Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

90. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 28, 1978, 0121Z

3040. Subject: Namibia: Secretary Vance’s Meeting With Secretary General Waldheim.

1. Secretary Vance called on Secretary General Waldheim early July 27 to review a number of subjects. Since the meeting took place before commencement of today’s Security Council actions on Namibia, this quite naturally was the first subject covered. The Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Young, Assistant Secretary Maynes and PolMin (notetaker). The SYG’s Deputy Executive Assistant, Albert Rohan, also sat in.

2. The SYG was obviously eager to receive an up-to-date briefing on the current status of negotiations on the Namibia question and prospects for Security Council action enabling the Secretary General to appoint his Special Representative. He said he had heard that the Western Ministers were hoping that South African Foreign Minister Botha’s instructions would permit the Council to act promptly July 27.² The Secretary commented that Botha had indicated to him the previous evening³ that Botha’s earlier meeting with the Secretary General and Commissioner for Namibia Ahtisaari was extremely helpful. Botha gave the impression that he was encouraged by the Secretary General’s discussion of plans for implementation of the Western proposal. Botha also seemed to receive a very positive impression of Ahtisaari and was encouraged further by that. The SYG remarked that much would depend on the instructions Botha received from Vorster, but the Secretary’s meeting with Botha July 26 no doubt helped considerably.

3. Waldheim said there would be many difficulties in implementing the proposal. He said his talk with Botha highlighted the basic differences in South Africa’s approach to the UN involvement in Namibia. Botha objected to the notion of “peacekeeping forces” or military observers. Waldheim told Botha that he did not mind what the various parties called the UN force, but he must go ahead in accordance with the plan and accepted UN practice. Botha also showed various concerns about the composition of the force, which he insisted should be decided by the Special Representative and the Administrator General. Waldheim said this perception concerned him, because it is the Secretary General who should make decisions about the composition and other aspects of the UN force. Botha spoke clearly against the inclusion of black Africa and “Easterners,” by which he apparently meant “Socialist” countries. He mentioned Morocco, Egypt and other North Africans as acceptable participants. Waldheim said he is not personally particularly keen on including Eastern European nations, but it is clear that the force must have a geographic balance. He suggested the possibility of Romania as the participant from Eastern Europe. Ambassador Young and Mr. Maynes mentioned Fiji and Argentina as possibilities.

4. The Secretary also mentioned Brazil, which he understood possibly had some interest in participating. He said Botha had been disturbed by an early mention of Nigeria, which had emerged in South Africa papers as a decision already taken without consultations. He said he thought a large part of South Africa’s concern about Africans related to its need to be consulted on these matters, as much as an unalterable basic objection to blacks. The Secretary suggested that many of these questions would smooth themselves out naturally when the consultative process commences. Waldheim interjected that he had made clear to Botha that no decisions on contributor nations have been taken. He went on to say that Obasanjo of Nigeria had told him in Khartoum that they were interested in participating. Waldheim said he told Obasanjo only that they would be “looking into” the question of troop contributions.

5. Waldheim said that after the Security Council passes the enabling resolution, he hopes later on July 27, he intended to send a survey team of 40 to 50 men to Namibia. Then in two or three weeks, based on the report of the survey mission, the Secretary General would present his report to the Security Council and ask it to establish the UN force to permit full implementation of the Western proposal. He commented that of the Europeans he has approached informally thus far, most were interested in police and other civilian functions and very few of them were eager to discuss a military contribution. Waldheim said he very much hopes Canada will make a significant military contribution. The Secretary expressed his view that the Canadians would be willing to contribute something. He asked whether the Finns, and the Swedes, for example, have been approached. Waldheim said he has until now hesitated to approach countries like those formally.

6. Ambassador Young commented that the problem in Namibia will lie heavily in the area of police and other for a purely military function; therefore, provision of a highly competent police force would seem to be critical to the success of the plan.

7. The Secretary returned to Botha’s comment about the participation of black Africans in the UN force. He thought South Africa in the end would not say no, but it would continue to have various concerns about composition of the force situated along the northern border because of obvious political sensitivities. Waldheim said Botha was nonetheless very outspoken against the participation of any black African nation. He told Waldheim that he was opposed to the participation of any “regional” force except from North Africa. Ambassador Young asked whether Sudan and Kenya had been considered. Sudanese troops are well-trained and competent and Kenya had said that, while it does not want a role in Rhodesia, it might be interested in Namibia.

8. Secretary Vance, turning to the scenario for the afternoon’s Council meeting, said he believed it was important that the Council agree to conduct the vote on the resolutions first, with all statements to follow. The Secretary General said he had talked to Salim, who indicated that the Africans want to make their statements before the vote. Ambassador Young noted that Ramphul of Mauritius has been most difficult figure with which to deal on the African side. He said he thought this in part revolved around Ramphul’s need for constant attention and suggested that it might have some helpful psychological effect if the Secretary General had a word with Ambassador Ramphul. The SYG said he thought that it was a good idea and he would chat with him.

9. Waldheim with the Secretary’s agreement, then called Ahtisaari into the room. Ahtisaari briefly discussed the problems ahead as he saw them at present, partially reflecting his conversation with Foreign Minister Botha. He too noted the potential difficulties in Botha’s insistence on what would amount to a veto right over the selection of contributors, including Nigeria and Eastern European states. Ahtisaari believed that the selection of participants would present a number of delicate issues. The Secretary again emphasized the need for consultations in this process to forestall the kinds of concern that Botha had expressed about Nigeria. He urged that Ahtisaari work closely with the Administrator General in Namibia in the process of consultations.

10. Ahtisaari said that in his talk with Botha July 26 he had outlined the major elements of a mandate for the UN operation in Namibia, and he had the impression that Botha had no disagreement with Ahtisaari’s interpretation of the broad mandate. Ahtisaari said he had tried to reassure Botha that the UN function will be fundamentally of a monitoring character, and that the UN has no other ambition in Namibia.

11. Waldheim mentioned Botha’s concern about the size of the UN force. Botha apparently expressed irritation that UN and other sources are already speaking of a five-thousand man force, whereas Botha said previous talks had always been in the range of two to three thousand. Waldheim told Botha that the number will in the end depend upon discussions of requirements to fulfill the plan. He also noted that SWAPO’s concerns are just the opposite—they desire a large number for the sake of psychological security. Ahtisaari said these decisions must be in the hands of the Secretary General and consultations should be undertaken only after decisions have been made.

12. The SYG said Sam Nujoma of SWAPO had expressed the hope that their views also could be taken into account in forming the force. The Secretary General commented that a UN operation of this kind, to be successful, must have the cooperation of all parties. In other words, every effort must be made to win the full cooperation of South Africa as well as SWAPO, since it will be crucial to success.

13. Ahtisaari commented that Botha would have preferred that Ahtisaari proceed to Namibia for his survey alone, but after discussion it appeared that Botha had accepted the need for a sizeable survey team. The SYG interjected that the Federal Republic of Germany was reluctant to provide the aircraft to take Ahtisaari’s survey team to Namibia. Waldheim asked the Secretary to be responsive to the urgent request for airlift assistance which was being transmitted to the US. The Secretary said he wished to be as helpful as possible and would examine any such request for help in a positive way.⁴

14. Looking ahead to implementation of the proposal, Ahtisaari commented that he would of course insist that the registration of voters recently conducted by South African authorities be redone. After the UN force has fully established itself and ensured a calm atmosphere in the territory, he thought registration of voters might be conducted around October. Then, because of the time needed to carry out the proposal and the practical prospect of a rainy season during the winter months, he thought he could anticipate elections in March or April, 1979. Ahtisaari asked about our thoughts about the duration of the UN mandate. He said he would prefer a 12-month mandate. Ambassador Young recalled that SWAPO had indicated a desire for a mandate of at least six months.

15. Ahtisaari also raised the need to commence now thinking ahead to the problems of technical assistance to an independent Namibia. He said during the transition period there would be requirements to guarantee food supplies for the populace, determine the degree of South African repatriation that is likely to ensue and generally protect to the extent possible the infrastructure of Namibia. During the initial transition period, perhaps the most important effort will be research and surveys of these needs and training of Namibian personnel.

16. The Secretary General, finally, recalled that Botha had again remarked that the South Africans would withdraw from Namibia only after a ceasefire. Waldheim asked who is to determine when a ceasefire has occurred. He pointed this out as a further indication of the many difficulties they are likely to have with South Africa in the implementation of the plan.

Young

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.
2. The UN Security Council acted on the recommendation of the Five, enabling Waldheim to appoint the Special Representative (Ahtisaari), on July 27. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, p. 889)
3. In telegram 3026 from USUN, July 27, the Mission reported on Vance’s July 26 meeting with Botha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2690)
4. In an August 8 memorandum to David Anderson, Leo Reddy noted that a U.S. Air Force plane was loaned to the United Nations for the Special Representative’s visit. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978)