Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

116. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated

Nov 30—SCC. Mexico refuses the Shah.² Implementation.

Dec 1—SCC. McHenry to address SC in evening. Economic aspects of sanctions.

Dec 3—SCC. Economic sanctions. Shah’s residence. Vance briefed on Libyan attack on U.S. Embassy Dec. 2.³ SCC agreed suspend relations with Libya. You commented: If we are confident the Government of Libya abetted the attack, we should break relations; signal that we are no longer prepared to conduct normal relations. I do not understand Qadhafi’s game. This attack comes immediately after Qadhafi sent a message to the President⁴ and sent emissaries to Khomeini on the hostage issue. Vance said that this was clearly done with their knowledge and acquiescence. We asked for protection and they did not provide it. He favored suspension of relations and the establishment of an interests section. The VP said that was a “soft break” and worried that the mood of this country could explode. You noted the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Puerto Rico would lead to blaming us for releasing two terrorists.⁵ The VP said the average American sees us as impotent cowards and commented that the situation could poison the next election. DA wondered why we should have a “soft break,” noting that Libya was interested in economic relations with us. You replied that it was to prevent a confrontation between the U.S. and Islam. There are more countries than we in hot water. We should suspend relations, demand compensation, and not restore relations until our demands have been satisfied. Vance said the Libyans were worse than the Pakistanis (about paying compensation?). You said something to the effect that in Iran there was a crisis, in Libya suspension of relations, and in Pakistan the chill was warming (?) at which point the meeting ended. (State attendees were Vance, Christopher, Saunders)

Dec 4—Mini-SCC.⁶ Secretary Miller referred to rumors that we intended to freeze Libyan assets. DA reported the President’s view that we should call in the Libyan Charge and give him 24 hours to make a satisfactory response. If such a response is not forthcoming, we should suspend relations. State was to follow up. (Newsom and Saunders attended from State.)

Dec 4—NSC.⁷ Long discussion of economic sanctions, loan defaults, cooperation with allies, etc. Also a long discussion about next steps on Iran, including more severe measures.

Dec 5—SCC. Warren Christopher stated that the intention was, in the next several days, to suspend relations with Libya and reduce our representation to an Interests Section, probably with the UK as the host power. ZB referred to a (Presidential?) note to Vance which said to protest and if we do not receive satisfaction, to suspend relations. Newsom said the Charge was to be called in today.⁸ There was clear evidence of Libyan Government involvement. We would demand an immediate response. In the meantime, we were suspending our activities and reducing the number of our people. If there is no response from the Libyans, we would inform them in a few days. If the answer was satisfactory, we would take another look at the situation.

Dec 6—SCC.⁹ John Sawhill said the oil companies were expressing concern about Libya. They wanted us to keep some people there. Vance said our intention was to “suspend operations” not to break relations. Five people would remain. Sawhill said he would pass information from the companies to Hal Saunders. Keeping people in place reduces the chance of an oil cutoff. The same companies that were in Iran are in Libya. If there was a cutoff, they would have to try to reallocate oil. It would be hard to do since the quality of the oil is high. Newsom said we have suspended relations pending a reply from Libya. We could either maintain a small embassy or an Interest Section.

Dec 7—Mini-SCC.¹⁰ Warren Christopher reported that we had received two responses back from Libya. They will pay compensation but will not take full responsibility. Eagleton got a more reassuring response (?).¹¹ We are in the process of cutting back from 11 to 6 individuals. We will stop there and see where we may wish to go. He wondered if the subject had been discussed at the (foreign policy) breakfast that morning. Later in the meeting, Christopher raised the issue once again. He said our options were to keep 6 people and the U.S. flag or to go to an Interests Section. He thought it was to be discussed “upstairs” (i.e. at breakfast). There was some advantage to keeping the U.S. flag. The British were skittish about taking us in.

(A further review to December 15 revealed no further mention of Libya.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 8/80. Secret. Prepared for Brzezinski.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 166.
3. See Document 110.
4. See footnote 3, Document 113.
5. Reference is presumably to the four Puerto Rican nationalists granted clemency by Carter on September 6.
6. See footnote 3, Document 110.
7. The minutes of the December 4 National Security Council meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981.
8. See Document 111.
9. See Document 112.
10. No record of the December 7 mini-SCC meeting was found.
11. See Document 113.