan was a six percent rate of growth from 1973 to 1976. We have raised our goal a bit for this current plan, partly because of demographic pressures. Our population is growing at 2.6 percent annually. The number of people living below the poverty level in Tunisia has been reduced from 27 percent to 16 percent in the last ten years. This is defined by a per capita income of $125 annually.

There are still some regions of Tunisia which are underdeveloped, particularly in the northwest and in the center. We still have immigration from those areas and we need to do more. Nearly one million people live in these five provinces. The United States Government was one of the first to show an interest in helping in those regions, and we hope that this U.S. contribution can be increased. The central area of Tunisia is a weak point in our overall development. It is very important to us. Tunisians want peace and stability so that they can continue with economic and social development. We are very attentive to whatever can be done to make men feel more secure. We are very attached to global and regional efforts to bring peace and to let people work and improve their lives.

We only spend seven percent of our budget on external security, but we must be aware of what is happening beyond our borders. There are some who want to destabilize Tunisia, because they see it as an embarrassing example, a model of what can be achieved. We have to look to our right and to our left. There is already a competition for power beginning in Algeria. There are three leading personalities who could end up with responsibilities. We have good relations now, but we must be careful. In the other direction, Libya has ambitions. On September 1, 1978, Qadhafi recognized the failure of previous efforts at unity with Tunisia and spoke of the need for new approaches based on popular revolutionary committees that would be formed in open [Page 477] or in secret.2 These would be used to destabilize the “reactionary” Arab states. On October 14th, we discovered a large supply of arms that had come from Libya. There were enough light arms to equip an entire company. We didn’t say much at first and when we did reveal this fact, the Libyans sent their foreign minister to deny it. But we don’t believe them. Qadhafi wants to be a prophet of a certain point of view. He is a megalomaniac.

In the Mediterrean area, we are interested in your efforts to bring peace to this “lake of civilization”. Peace is contagious, as is subversion. We hope for success. When we have some troubles internally, we believe they are caused by outside interference, not by internal problems, since we are close to all levels of our society. Tunisia does not have several faces, and we have the courage of sticking with our opinions. We believe that truth pays.

President Carter: Let me respond briefly. We have observed with admiration the economic prosperity and growth in Tunisia. This is not just a growth of GNP, but also involves a balanced distribution of the better quality of life. This is unprecedented among the nations that I have studied. Your continued commitment to further growth is of great interest to us. Our American business community is increasingly in joint ventures and investment in Tunisia. There are great opportunities for agricultural business to cooperate with Tunisia. I believe that the soundness of your economy will guarantee your future success.

The economic prosperity, stability, independence, and security of Tunisia is of great importance to the United States. This is not only important because it benefits your people and the United States, but it helps extend Tunisia’s positive influence throughout North Africa and the Middle East. We have close consultative relationships with Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iran. This is a very important stabilizing factor as we face the challenge of increasing Soviet intervention in the area which is so heavily influenced by you. We have been interested in developing a balanced approach in our dealings with the Arab world and Israel. Following Tunisia’s lead, there have been good developments among some Arab countries who no longer see their primary goal as the destruction of Israel. As President Bourguiba saw, Israel is here and will survive and we are commit[Page 478]ted to the Israelis and to their peaceful existence. There is a recognition of this by an increasing number of Arab leaders.

We believe that President Sadat has taken a courageous and proper step in seeking peace with Israel. This may lead, if it is successful, to a greater harmony between Israel and her neighbors, as well as more cooperation among our Arab friends. This is important at a time of transition or instability in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, and even in Iran, as well as the western part of North Africa. We share your concern about the well-being of the Palestinians and your commitment to see the U.N. resolutions, especially U.N. Resolution 242,3 implemented and peace brought to this troubled region. I hope that my assessment of the Camp David agreements is correct. I see them as a major step forward in accomplishing those hopes and aspirations. Doors will be opened for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from much of the occupied territory, and for the establishment of an autonomous self-governing authority and the return of those Palestinians who have been displaced in the 1967 War and thereafter. It will eliminate the Israeli occupation government, and although future negotiations are yet to be conducted, the opportunities are unprecedented and those who object to these efforts can only hurt the prospects for peace and the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, to which we, of course, are committed. It is obvious that in any complicated negotiation there are facets of agreement that are not fully acceptable to the leaders involved. But further violence in the Middle East will open the prospects for regional instability from India as far as the Atlantic Ocean. We see very clearly the possibility for regional conflicts and instability. We hope that we can continue to make progress and to guarantee peace. Instability enhances the influence of the more radical leaders, such as your neighbors, and we think that peace between Egypt and Israel followed by peace between Israel and all of her neighbors and the realization of the rights of the Palestinians and the establishment of autonomy in the occupied territories will be an important step forward. Over lunch it would be helpful to us to have your assessment of the political and military situation in your region, and the possibility of changes in Algeria, if President Boumediene does not survive. We want to see that our attitudes are compatible with your own as we face the future.

(From 12:15 to 1:30 p.m. a general discussion took place at lunch.)

The Prime Minister reviewed the situation in Algeria, which he called a very centralized regime where all decisions were made by [Page 479] President Boumediene who dealt with a group of equally important ministers and advisers. There is no hierarchy around Boumediene, and there is no acknowledged successor. The leading candidates in the Prime Minister’s view are Yahyaoui, the present head of the party and former head of the military academy. Some say that the second contender is Bouteflika, the foreign minister, but the Prime Minister said that he did not believe that Bouteflika had a chance. The third name that is mentioned and the real second runner is the minister of interior, Abelghani. He has two qualities, the fact that he is a former military officer, and the fact that he succeeded smoothly to the ministry of interior. Another possibility is the former head of military security, who has not always had the confidence of Boumediene, Colonel Drai. Finally, some people mentioned the commander of the Oran district, Chadli Bendjedid who is not well-known. Yahyaoui represents a trend that is seen now in the area, such as in Iran, a certain religious fundamentalism. The most moderate and balanced of the successors would be Abelghani, and the most extreme would be Drai.

Secretary Vance asked about the Baghdad Summit,4 and the Prime Minister replied that the real decision at Baghdad was a decision not to decide. It was an attitude of wait and see. There were many mental reservations. The President noted that the final communique had looked very negative in its attacks on Egypt. It seemed as if the radical leaders had prevailed. The Prime Minister said that this was only partly true. The question of any concrete steps against Egypt will be left to another meeting of foreign ministers who would meet once an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was signed.

The Foreign Minister noted that there were pressures at Baghdad to take immediate action against Egypt, and that initially Saudi Arabia worked hard to soften this approach. Tunisia played its part, and was helped somewhat by Jordan and Kuwait. Sadat, in the Foreign Minister’s view, did not help his own friends. He refused to receive the delegation that was sent and he insulted many of the Gulf States. This added to the tension at Baghdad. The results that were achieved were the best that were possible under the conditions. They were conditional recommendations.

The discussion then turned to Tunisia’s agricultural prospects. The Prime Minister placed emphasis on the need for quality, since Tunisia could not aspire to a large export of its agricultural products.

The President mentioned that the U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission had not been sufficiently active, and perhaps more could be done to [Page 480] encourage joint ventures. He mentioned that Secretary of Commerce Kreps might consider stopping briefly in Tunisia. The Prime Minister agreed that our commercial relations were not adequately developed.

The luncheon ended with the President sending his best regards to President Bourguiba, and expressing his hope that they would someday meet personally.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 11/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
  2. In telegram 6725 from Tunis, September 21, the Embassy commented on Qadhafi’s speech: “Qadhafi proclaimed in essence that the January 1974 Jerba unification agreement between Tunisia and Libya, ‛temporarily rejected by the forces of regionalism,’ is still valid. He continued that lesson had been learned by this rejection and that as a result, Libya has now been forced to choose another method—that of ‘popular revolution.’ He then explained that this involved the creation of ‛peoples revolutionary committees’ which would work—openly or secretly—to seize power and establish unity.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389–0947)
  3. Adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967. For text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967, pp. 257–258.
  4. Reference is to the ninth Arab League Summit, held in Baghdad November 2–5. See footnote 4, Document 163.