95. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 12036. Dept pass White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Namibia: Call on Prime Minister P.W. Botha.
1. I had a 45-minute conversation with Prime Minister Botha this afternoon during which I delivered to him your letter.2 He read the letter and said that he highly appreciated that you had taken the trouble to write to him again. Noting that one thing that had been established was the will to talk to each other, he said at the outset that he would be dishonest if he did not say that South Africa had its grievances: the U.S. is a big country whereas South Africa is a small country, but he [Page 252] believed it could make its own contribution on the basis of mutual respect.
2. I stressed the importance that you place on finding peaceful solutions in Namibia and Rhodesia, and said that you are concerned about the dangers of Soviet penetration in the African continent as well as other areas of the world, and are particularly concerned about the dangers in Southern Africa. I pointed out that we believe we have made good progress over the past 18 months working with the Western Five and the relevant parties to develop a solution for the Namibia problem. Noting that it would be a tragedy if we were to fail, I said we had come to see if we could find a way to move forward in a search for a solution that would receive international approval. A solution in Namibia, I said, could have important spill-over effects particularly in Rhodesia. I stressed our concern about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia and a feeling that if we could get Namibia back on the track, it could have a positive effect in Rhodesia.
3. I noted your feeling that we should try to improve our bilateral relations. I said that we would like to establish a dialogue in which we could share our concern about the relations between our countries, including the difficult question of South Africa’s racial policies. I noted your view that if we could solve our Namibian problem and continue our cooperation on Rhodesia, we would like to invite the Prime Minister to the U.S. for personal discussions between the two of you.
4. Prime Minister Botha said that he did not want to oversimplify the situation; however, South Africa is aware of the problems existing not only for the U.S. but for the rest of the world in the Southern African situation. The South African attitude is not based on any lack of understanding, but South Africans must live in their own country and just as the U.S. has commitments, it has commitments. Thus in Namibia they regard it as important to give the people of the territory an opportunity to designate their own leaders, he noted that it is their view the elections sould be free and that those elected should be free to talk to whomever they wished. He stressed: quote if for one moment we were to agree that elections should be postponed, we would have chaos in South West Africa. Unquote. The Namibian problem has been on South Africa’s shoulders so long that they would like to be done with it, but they are determined to let the people come forward with their own leaders.
5. At this point Botha digressed to Rhodesia and expressed the view that he thought the U.S. should have let the internal agreement go forward. He noted that he agreed with us that if the situation in Rhodesia could not be kept under control, Southern Africa was headed for catastrophe. In this regard, he maintained that the problem in Southern Africa is not really terrorism but the power behind terrorism. [Page 253] The time had come, he said, for the West to say quote stop unquote. Even in Zambia people are tired, as evidenced by Kaunda’s recent statement on the use of the Rhodesian railway. He related the story of a conversation he had with a chief in the Caprivi Strip who said that relations across the border were good and that people came over from Zambia to buy sugar, salt and other commodities which they could not get in Zambia any more. Botha felt that Africa’s problems can be reduced to just a few: they need to learn to produce food, use money in the right way, and be trained to live without the gun.
6. Botha then said that he was not hard-headed nor trying to be unpleasant, but quote I am not going to allow South West Africa to be placed in the same conditions. I am going to fight (first). Unquote. He expressed the view that we are forcing Rhodesia to go the way of Mozambique and Angola, then said that South Africa is alone and privately I must not ask him to do something his people would not accept. Quote don’t force me to be in a position where my people will say I have betrayed them. Unquote.
7. At this stage I pointed out to him that if elections are held in December, then we see no way that those elections can receive international approval, which would mean that it would not then be possible to proceed with the program laid out in the Western Five proposal. I suggested that if, on the other hand, we could set a firm date in May or June and find some way to make sure that the elections would go forward on that date, then we would have made it possible for the elections to be held in a way that would win international support. I could not see how that would be in any way a betrayal of his principles—indeed quite to contrary. I expressed the belief that we should continue to work together to try and find a solution that would be internationally accepted. Secondly, on Rhodesia I said I honestly did not know what Smith wanted; that he tells one person one thing at one time and then tells someone else something entirely different at another time. I said this had happened to me just last week. I said I found it hard if not impossible to deal with people like Smith whom you could not trust. I concluded that unless there is to be an all parties conference I was afraid that we could see no progress and further Soviet and Cuban penetration and influence.
8. Prime Minister Botha said that the intrusion of Cubans in Rhodesia could change the whole situation and noted that South African Parliament would have to take such a development into account. Quite apart from anything Smith may have said, he thought that as the three black leaders were already committed to the internal government, every effort should be made to help it to work.
9. As far as Namibia was concerned, Botha argued that the postponement of elections had already led to a lot of trouble. If South [Page 254] Africa were to postpone it again, the whites in Namibia would turn around and say the South Africans had betrayed them and the blacks would say that South Africa had adopted SWAPO’s plan. The moment one plays into the hands of SWAPO, there will be another Angola. The whites in South West Africa would not take this lying down. Botha implied that the Portuguese had done so in Angola. The West must allow South Africa to quote take it where we know it (sic) because we know it so intimately. Unquote.
10. Botha said the SAG does not want to set up a government in Namibia. The SAG first wants to know who represents Namibia before talking to Waldheim and others. Any attempt to force South Africa would only lead to confusion.
11. I emphasized that we believed that without international approval, there would inevitably be increased conflict in Namibia and that there would be a danger that those who won an election in which only part of the people participated would say that they had a right to govern on behalf of all.
12. Botha disputed the last point, however, he said the local leaders wanted stability and indicated that there was no doubt that if forced to choose between stability and international acceptability, they would choose the former.
13. I emphasized the impartiality of the UN, noting particularly the impartial and fair role which it had played in the Middle East particularly in UNIFIL. This was in response to Botha’s statement that all South Africans had lost all faith in the UN’s fairness and impartiality. I mentioned also that actual implementation of a Security Council mandate by the Secretariat is a different situation than what happened in the General Assembly, such as the G.A. resolution that SWAPO is the sole representative of the people of Namibia. Moreover, I said, the Five Western powers were prepared to take steps if necessary in the Security Council to reinforce the impartiality of the UN.
14. Botha referred to the invitation from President Carter and said he thought that it only could do good if the U.S. and South Africa could sit around a table to discuss their problems; however, he added, there is a vast difference between South Africa and the Middle East. Israel is not an outcast; South Africa is. There is no embargo against Israel but actions have already been taken against South Africa. Quote One day we will erect a monument to the West saying, they forced us to look out for ourselves. Unquote Botha said another difference was that in Palestine national homes are welcome whereas in South Africa they are not (a reference to the world’s rejection of the apartheid concept of tribal homelands in South Africa). Botha said that he must be convinced that the UN would accept South Africa and listen to it again. Since it was the UN that made South Africa an outcast, as long as this [Page 255] exists there is no way of arguing on the same grounds as in the Middle East. It would be a long time before he could accept impartiality of the UN. Referring once again to the UNGA’s recognition of SWAPO, he commented that SWAPO was Marxist-oriented and had been from the outset; that it was formed in Cape Town and not in South West Africa.
15. At this point I pointed out the importance of working with the Front Line States and their cooperation in enforcing the UN plan on SWAPO, but Botha replied that Front Line States were not masters of their own destinies, that they have to rebuild their own economies. He noted that Malawi had cooperated with South Africa and they are now making progress. Swaziland had also cooperated with South Africa and is making progress, but Lesotho quote is trying to use a big stick unquote and is not even in a position to help itself like the Transkei. Botha concluded that he was prepared to go out of his way to find solutions in Southern Africa and that he was prepared to discuss the differences with the U.S., but he said we should not ask him to be untrue to what he believed to be his own duty.
16. At supper tonight he said he had reflected on our conversation and felt there was a real basis for trying to improve our relations. He asked me to stay over until Wednesday and to try and work out a solution to Namibia that both he and we could live with. I agreed to do so and said I would talk to my colleagues about this. We got along well at dinner and have a meeting scheduled for tomorrow3 at 8:30 a.m. to see whether we can with our colleagues work out an acceptable formula which we will review with Tuesday p.m. or Wednesday4 morning on a working trip to Capetown.
17. The going is tough but the door is still ajar.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 94.↩
- October 17.↩
- October 17 and 18.↩