Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 28, 1978, 0207Z

108494. Exdis, Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: The Secretary’s Meeting With Sam Nujoma.

1. Summary: The Secretary met with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph Garba April 27 for a discussion of Contact Group’s Namibia proposal and SWAPO position toward it.² Secretary stressed that the Namibian situation had reached a crucial turning point and that all parties had an opportunity to take the steps needed to ensure an independent Namibia. Were we to fail at this point, the Secretary stressed, we would not be able to forgive ourselves for passing up this chance. Nujoma presented the SWAPO position along familiar lines. He stressed SWAPO’s willingness to negotiate but claimed that the proposal as it stood was unacceptable in several key areas. At the end of his presentation, Nujoma gave the Secretary a copy of SWAPO’s response to the Contact Group’s proposal (text septel).³ Garba, who together with Nigerian President Obasanjo had originally suggested the meeting, attempted to play a mediatory role and at the end of the meeting gave Nujoma an alternative draft statement developed by the African Foreign Ministers yesterday in New York (text septel)⁴ for SWAPO’s use. Following the meeting, Ambassador McHenry had a further session with Nujoma and SWAPO UNRep Gurirab in an effort to dissuade SWAPO from issuing their statement of rejection of proposal, but as he was leaving the building, Nujoma advised reporters that SWAPO would be issuing a statement later in New York today. End summary.

2. The Secretary opened the meeting pointing out that the Namibia negotiations had reached a critical and historic point which opened the opportunity for all sides to take the necessary steps which would ensure an independent Namibia emerging from elections to be held this year under the Contact Group proposal. The Secretary pointed out that the failure of the parties to grasp this opportunity would be a tragic development for which they would not be able to forgive themselves in the future.

3. Garba replied to the Secretary’s remarks by stressing the desire of the African Foreign Ministers to move ahead with the Namibian initiative. He noted that Nujoma was under pressure to make a statement on the SWAPO position and Nujoma wished to clarify certain points with the Secretary. The idea for the meeting, Garba pointed out, originated with President Obasanjo who had urged Nujoma to ask to see the Secretary.

4. After expressing his appreciation for the Contact Group’s efforts, Nujoma launched into a recitation of SWAPO’s objections to the Contact Group’s proposal. As expected, he cited the problem of Walvis Bay, which he said the SWAPO Central Committee insisted had to be recognized as an integral part of Namibia. He said that the Five Contact Group members or the United States must make a statement that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia, and he added that this point also had to be included in any Security Council resolution on Namibia. He recalled that the Secretary had told him this was not possible during their meeting in Dar es Salaam but he insisted that a statement of this type was essential. Otherwise, SWAPO would end up in a war with South Africa under very dangerous conditions. Walvis Bay, he claimed, was a symbol of colonialism and he referred to the US War for Independence by force of arms against colonialism as justification for SWAPO’s position.

5. Nujoma then turned to the role of the UN Special Representative, referring in this connection to the South African statement that the Administrator General would be in charge during the transitional period. He expressed concern over the explanations and clarifications which the Five had given to Botha which he said included assurances on the status of Walvis Bay and the paramount position of the Administrator General. The Secretary noted that our clarifications had not covered Walvis Bay and had not in any way confirmed the paramount position of the Administrator General.

6. Turning to the problem of the Namibian police, Nujoma claimed that Contact Group proposal would leave the police intact under the Administrator General, which would leave SWAPO in a very weak position. On the location of South African troops, Nujoma cited SWAPO’s major concession of allowing a 1,500-man South African force to remain in Namibia during the election period but restricted to Karasberg in southern Namibia. If this South African troop presence is simply a face-saving device for Vorster, as the Contact Group claims, Nujoma asked why they could not be in southern Namibia. He acknowledged a need to reassure the white settlers in Namibia but insisted that the South African forces had to be restricted to Karasberg or some other point in southern Namibia.

7. Turning to the tactics followed by the Five, Nujoma complained that it was “premature and unfair” for the Five to have tabled their proposal in the Security Council.⁵ He noted SWAPO’s view that more meetings were needed to resolve the issues which he cited and stated that SWAPO “certainly cannot accept your proposal as it is now.” He stressed, however, that SWAPO was prepared to make further concessions and said that they were prepared to meet with the Five and, hopefully, with South Africa as well. Nujoma also objected to the statement by Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson in the General Assembly that the Contact Group proposal was in final form. This, he said, was unacceptable to SWAPO, and he added that “we hope that those assisting us would not seek to impose their will on us.” At this point, Nujoma handed over SWAPO’s reply to the Contact Group proposal.

8. In reply, the Secretary reviewed his discussions with Nujoma in Dar es Salaam⁶ and how the US was prepared to meet the SWAPO position on Walvis Bay. The Secretary said that the US statement was constructive and should meet SWAPO’s needs. He stressed, however, that we could not state that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia. The Secretary reminded Nujoma that we were prepared to make our statement at an appropriate time and said that he thought the other members of the Five would be prepared to make similar statements. Referring to Nujoma’s reference to US War for Independence, the Secretary acknowledged SWAPO’s struggle and pointed out that now SWAPO had a chance for an independent Namibia. If this chance were allowed to drop, the Secretary pointed out that this would be a tragedy for all concerned. As regards the South African statements, the Secretary reminded Nujoma that these were for internal consumption and that the position of the Contact Group was clear. The Secretary pointed out that during the February proximity talks, we had explained to SWAPO why the South African residual force could not be confined to a point in southern Namibia. He reminded Nujoma how far the Contact Group had moved South Africa off the SAG’s original position and stressed that the residual South African troops would be closely monitored by the UN. South Africa’s acceptance of this point is a major breakthrough, the Secretary pointed out.

9. Ambassador McHenry reiterated the Secretary’s point that Vorster’s statement was for internal consumption. The Contact Group had made it clear that the police are also under the control of the Special Representative. He pointed out that the “two men in a jeep” principle would give the UN control over the police force, which in any case would be largely disarmed under the Contact Group proposal. McHenry stressed that SWAPO should look at the proposal and not at what Vorster said in public, and he pointed out to Nujoma that the presence of 5,000 UN troops would represent a qualitative change in the situation in Namibia. On this point, the Secretary quoted from Foreign Minister Jamieson’s statement at the April 25 General Assembly session that members of the Contact Group “would view with great concern any actions during the transition period which could threaten the security of Namibia and its prompt achievement of independence, and would act accordingly.”

10. The Secretary said that he felt very strongly on this point and that Mr. Jamieson’s statement should be taken by SWAPO as a solemn assurance of the Contact Group’s position. The Secretary stressed that the US and its partners were involved in the Namibian problem on a long-term basis and they are committed to making their proposal work.⁷ If we succeed in this effort, the Secretary pledged to use his influence with Congress to obtain approval of US development assistance for an independent Namibia.

11. Ambassador McHenry reviewed for Nujoma the way in which the relationship between the Administrator General and the Special Representative is treated in the Western proposal, stressing that the use of the word “satisfied” means in effect that nothing could happen in Namibia without the approval of the Special Representative, who in any event had substantial powers of his own. He suggested that SWAPO in its acceptance of the proposal could very well make a statement noting that the Special Representative must approve actions by the Administrator General. As far as the timing of the Contact Group’s tabling of their proposal, McHenry said we concluded that the time had come to put the proposal on the table. He noted that there were many points remaining at issue with South Africa when we tabled the proposal but we went ahead.

12. Turning to the SWAPO statement, the Secretary said he would study it but stressed his view that it would be a very serious mistake for SWAPO to make a statement rejecting the Western proposal. This would be a tragic loss, he said. Nujoma replied that SWAPO will not reject the proposal but would propose amendments to it. McHenry pointed out that a statement to this effect would be viewed as a rejection. Nujoma fell back to referring to Vorster’s statement, to which the Secretary urged that SWAPO pay no attention to what Vorster said. The Secretary said that our proposal stands for itself and that SWAPO should refer instead to the statement by the FRG Ambassador at the April 26 General Assembly session regarding our assurances to South Africa. He stressed that there were no secret understandings between the Contact Group and South Africa.

13. Nujoma suggested further meetings to discuss the proposal. The Secretary said Nujoma could meet in New York with Ambassadors Young and McHenry, but he again urged that SWAPO refrain from issuing any statement until they talk with Young and McHenry and the African Foreign Ministers. At that point, Garba handed Nujoma the statement developed by the African Foreign Ministers. Garba said it was a very balanced statement and stressed that the African Foreign Ministers in New York had agreed to it. (Comment: While Garba’s document does pose some problems for the Contact Group, it is vastly superior to the SWAPO statement in that it is an acceptance in principle of the Contact Group proposal, with the caveat that SWAPO will need additional clarifications of points of concern to it. Garba’s statement undoubtedly reflects the growing exasperation of other Africans with SWAPO’s tactics and may well provide a basis on which we can work in the future. Nujoma was clearly taken by surprise and not at all pleased by Garba’s move. End comment.) Nujoma agreed to look at the statement but raised the question of South African arrests of SWAPO supporters in Namibia, at which point the meeting concluded.

14. During a follow-up meeting with Nujoma and Gurirab after they had reviewed Garba’s paper, McHenry suggested that SWAPO avoid issuing its statement but follow essentially the same tactic that Vorster had followed, i.e., issue a statement of acceptance which puts SWAPO’s interpretation of the issues of principle concern to it on the record. Nujoma did not explicitly reject this approach but kept returning to the issue of Walvis Bay, on which he continued to insist upon a Contact Group statement that it was an integral part of Namibia. On the question of the location of South Africa’s residual force, McHenry urged that Nujoma take into consideration the extent of South Africa’s concessions and pointed out that the South African residual force under UN monitoring and control would hardly be a threat to SWAPO. As far as Walvis Bay is concerned, McHenry pointed out that all the Namibian parties, even the DTA, say that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. Even South Africa is probably ready to negotiate this issue. However, Vorster views this as part of his country and we cannot force him out of it. He closed with a strong request that Nujoma refrain from issuing any statement at this time, to which Nujoma said that SWAPO, as a political organization had to make its own decisions and that SWAPO’s judgment of the situation was different from that expressed by McHenry.

15. For London: Garba advised us this morning that he will be seeing Prime Minister Callaghan tomorrow (April 28) at 10:00 a.m. You should get a copy of this telegram to the FCO as well as copies of the SWAPO statement and the statement drafted by the African Foreign Ministers which are being transmitted septels. You should also advise British that during brief private session with Garba following meeting with Nujoma, the Secretary asked that Nigerians continue to lean on SWAPO to be more forthcoming. On Rhodesia, the Secretary asked that Nigerians keep pressing Patriotic Front and said that we would be working with Front-Line and Salisbury Group. He advised that we were working with UK to establish better communications with Smith. As regards the April 26 Salisbury announcement, the Secretary told Garba that we did not regard this as flat turndown, that we believe door is still open, and that we will be following situation very closely in coming period.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Paris, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Pretoria, and Cape Town. Drafted by Thomas M. Niles (IO/UNP); cleared by Helman (IO), Petterson, Holloway (IO/UNA), and Anderson (S/S); approved by Vance.
2. See footnote 2, Document 85.
3. In telegram 108386 to USUN, April 28, the Department transmitted SWAPO’s response to the Contact Group proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0679)
4. In telegram 108383 to multiple posts, April 28, the Department transmitted the alternative draft statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0356)
5. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, pp. 881–882.
6. In telegram 1672 from Dar es Salaam, April 16, the Embassy reported Vance’s meeting with Nujoma. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978)
7. In telegram 1732 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0220) In telegram 1733 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Mozambican Minister of State Montiero on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0235) In telegram 1736 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0244)