14. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
11017. Subject: President Sadat Oral Message to President Carter re Chad and Niger.
Summary: Sadat wants President Carter to know of urgent message received from Chadian President Malloum re Qadhafi-supported rebel threat. Rebels apparently moving on Fort Lamy. Joint Egyptian/Sudanese military mission sent to Chad to assess situation and make recommendations on military assistance. Chadian rebels had also attacked Genayna, an important religious town in Western Sudan, which suggests to Sadat that they hold at least half of Chad. Sadat impatient with Numayri who seems to be “sleeping on his ear.” Niger President also advised Sadat of Qadhafi threat and asked for military assistance. Sadat intends to provide both Chad and Niger with military aid, including perhaps some “commandos” to Chad. He sees these activities as [Page 25] part of Soviet threat to moderate regimes in Africa, ultimately aimed at getting rid of Numayri and him. He asks President Carter for:
(A) Small arms and vehicular equipment (amounts unspecified) for use in helping Chad and Niger;
(B) USG assistance in preventing Israelis from exploiting his current pre-occupation with Africa by mounting some kind of military action against Arab state. End summary.
1. Sadat asked me to meet with him last evening. He had just arrived from Alexandria and was preparing for his departure today for OAU Summit in Libreville. He wished following to be conveyed to President Carter in furtherance of his dialogue with US on Africa.
2. Five days earlier he had received an urgent message from B/G Felix Malloum, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Chad. Malloum had at same time sent a message to Numayri. Malloum’s two messages noted that Chadian “guerrillas,” supported by Qadhafi, had occupied the northern part of Chad during the regime of former President Tombalbaye. (According to Sadat, Qadhafi had earlier told him that the northern Chad region had been bought from Tombalbaye for two million dollars, which the former Chadian President had put into a Swiss bank.) The armed guerrillas, according to Malloum, are pressing southward toward Fort Lamy (Sadat at no time used “N’djamena”). Malloum had asked for Egyptian assistance to meet the threat. Sadat said he views this development as part of the Soviet game plan in Africa. They are using Qadhafi against Chad and the Sudan, just as they are using Ethiopia against the Sudan. He has been on the verge of asking Gamasy to go to the Sudan and recommend to Numayri that Egypt and Sudan take some joint initiative to assist Chad. However, “my friends in the Sudan—they are lazy.”
3. He had then read of a raid on the Sudanese town of Genayna, just west of the Sudanese/Chad border. This had taken place five days earlier. Genayna, Sadat explained, is an important religious center in central and east Africa. It was from this town that Islam entered Africa through the Senusi movement. Numayri, the “idiot,” had sent him nothing about the attack on Genayna, although four Sudanese soldiers had been killed. The attack had been made, not by Malloum’s forces, but by Chadian rebels armed by Qadhafi. Qadhafi’s purpose, Sadat noted, is identical to the Soviet objective: to get Numayri and then Sadat.
4. Before sending Gamasy, he had finally gotten a message from Numayri referring to Malloum’s message and asking what Sadat thought ought to be done. Sadat had replied that GOE is sending a military delegation, first to the Sudan and then to Chad, and that it should be a joint Sudanese/Egyptian military delegation. Purpose would be to assess the situation and to assure Malloum that Egypt and Sudan are with him whatever the consequences. Sadat is still [Page 26] awaiting report from his mission, but he expressed annoyance that it had taken the Sudanese two days before they were ready to join the Egyptian component. He understood that the Chadian rebels are apparently approaching Fort Lamy.
5. Sadat then produced a map in order to point out Genayna’s position just inside the Sudanese border. The Chadian rebels had had to cross virtually all of Chad to get to the Western Sudan. This suggested to him that more than half of Chad might be under rebel control. All this was happening while the Sudanese are “sleeping on their ears.” The situation was “fantastic,” especially since he understood that the Chadian rebel movement has no more than 3,000 guerrillas. Some action is necessary to help President Malloum against the rebels. He was still awaiting joint military delegation’s report before deciding what to do.
6. Sadat then pointed on map to Niger, whose President had two days earlier instructed Niger Ambassador to inform Sadat of his concern about Qadhafi. The President of Niger had asked Sadat to assist him with arms. Sadat said he had promised to provide arms (but no soldiers) and that both Chad and Niger could depend on Egypt and the Sudan. He would use his Antonovs to send arms. Here Sadat noted that Algeria has also taken a threatening position towards Niger.
7. Sadat continued that GOE now has responsibilities in both Chad and Niger. He had given his word and, whatever the cost, he would fight his battle. Chad and Niger leaders relying on his word. He wished President Carter “to be in the picture” and recalled that he had previously asked for arms for African “brushfires” which he might have to extinguish.
8. Sadat said he wanted two things from President Carter:
(A) Some small arms and efficient cars for use in these African areas (numbers not specified). Semi-track would be best, but jeeps would be all right. If we are not willing to send American arms, he understood that CIA has large quantities of Soviet arms. Perhaps these could be sent.
(B) In view of his pre-occupation with Africa, he was concerned that Begin—and especially, Weizman, as Minister of Defense—might undertake some pre-emptive strike against the Arabs. He asked President Carter to keep the Israelis from seeking to exploit the situation, through any kind of military action while he is busy in Africa.
9. Although this was the gist of his message, Sadat repeated his points several times, stressing his conviction that the Soviets are behind Qadhafi. He recalled Golda Meir’s description of Qadhafi as a “monkey with a checkbook.” Whatever the situation in Chad requires, he would assist. While he could not send troops, he might send some commandos [Page 27] if necessary. It will depend upon what his military mission recommends. The Sudan, Sadat noted, might be able to send troops.
10. Sadat also noted Malloum is bringing his case against Qadhafi before OAU meeting.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2088. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩