Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 14, 1977, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Chad Military Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

• CHAD

  • Vice President Mamari DJIME N’Gakinar
  • Pierre TOURA GABA, Ambassador of Chad

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary, AF
  • William G. Bradford, Ambassador to Chad
  • Thomas W.M. Smith, Director, AF/W
  • Alec G. Toumayan, Interpreter

The Secretary began with a brief welcome.

The Vice President replied by acknowledging the Secretary’s welcome. He said he had come to Washington on very short notice, and greatly appreciated the opportunity to call on the Secretary and later the Vice President, despite their busy schedules. He said he had come because the security of the Chadian state and Chad’s territorial integrity were threatened. He said the US plays an important role in the world and that the US is virtually Chad’s only hope for assistance. “However”, he said, “Chad knows it can count on the US”.

The Secretary replied that he had been following events in Chad closely, and that President Sadat had drawn our attention to the urgency of Chad’s needs. The Secretary asked the Vice President to outline the situation in Chad so that he could evaluate the situation in light of the Vice President’s statement.

The Vice President said that Chad was the object of imperialist aggression designed to destroy the country. Under the previous Chadian administration, Libya had occupied Aouzou. For the past ten years there had been a rebellion in the area. The Vice President said the objective of President Malloum’s administration was to achieve reconciliation with the rebels. The policy has had some success, but many rebels have reacted by waiting to see what the results of the policy would be before laying down their arms.

The Vice President continued that some of the Toubou rebels do not wish to be reconciled to the Chadian Government because they are under the influence of Libyan President Quadhafi. Quadhafi controls Goukouni, the present leader of the rebels in the Tibesti. The Vice President said that Quadhafi is under Soviet control, and is also inspired by the old Senussi idea of expansion, but chiefly, said the Vice President, it is the Soviet Union that is pushing Quadhafi and supplying arms for the rebels. Because Chad is pro-west, the Soviets are attempting to penetrate Chad, a move which would be followed by the penetration of other countries.

The Vice President said Quadhafi’s first step had been to send food to the border area and to create employment. The tactic had been successful and many Toubou had joined FROLINAT, the rebel party, in order to get work. Quadhafi is now exploiting his influence in the area, and is defeating the Chadian Government’s efforts to achieve reconciliation.

Turning to the military situation, the Vice President said that on June 20 Ounianga Kebir had been attacked. The attackers had artillery, bazookas, and mortars. Although the Chadian garrison was surrounded, a relief column from the south managed to break through. Some rebels were killed and Soviet arms with Libyan markings were captured.

The Vice President said that on June 22–23 Bardai and Zouar were attacked. Zouar beat off the attackers, but Bardai was surrounded and, because the rebels held the heights around the town, was eventually forced to surrender. The Chadian Army lost 350 men with their equipment, a serious loss. Chad was obliged to evacuate Zouar and to regroup at Largeau and Ounianga Kebir. Now, said the Vice President, with your help we may hope to regain the offensive.

The Secretary asked how many men the Chadian Government had in the area. The Vice President replied by describing the strengths of some of the garrisons and concluded that the total Chadian force in the area was between 1100 to 1500 men.

The Secretary asked what the Chadian Army required. The Vice President replied that aircraft and armor were essential.

Mr. Moose asked if the Libyans had used armor or air in the attack on Chadian forces. The Vice President replied that Libyan planes landed at central airports to deliver supplies. He said Libyan ground troops are heavily armed and the Chadian support aircraft have been fired upon. However, the Chadians have not been attacked from the air. The Vice President said the rebels have armor. Quadhafi is said to have given them six tanks, although these have not been seen.

The Vice President said that if Chad had sufficient aircraft Bardai would not have fallen. He again made a plea for assistance and then gave the Secretary a paper outlining Chadian requirements. (A translation of the paper is attached.) The Secretary asked for and received an explanation of some of the details of the Chadian request.

The Secretary asked if it were true that the government controlled the south and the rebels controlled the Tibesti. The Vice President replied that the government controlled certain centers in the north, but that the rebels were active outside these settlements.

The Secretary asked what commitments had been made by other countries. The Vice President replied that Egypt and Sudan had offered political support by seeking to encourage a reconciliation between the Chadian Government and Habre, a rebel leader formerly closely allied with Goukouni, now active in eastern Chad. Neither country had provided much material yet, although Egypt had offered small arms. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Vice President said Egypt had declined to provide aircraft because the Egyptians have their own problems. The Vice President said that France has provided AD–4s, but these are old planes and are nearly worn out. France provided pilots for these planes. France has sent several Transalls, which were used to evacuate Zouar. Gabon has loaned Chad two AD–4’s.

In response to the Secretary’s question, the Vice President said Chad does not have pilots and the AD–4’s have civilian French pilots. The Vice President requested armament for spotter planes bought in Switzerland and for armor to protect convoys on the road.

The Secretary noted that the Vice President would see Vice President Mondale the following day.² He continued that he wished to study the Chadian request carefully and that we would be in touch with the Chadian Government. The Secretary said he could not make promises, but that he would examine the request sympathetically.

The Vice President said that Morocco had sent three experts to N’Djamena but the results of their trip are not yet known.

The Secretary asked Mr. Moose if there were any other countries to which we have provided equipment which might be transferred to Chad. Mr. Moose agreed to look into it.

The Vice President said that he had a personal letter from President Malloum for President Carter but that in view of the fact that the President was too busy to see him, he wished to give it to the Secretary for delivery to the President. The Secretary replied that he would see the President at breakfast the following day and would deliver the letter to him at that time. The Secretary said the President would reply at a later date.³

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chadian Government⁴

N’Djamena, July 11, 1977

SUBJECT

• Needs Expressed by Chad to the United States

Owing to the generalized rebel offensive at Bet, flagrantly abetted by Libya, the Supreme Military Council transmits the following request for assistance:

To ensure movement of supplies between N’Djamena and Faya: six (6) large transport aircraft with equipment, if possible with rear ramp to facilitate loading and unloading operations of either cargo (loading pallets are also requested) or vehicles;

Note. Characteristics of the Faya airstrip (which determine the type of aircraft to be used):

Faya:	Altitude: 235 m
	Runway Orientation: 06
	Runway Orientation: 24
	Dimensions: 2,300 m x 50 m

For close air support for ground troops: six (6) B 26 fighter bombers with appropriate equipment, arms, ammunition, and bombs;

For helicopter operations:

a. Twelve (12) C H 46 or C H 53 cargo helicopters with equipment;

b. Three (3) UH–E1/Gunship armed helicopters with appropriate equipment, arms, and ammunition;

c. Two (2) UH–E1/Command and Control helicopters with appropriate apparatus and equipment, including that for air-to-ground liaison;

For formation of an Armored Company: about 20 light tanks with full equipment and appropriate armament and ammunition;

In order to prepare 1,500 reservists of the Chadian Armed Forces who have been called up, Chad needs to receive supplies from A to Z (clothing, vehicles, arms, ammunition, communications equipment, etc.), for a motorized, or rather mechanized (APC) U.S. Army Battalion.

Chad has two Pilatus PC 6 aircraft which are judged the best type of aircraft for visual reconnaissance, including surveillance of the northern boundary and the detection of convoys from Libya. Switzerland sold us these airplanes without appropriate equipment and arms. We have contacted the Matra Company at Velizy, France, to equip these two airplanes with rocket launchers, machine gun capability, and bombs.

This operation was so costly that we were forced to forego it, despite the critical importance of armed reconnaissance in the current situation. Could the United States equip these airplanes with armament, or if not, cover the cost of the operation which would then be carried out at Matra?

In order to provide fuel for both the ground and air forces, Chad needs to obtain free fuel, or equivalent funds in order to pay its suppliers directly.

Provisions for troops:

50 tons of rice;

10,000 individual combat rations.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Smith on July 15; cleared by Moose. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. See footnote 2, Document 18.
3. See Document 21.
4. Confidential. Printed from an official translation.