96. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 12069. Subject: Report on Conclusion of Talks on Namibia. Department pass to White House for the President from the Secretary. Ref: Secto 12050;2 Secto 12070.3
1. We have just concluded our discussions in Pretoria. We have agreed with the South Africans that our proposals made over the last three days are still on the table (which was sent to you last night—Secto 12050). Proposal A was presented first and is the version which the South Africans are currently considering; Proposal B was the alternate, also sent last night (Secto 12069) while Proposal C emerged today.
2. The South African Government has called the “leaders” of Namibia (excluding SWAPO) for a meeting tonight in Pretoria. The South African Government will put draft Proposal A (our joint statement) to the Namibian leaders, and Prime Minister Botha will urge them to approve it. He anticipates that they will. In addition, he will inform them of a unilateral statement which he would make containing the following points:
A. South Africa military forces will begin their withdrawal only when and if there is a complete and comprehensive cessation of hostilities.
B. Since the date of elections is predicated on South African withdrawal, a continuation of violence can therefore interrupt and delay indefinitely South African withdrawal and, therefore, the date of elections.
C. To prevent any party from unilaterally delaying the holding of elections, it is necessary to fix a date and that the elections will proceed even if South African forces have not been withdrawn.
3. Tomorrow morning, the Prime Minister will call a Cabinet meeting and will also urge the Cabinet’s approval of Proposal A, as amplified by the oral statement. Brand Fourie told me that it is his belief that the Prime Minister has the votes to get this through the Cabinet. At about noon or so, the Prime Minister will hold a press conference [Page 257] at which time he will read the joint statement and his oral unilateral statement, which will then have been approved by both the Namibians and the Cabinet. Our Embassies will be informed shortly before the statement that this is being done. We will then wish to inform our press in each of the Contact Group countries of the decision of the South African Government on the joint statement. We will also issue our oral statement in response to the Prime Minister’s oral statement. Our oral statement is as follows:
“The fixing of a date is necessary to provide a firm framework for the electoral process and to reduce uncertainty. The proposals of the Western Five adopted by the Security Council establish a number of prerequisites before the official political campaign starts. In this connection the South African Government stressed that the withdrawal of South African troops would only begin upon cessation of hostilities. The Five pointed out that this would be brought about following notification to the Secretary-General of an agreed cease-fire. No party can be allowed to delay unilaterally the holding of UN supervised elections. If the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk through acts of violence or intimidation or any other failure to carry out the provisions of the proposals, it would be for the Secretary-General to bring the matter immediately to the Security Council and the governments of the Western Five undertake to support necessary action in the Security Council. The Five Western governments undertake to maintain observers in Windhoek during the transitional period and to do everything possible to ensure the implementation of the proposals leading to elections on the agreed date.
“The Five Foreign Ministers are confident that the Security Council would respond promptly and effectively to any situation where the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk and would maintain that election date and that there will therefore be no case for any unilateral action.”
I will hold a press conference at that time in Geneva announcing the above and answering questions from the press on the record. I will probably expand on my on-the-record statement with a backgrounder.
4. I shall be prepared to make public the other two proposals, Proposals B and C, depending upon the circumstances and agreement which we will reach throughout the night with our Contact Group colleagues.
5. I called Kurt Waldheim on an open line immediately before leaving Pretoria and filled him in on the fact that we had made a number of proposals which were still under consideration, and that we would be prepared to speak to them definitively tomorrow after the conclusions of the South African Government are announced. I will be in touch with him by telephone as soon as we hear that South Africa [Page 258] has made its announcement. Tonight I urged him to get Ahtisaari prepared to go to Windhoek tomorrow, or as soon thereafter as possible. (745’s reaction was generally favorable, but he wants to look at the fine print.
6. Although we don’t know yet what the final outcome will be, I believe the visit was useful. We have had a full and frank discussion of the gut issues and I believe that the South Africans and ourselves have a better understanding of each other. They are particularly appreciative of your personal message, and I feel that P.W. Botha is aware of the importance of not closing the doors which would open a road to generally better relations between our two countries. He understands very clearly that they are tied to what happens in Namibia.
7. My guess is that the press will probably play the trip in a negative vein, in part because of the pessimistic speculation which will continue until the South African decision is announced, and in part because so much depends upon the meeting between Ahtisaari and Judge Steyn.
8. I think it is important that we convey to the African states as promptly as possible the actual situation. We have not deviated from the proposal of the Contact Group. The Five are working on joint instructions to our Embassies in the African nations and members of the Security Council. They will be making joint demarches as soon as possible. Our representatives at the UN will be working on plans for the Security Council meeting on October 23, which undoubtedly will be a tough session. It may be delayed if Ahtisaari is about to meet with Steyn.
9. Obviously, we were unable to reach agreement on the December elections and we will be pressed hard to say what we will do if the South Africans proceed. I will try to reach agreement among the Five on a response along the following lines: It is our hope that early discussions between Ahtisaari and Steyn will provide a basis for the immediate implementation of the Secretary-General’s report. However, as stated in paragraph 5 of the communique, we saw no way of reconciling the proposed December 4 election with Security Council Resolution 435.4 Hopefully the South Africans themselves, realizing the firmness of our position, will find a way of dealing with the election question in such a way as to permit Ahtisaari to begin his work at an early stage. We realize that for the time being this situation is not satisfactory and that within a very short time it will be necessary for the international [Page 259] community to decide on what steps it must take if the Secretary-General reports that he is unable to implement our proposals.
10. I will be meeting with Nimieri in Khartoum tonight to fill him in on the gist of what has happened. He has kindly agreed to receive me at 2:00 am this morning. Hans-Deitrich will be doing the same in Lagos at approximately the same time. We are entrusting the discussions with Juliu to Jim Spain and his colleagues. Jim has as good a relationship with Nyerere as anybody I know.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–2745. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance was en route to Geneva to meet with the U.S. delegation prior to SALT negotiations in Moscow.↩
- Not found.↩
- Telegram Secto 12070 from the Secretary’s aircraft, October 18, transmitted the text of the draft joint statement by the South African Government and the Western Five on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427–0509)↩
- UN Security Council Resolution 435, which reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal authority over Namibia, was adopted on September 29. The vote was 12–0 in favor of the resolution, with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstaining. China did not vote. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, pp. 915–916)↩