Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Chad to the Department of State¹

Ndjamena, July 6, 1977, 2000Z

2261. Subj: President Malloum Suggests Travel to US to Present Chadian Case for Armaments Directly to President Carter.

1. Vice President Djime called me to his office this evening, and requested my advice on how to go about making arrangements for President Malloum to go to Washington immediately and present Chad’s request for assistance personally to President Carter. He stressed that arms were pouring into northern Chad from Libya and situation is becoming desperate. For first time he stated categorically that he believed Soviets were behind present Libyan push. I assured Vice President that President Carter was already aware of the situation in Chad. I explained the many problems concerned with such a visit, but said that I wanted to sleep on the problem and I would call him in the morning.

2. Realize the short notice and complicated subject matter of such a visit make it extremely difficult. However, if we are going to grant Chad any assistance believe we could profit from the visit as a visible sign of our interest in helping moderate African states defend their territorial integrity against outside aggression. If we are not going to grant any assistance it is better for me to say “no” here rather than have it said in Washington.

3. Please advise as to what line I should take with Vice President in morning.²

Bradford

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–2289. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 157286 to Ndjamena, July 7, the Department replied that the short notice made a meeting with Carter or any other specific official unlikely: “We fully recognize the urgency of Chadian needs. Our ability to respond is limited by the following constraints. First, providing equipment as a grant is impossible without a prior Presidential Determination that it is important to the security interests of the US and the prior appropriation of funds by the Congress. Given the prevailing attitude in the administration and the Congress towards the provision of military equipment particularly under new programs, neither is likely even if speed were not important. Second, government to government sale of military items requires a finding of eligibility (i.e. that it is important to the security interests of the US), Presidential Determination, and notification to the Congress.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2617)