85. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1

Secto 4091. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Vance/Owen/Young Meeting With Pik Botha.

1. Summary: Secretaries Vance and Owen and Amb. Young, accompanied by American and British staffs, met at Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s home in Pretoria evening of April 16 for talks that focussed mainly on Rhodesia and Namibia. With Botha were Foreign Secretary Brand Fourie and Neil van Heerden, Botha’s Special Assistant. As [Page 223] expected, Botha raised a series of questions about features of the Western Five’s proposal.2 He professed concern that unless he could give certain assurances to the people of Namibia, or satisfactorily answer some questions raised about aspects of the proposal, it would be impossible for the South African Government to accept it. Discussions were candid and businesslike. For a change, Botha did not subject us to usual display of bombast and, in general, he did not resort to emotional rhetoric, except to describe “terrorism” in Namibia and to stress the serious political risks he claimed he faces in trying to sell the Western proposal. His principal concern was the security question, i.e. the withdrawal of South African military forces from Namibia and the dangerous consequences he said this could have for the Namibian people. Holding to the proposal as it is written, Owen, Vance and Young addressed Botha’s expressed concerns and at the same time made clear their belief that it is in the interest of all for South Africa to accept the proposal.3 End summary.

2. After discussion of Rhodesian problem (septel),4 Owen broached the topic of Namibia by observing that if Namibian settlement effort went well, it could have positive effect on Rhodesian situation and on UK and US bilateral relations with South Africa as well. Botha said there had been movement in the right direction on Namibia, but he feared it “was slipping away”. He then proceeded to point out problems the SAG has with the Western Five’s proposal.

3. Botha began with the issue which later both he and van Heerden privately described as the crux of South Africa’s difficulty with the proposal: withdrawal of South African residual military forces from Namibia within one week following certification of election of Constituent Assembly. He said this provision of the proposal has caused him great trouble with South West Africans. For example, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) simply would not accept this. He then launched into description of the growing enmity between Hereros and Ovambos, the danger of assassination which DTA leaders face, and the fears of Ovambos who oppose SWAPO that in the event of South African troop withdrawal, they could be confronted with invasion by Cuban and SWAPO forces. Were he to tell Namibians he would have to respond negatively if the majority of the Constituent Assembly, [Page 224] freely elected by the Namibian people, asked South Africa to keep its troops in the territory, “the proposal would be shot down”.

4. Owen said the proposal does not put withdrawal after certification of the election in a negative way. He explained that the proposal does not say that if the Constituent Assembly voted to keep South African troops, they could not, under any circumstances remain. He said if the Constituent Assembly voted in favor of retaining troops in Namibia, “we would have to look at it”. Vance said that in the event of such a request by the Constituent Assembly, obviously the Security Council would have to take a fresh look at the matter. Botha disagreed with Owen’s explanation, saying that from the way the proposal is written, one could only conclude that South African troops could not remain. Owen said he did not accept that assertion and maintained that the proposal was a political not a legal document. Botha stated that the SAG preferred the language in the proposal as it was before December 3. Vance and Owen said they would give further consideration to this matter and that it might be useful if they and Young discussed this later alone with Botha. Owen reminded Botha that Secretary Vance and he represented only two members of the Five and could not speak on behalf of the three others.

5. Botha said that in discussions he had had with groups in Namibia, it was pointed out to him that in one part of the proposal it is stated that the Administrator General and the UN Special Representative would work together, but that elsewhere in the proposal the implication is that the Special Representative is “the top guy”. Botha said he had told the DTA his understanding was that the two officials must work closely together if the agreement is to succeed. Vance, quoting from the proposals, assured Botha that his interpretation was correct, that the Administrator General and the Special Representative would work together. Later in the discussion Botha said South Africa and the DTA remained absolutely opposed to the concept of UN supervision and control. However, he had explained to the DTA that this had been qualified in the proposal in that the term supervison and control meant that the UN Special Representative had to be satisfied. The DTA had expressed fear that this could mean the UN Special Representative would have control of the political administration of the territory. However, he had told them this was not the case. Fourie said he understood that the wording which states the UN Special Representative must be satisfied was formulated to take account of the SAG’s problem with the phrase “supervison and control”. Owen smiled and said he could not object to that explanation. Ambassador Bowdler pointed out that the inclusion of the words supervision and control was important for obtaining UN approval.

6. Returning to the question of the security of the territory, Botha asked if the US and UK would be willing to provide military assistance [Page 225] if the Cubans crossed the northern border. Vance said that if the parties agreed to the proposal, and the UN implemented it, he found it hard to believe that even the Cubans would move into Namibia against the UN force and also the South Africans residual military force. After Botha reiterated that Ovambos who oppose SWAPO fear the possibility of instrusions by hostile forces, Owen said for this very reason we need a “credible, sizeable UN force in the area.” He went on to say that in the unlikely event of a Cuban invasion, the UN would immediately be challenged in a way that the world could not ignore. He said in a situation of this kind, in which British and UN credibility would be challenged, and in which the UN Secretary General would ask for help, Britain, which was deeply involved in the Namibia question, “would know how to respond.” Botha persisted that he needed to be able to give some assurances to the Ovambos (specifically Ovambo traditional leader Njoba). Owen replied that we might have to think of giving the Namibian people as opposed to the SAG, some kind of assurance. He and Secretary Vance noted that with respect to the security of Namibia, the UK and US have as vested an interest as does South Africa in the presence of a strong UN force.

7. Botha stated that unless the Administrator General was consulted as to which countries would provide contingents of “military observers,” it would be “extremely tough” for South Africa to accept the proposal. Vance responded that there was no question about this, inasmuch as it is standard practice for consultations to take place concerning the composition of any UN force.

8. Turning to another subject, Botha said the reference in the proposal to “installations” at Rundu, Oshakati, and other border locations was incorrect. These were towns; the installations were on the outskirts. He then asked why we could not accept the presence of no more than a platoon of troops at each of these installations. Owen answered, “Pik, you know perfectly well why”. Vance said that we understood the anxiety about the security situation, but this merely underscored the need for a credible UN force. Owen said that perhaps South Africa should begin deploying police in the area, so that they could be present when the military forces were withdrawn.

8. [sic] Ambassador Young observed that another reason for a strong UN force in Namibia is the likelihood of “wrangling” within SWAPO. If the South Africans acted to control any outbreak of intra-SWAPO strife, they would be condemned. This would not be the case if the UN force, which would be there to offer protection for all to take part freely in the political process, dealt with the problem. Botha did not disagree but said SA “put it to the public that law and order is the responsibility of the Administrator General and police.” Fourie added that a strong UN force would have to act on the basis of agreement [Page 226] between the Administrator General and UN Special Representative. Vance and Owen repeated that the working relationship between the Administrator General and Special Representative was a critical element of the proposal.

9. Botha then brought up Walvis Bay. He said South Africa had “made it clear that if any concession was made to SWAPO on this, the proposal is completely unacceptable.” Owen noted that Walvis Bay is not mentioned in the proposal and that we believe the issue should be resolved by South Africa and the Namibian Government after independence. Botha responded that he could not bind himself to any statement that South Africa would have to negotiate the future of Walvis Bay. Owen said that this was not the case, all we were saying was that it is our position that Walvis Bay is a matter which should be negotiated.

10. Botha asserted that the way the proposal is phrased, the Administrator General has no say regarding the return of Namibians who are held in Zambia and Tanzania. Only the UN Special Representative and the jurist appointed by him would have a role in determining who should be returned. It was important that the families of those Namibians who are detained in Zambia and Tanzania be permitted to speak to them to ascertain they had not been forced to decline to return to Namibia, and to tell them what the real situation in Namibia is so that the detainees would have a valid basis on which to make their decision. Vance and Owen assured him that the proposal placed no bar against a procedure of this sort. Organizations like the Red Cross and Amnesty International could take an active interest in Namibian detainees. They said further that the US and UK are very sensitive to human rights issues. They added that the British and American Governments would not be selective regarding the release of prisoners in South Africa and Namibia and those in Zambia and Tanzania.

11. At this point, the meeting was adjourned for dinner, following which Vance, Owen and Young sent [met] separately with Botha.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164–0275. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Bonn, Paris, USUN, Ottawa, and Pretoria. Vance was in Salisbury to meet with members of the Transitional Government and British Foreign Secretary Owen.
  2. In telegram 1102 from USUN, March 25, the Mission transmitted the text of the revised Western Five proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign File, D780132–0163)
  3. In telegram 818 from Cape Town, April 25, the Embassy informed the Department that the South African Government accepted the proposals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780176–0694)
  4. See Document 208.