91. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
3400. Nairobi please pass to Ambassador Young and Asst Sec Moose. Subject: Namibia: Western Five Meeting With Fourie August 31. Ref: USUN 3358.2
1. Summary. The Western Five Ambassadors and Charges met August 31 with Brand Fourie to discuss the Secretary General’s report on the implementation of the settlement proposal. Fourie focused the discussion on what he termed the two “major problems”: the size of the force and the role of the UN police. Surprisingly, he did not address the election date issue. Nevertheless, he stated that the two major problems were of crucial concern: (a) the force was simply too large—a size never envisaged by (and totally unacceptable to the South Africans; (b) UN police were not envisaged; the function proposed must be limited to accompanying the existing police; and those performing that function must not have “executive duties”. We replied that we believed that the UN had no intention of giving the UN police “executive duties” and that the confusion was the result of misinterpretation [Page 243] and imprecise drafting of the report. We urged Fourie to raise the issue with Waldheim. On the size of the force, we argued that in accepting the proposal South Africa had agreed to the tasks to be performed by the UN force and to leave the size of the force up to Waldheim. Waldheim was simply making a technical decision that a 7500-man force would be necessary to fulfill those tasks. We urged that Fourie and Botha talk with Waldheim about the UN’s rationale for the 7500-man force. Fourie agreed to recommend to Botha that he meet with Waldheim but repeated throughout our meeting: “My government will not accept this report as it stands.” Underlying Fourie’s comments is a fundamental distrust of the U.N. and concern that every contingency must be agreed upon in advance of South African acceptance. End summary.
2. The Ambassadors and Charges of the Western Five met pm August 31 at their own request with South African Permanent Secretary Brand Fourie to discuss the Secretary General’s report (reftel) on the implementation of the settlement proposal on Namibia. Fourie was accompanied by Neil Van Heerden, Adriaan Eksteen, and John Viall. (Foreign Minister Botha declined to meet with the group even though in observance of his rank the group had offered to call upon him.) The conversation, which lasted an hour and a half, was candid and direct but never unfriendly.
3. After briefing Fourie on the state of play in the Security Council, the Five asked him for his comments on the report. Fourie replied that the two major issues which he wanted to discuss were the size of the military section of UNTAG and the role of the UN police. He mentioned that there were other issues of concern, including the date of elections, to be discussed later but added that he thought these two would be “enough of a headache” for today. Later in the meeting, when the date of elections again came peripherally into the conversation Fourie asked: “What’s the point of taking on other issues (e.g., election date) if we can’t solve the really major ones?”
4. UN police force. The group then took up with Fourie the question of the police force. Fourie immediately took issue with that portion of paragraph 29 of the report which states: “The duties of the civil police element of UNTAG will include taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter . . .” He described the responsibility for “taking measures” as amounting to executive authority and stated: “Nowhere in the Western Five proposal is the establishment of a UN police force with executive duties discussed.” Ambassador McHenry replied that he did not believe that it was the Secretary General’s intention to give the police executive authority. The Secretary General was, he believed, simply trying to fulfill the tasks required of the UN in the proposal. There [Page 244] was the need for the UN to be able to accompany the police, and the SYG was stating his desire for trained individuals for the task. The number was small considering the large number of South African police. Para nine of the proposal makes clear that primary responsibility for maintaining law and order shall rest with the existing police forces; but para ten of the proposal states that the Special Representative “will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter”. In the end Fourie acknowledged that if the role of the UN police was to accompany the existing police, that was ok, but South Africa could not consent to an “executive” role for UN police. McHenry again reiterated that he did not believe that that was the UN’s intention and urged Fourie to question the UN on that point.
5. Size of the UN military force. When the conversation turned to the second “major issue”, Fourie argued on predictable lines: A 7500-person UN force was never envisaged by South Africa; South Africa had indicated their opposition to a large UN military presence to the Five; South Africa was never consulted by Ahtisaari on the size of the force as it had expected; and that a UN force that large simply cannot be sold to the South African Cabinet. He argued that the task of the UN force was to “monitor” and that monitoring did not require 7500 men. The SAG will not withdraw its forces unless there is peace, he said, “and if there is peace why do you need 7500 soldiers to monitor it?” He reiterated often: “My government will not accept this”. Ambassadors McHenry and Richard (UK) replied that specific numbers had been removed from the proposal precisely because we wished to make the question technical rather than political. South African Government had accepted the tasks of the UN force as outlined in the proposal (which included more than “monitoring”) and had agreed to whatever size force the Secretary General deemed necessary to fulfill those tasks. Determining the size was therefore a purely technical matter for the Secretary General to decide. Both urged Fourie to ask Waldheim to explain why he needed so many people.
6. Fourie persisted, returning frequently to the fact that South Africa had not been consulted. Fourie added that “until the numbers and composition of the force are settled not a single UN soldier will be allowed to land”. The Five replied that the South Africans had never been told that they would be consulted on the size of the force. They had been told that they would be consulted on its composition and Waldheim’s report indicated that they would be. We reminded him however that South Africa had been told explicitly that they could not veto. Fourie, however, was not convinced. We suggested that part of their concern was obviously related to composition. Fourie agreed but stated that even if composition was acceptable (and an acceptable [Page 245] composition would include no state which had helped SWAPO) the numbers were still too large. Pressed to indicate an acceptable figure Fourie replied “2000”. We urged that he and Botha speak with the Secretary General. He said that he would recommend a meeting with Waldheim but that verbal assurances from Waldheim would not be enough “for the Cabinet, as long as the numbers stand”.
7. Comment. The main sticking point seems clearly to be the size of the force, and we are certain that this is a real problem politically for Botha within the South African Cabinet. It seems that Botha has sold the Cabinet on the settlement plan on certain assumptions and one of those was that the force would be small and in any event preponderant power would be South African when the police and other forces were considered. Fourie stated specifically: “If my Foreign Minister were to try to sell seriously this report with the 7,000 figure, it would be the end of him. It simply cannot be sold”. The UN figure will have to be explained to the South Africans by Waldheim, and some solution will have to be found. One possibility might be for the UN to contract out the logistical responsibilities of the force to local commercial firms and thus reduce the force by 2300. Perhaps some ground can be gained by some UN assurances on composition. Needless to say any such changes or assurances may be unacceptable to SWAPO and the Frontline.
8. The problem of the police seems to be one of misinterpretation and imprecise UN drafting, which can hopefully be cleared up. Nevertheless, it is an issue on which the South Africans place great emphasis as evidenced by their categorization of it as one of the two “major problems”. We are surprised by Fourie’s downplaying of the election date issue and wonder whether Botha may not raise it in more sizable proportions. However, Fourie may have shed some light on South Africa’s position when at one point during the conversation one of the Five quoted from the annex of the proposal. Fourie replied that he thought the annex was illustrative and added: “if this annex is law, then we are going to stick to the date (for elections).”
9. At any rate, the South Africans are digging in. We have informed Waldheim of our conversation with Fourie, and he is prepared to discuss the issues with Botha. Waldheim said that he too had initially been concerned about the size of the force but that General Philipp (Ahtisaari’s military advisor) had insisted convincingly that a force of that size was from a military point of view essential. Perhaps Philipp, who established great rapport in Namibia with SADF General Geldenhuys, can convince Botha and Fourie. Even that, of course, may not be enough to solve the “political problem” back home in the Cabinet. End comment.
10. Ahtisaari later called Ambassador McHenry to say that he had heard of the South African comments. He said he would stick by the [Page 246] report and that we would now see whether South Africa was serious in its acceptance. Comment. We agree. End comment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780357–0241. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Nairobi, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.↩
- In telegram 3358 from USUN, August 30, the Mission transmitted Waldheim’s August 29 report on the implementation of the settlement proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780354–0695)↩