Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

16. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

IN 332817

Washington, July 7, 1977

COUNTRY

• Egypt/Libya

DOI

• [1 line not declassified]

SUBJECT

• Updated Egyptian Planning Against Libyan Leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi

ACQ

• [1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

• [2 lines not declassified]

To State: No distribution except to Mr. Harold Saunders

To NSA: Exclusive for Vice Admiral Inman

To DIA: Exclusive for Lt. General Wilson

1. In about January 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat gave orders that Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi was to be removed, by covert political action if possible, but if political action was impossible, by overt military operation. No time limit was set, but it was clear Sadat wanted action sooner rather than later. Since the initial effort was to be political action via an indigenous coup d’etat Egyptian General Intelligence (GI) was assigned primary responsibility. About April 1977, in the absence of a coup d’etat, Sadat ordered that plans be made for a military incursion in which an armored brigade would drive across northeastern Libya to Benghazi. On the basis of intelligence information given him by GI, Sadat was persuaded that the Egyptian incursion would be welcomed enthusiastically by the Libyan masses, provoking them to rise against Qadhafi and bringing about a change of regime. In the meantime, GI was to continue its search for a coup group and Egyptian Military Intelligence (MI) was to alert sabotage nets already in place in Libya.

2. In early June 1977, Sadat began pressuring Minister of War General Muhammad ’abd al-Ghani al-Jamasi to hasten the planning and preparation for the brigade incursion, because of Sadat’s growing conviction that the military option was the only recourse for bringing down Qadhafi. Jamasi and senior MI officers were reluctant to mount such an incursion, however, because intelligence collected by MI did not support GI’s assessment of widespread Libyan popular dissatisfaction or readiness to rise against Qadhafi. To the contrary, MI’s assessment was that the Egyptian brigade would not be able to reach Benghazi in force, although commando units would, and thus could not take the city. MI believed that the Libyan masses would rally behind Qadhafi to repel or halt the Egyptian invader. Thus, the Egyptians would be left with two options: to withdraw in humiliation back to Egypt; or to occupy what territory they could control in northeast Libya. In the latter case, Egypt would only succeed in uniting the Libyan population behind Qadhafi as never before, and would probably also end Qadhafi’s isolation from his Arab colleagues. MI intelligence indicated that while opposition to Qadhafi did in fact exist in Libya, it was passive and unorganized, and practically certain to stand with Qadhafi against any “liberating” force from Egypt. Through Jamasi, MI recommended that Sadat again shelve the military option and that MI be given permission to launch widespread and continuing sabotage throughout Libya. This course, according to MI, would destabilize Qadhafi and open the way for an indigenous move against him which the Egyptians could actively support.

3. By late June 1977, Sadat was ninety per cent convinced of the military option and gave orders that preparations for a military incursion were to proceed. Coincidentally, MI was receiving confirmed intelligence that Libya was reinforcing its eastern defenses and that Soviet and Cuban military advisors were assisting this effort. Moreover, MI believed that while the USSR would not commit Soviet forces to defend Libya against Egypt, Soviet signal ships anchored in the Gulf of Sallum would be used to jam and distort Egyptian military communications.

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] Jamasi was scheduled to meet with the heads of MI and GI for an objective review of Egyptian capabilities for bringing down Qadhafi. If this review does not develop a viable political action alternative, it is possible that the brigade size military incursion will be launched before the beginning of the month of Ramadan, about 15 August.²

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [2 lines not declassified].

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals—[handling restriction not declassified].
2. An unknown hand underlined this sentence. In an August 16 memorandum to Aaron, Quandt noted that Sadat had asked for three things: “Any intelligence we might have on the presence of the 700 km range ground-to-ground Scaleboard missile in Libya; general intelligence coordination on Libya; and, ‛watch the Soviets.’” Quandt recommended that Brzezinski act on the Scaleboard request. Aaron wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Find out from CIA—have them lay on extra photography if necessary.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78)