113. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State1
1891. Subject: Conversation With Ali Houdairi in Tripoli.
1. I have just had a wide-ranging 3 hour conversation with Chief of the Libyan Peoples Bureau in Washington, Ali Houdairi, followed by a quick tour of the damaged Embassy. Houdairi worked hard to emphasize prospects for better relations in future. He saw Qadhafi yesterday (December 8) and has an oral message for President Carter which he will deliver on his return to Washington (via London) probably arriving Tuesday.2 Houdairi apparently urged Qadhafi to receive me (as he had been received by the President) but Qadhafi declined with the comment that he never receives Ambassadors. (He does in fact on rare occasions receive Ambassadors). Instead Qadhafi said he would send a special emissary to talk to me (probably Liaison Secretary Qaud). I will have some frank observations to send back to Qadhafi if this occurs.
2. Our conversation centered on what really happened at the Embassy December 2 and the question of security then and in the future. I observed that in the interest of containing the crisis and not foreclosing the future we were not insisting that the Libyan Government acknowledge responsibility for having organized the attack, though we knew very well that elements of the Libyan Government were involved from beginning to end. I gave him details to back up this statement. He seemed genuinely surprised at some of the items, such as tools supplied by the Popular Resistance office across the street and removal some Embassy files to official Libyan vehicles and the Peoples Resistance building. He did not try to refute any of this evidence.
3. I told Houdairi that before we could begin our assessment of where we stood and what would be an appropriate U.S. diplomatic establishment in Tripoli in the future, we needed a simple acknowledgement of Libyan responsibility for the lack of security that had resulted in entry of the Embassy. Houdairi seemed to think this would be forthcoming (but we have no idea when).
4. On security I bore down hard on the inadequacy of verbal assurances of the kind that proved worthless December 2. He argued [Page 282] that “it cannot happen again” implying that Qadhafi had told him so. I replied that even if we were confident that the Libyan Government did not intend that the Embassy should be touched, there was now a proliferation of revolutionary committees eager to display their zeal. We would therefore need automatic access to effective security forces that could be brought to the Embassy in case of an emergency. Houdairi replied that all popular organizations were under the discipline of the government (which of course destroys their claim that the attack was spontaneous). Nevertheless he thought the Libyan authorities would cooperate to provide us the kind of security we believed necessary (this will take some doing!).
5. I emphasized that the U.S. Government would be making decisions based on all information and evidence available. I added that consideration the Libyan Government gives to our requirements over the coming days and weeks will have an important bearing on the outcome of our deliberations.
Comment: Houdairi remained upbeat in spite of the heavy emphasis on what had been done by whom at the Embassy and our serious security concerns for the future. This optimism (“relations will be [garble—better?] than at any time in the last 10 years”) was apparently based on the fact that a personal contact and relationship has been established between President Carter and Col. Qadhafi.3 Ironically, this is something we in the Embassy have been hoping would happen for some time. We would like to share Houdairi’s optimism. Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that it is based on his meeting with the man who counts here. Experience, however, speaks for caution when dealing with Qadhafi, and this is only the beginning of the dialogue.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1905. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- December 11. See Document 117.↩
- Presumably a reference to Qadhafi’s message to Carter in response to an earlier message from Carter conveyed by Brzezinski to Houdairi on November 27. The messages mostly concerned possible Libyan efforts to secure the release of the U.S. hostages in Iran. The Embassy transmitted Qadhafi’s message, which was read to Eagleton by Shahati in a November 29 meeting, in telegram 1866 from Tripoli, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790549–0948)↩