83. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 2004. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Secretary Vance Meets With Sam Nujoma.
1. Summary: In bilateral meeting with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma February 12, Secretary Vance once again explained the position of the Western Five on major issues that had emerged in the talks between the Five and SWAPO.2
[Page 217](A) We will accept whatever recommendation the UNSYG makes regarding the size of the military and cilivan components of the UN force.
(B) The UN Special Representative (UNSR) has what amounts to a veto over actions of the Administrator General; if there are differences between him and the AG, the UNSR can offer suggestions; if the differences are not reconciled, he can take the matter to the Security Council; and we shall try to devise some intermediate mechanism for settling disputes.
(C) Full provisions will be made to monitor the activities of the police.
(D) Walvis Bay is a question which should be put aside for now.
After some discussion, Nujoma accepted our position and explanations regarding the size of the UN force, the relationship between the Administrator and UNSR, and the monitoring [of] the police. However, he was adamant on the subject of Walvis Bay, insisting that the Western Five must declare that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. In addition, he insisted that SWAPO would accept a residual South African military presence only in the extreme southern part of the territory. End summary.
2. The Secretary met with Nujoma at USUN late afternoon February 12. He told Nujoma he appreciated the opportunity to meet so that he could clarify the Five’s positions on some major issues and, at the same time, answer any questions that SWAPO might have.
3. The Secretary said he believed we have a unique opportunity and it would be tragic if we lost it. All of us must lend our best efforts to make this initiative successful. This will take courage, but the objective of an independent Namibia is in the best interests of all, particularly the people of Namibia.
4. He said that the Five would endeavor to clarify particular points that had been raised in our discussions. These would be put to paper and given to SWAPO. As he saw it, the key outstanding issues are:
(A) The size of the UN force: The Secretary said he wanted to make it quote crystal clear unquote that whatever the SYG recommended regarding the military or civilian component of the UN force would be supported by the Five. He and the other four Ministers are confident of the SYG’s judgement.
(B) The respective roles of the Administrator General and the UNSR: The Secretary carefully spelled out (when appropriate, reading from the text of the proposal and a draft paper elaborating on some aspects of the proposal) how the Administrator General could not take any actions affecting the political process without the approval of the UNSR. He also explained how the UNSR could take initiatives, and [Page 218] what recourse he could have in case of disputes. At first Nujoma was unpersuaded, asserting that the UNSR would have no effective power and that the South Africans would be able to manipulate the entire administrative machinery. However, careful explanations by the Secretary and Ambassador McHenry apparently brought him around to our point of view . . . Nujoma said that the relationship they had described and the recourse open to the UNSR were quote appropriate unquote.
(C) Restrictions on the police: The Secretary assured Nujoma that adequate arrangements would be made to monitor the police effectively. He mentioned the two-men-in-a-jeep concept. Nujoma took no exception to this formulation.
(D) Walvis Bay: The Secretary made the point that the Five believe the question of sovereignty over Walvis Bay is one which should be put aside for now. Nujoma did not comment immediately on this, but the issue was raised again later in the discussion. (See para 6 below).
5. McHenry raised an additional point, the issue of who would make a judgement in cases of dispute as to who was a political prisoner. He noted that the Five had dropped the panel of jurists idea, which SWAPO had opposed. He then asked Nujoma for his reaction to the concept of appointment by the SYG of an official who would decide in cases of dispute between the Administrator General and the UNSR regarding political prisoners. A lengthy discussion ensued on this subject. Nujoma argued repeatedly that the UNSC or his legal staff should resolve disputes on prisoners. He said he regarded an appointee of the SYG as someone who would be political in nature and therefore unqualified to make decisions about Namibian prisoners. After more discussions on this problem it became apparent that there might be no difference between what the Secretary and McHenry were proposing and what Nujoma had in mind. It was a question of expressing this in such a way as to eliminate any doubts Nujoma and SWAPO might have, and the Secretary said the Five would undertake to put our ideas on this in writing and present them to SWAPO.
6. Returning to Walvis Bay problem, the Secretary stated that the Five understood SWAPO’s position regarding who should control the enclave. We were not asking SWAPO to change its position. However, we believed that SWAPO should reserve its position now and get on with the business of elections and independence. McHenry pointed out that no troops withdrawn from Namibia could be placed in Walvis Bay and that, moreover, Namibians residing in Walvis Bay would be able to vote in the Namibian elections. Nujoma took strong exception to the suggestion that SWAPO should reserve its position on Walvis Bay. He equated this with having SWAPO accept South Africa’s claim to sovereignty. Careful explanations of the need to defer resolution of the Walvis Bay issue until after independence failed to move Nujoma.
[Page 219]7. He declared that SWAPO wanted the Western powers to declare that Walvis Bay is a part of Namibia. He said if the issue was not resolved before independence, SWAPO was convinced it would have to fight South Africa to gain Walvis Bay for Namibia. He said SWAPO could not negotiate with South Africa, which was a quote fascist, ruthless regime. Unquote. Nor could SWAPO accept having quote an enemy within striking distances from Windhoek unquote.
8. The Secretary said that the two major outstanding issues were Walvis Bay and the location of the residual South African military force. With regard to the latter issue, the Secretary said he had listened to Nujoma’s arguments the previous day that the South African residual force should be confined to a base in the extreme southern part of the territory. However, he still could not understand why SWAPO could not accept our proposal for a residual force confined to one or two bases in the north under close supervison by a large UN military force. Nujoma said SWAPO would continue to refuse to accept the presence of any South African troops in that area. It was immaterial to SWAPO if they had to continue their guerrilla warfare for years solely on this issue. He maintained that the Western Five had no appreciation of the distrust and hatred SWAPO soldiers felt for their South African adversaries. He complained that SWAPO had made concessions, but that on this issue the Five were quote pushing us into a corner unquote. SWAPO had expected some accommodation by the Five to SWAPO’s views, but the Five were unwilling to do so on this important matter.
8 [9]. Summing up, the Secretary repeated that it was clear that Walvis Bay and the location of a residual force of South African troops were the two major issues yet to be resolved. With regard to other matters we had discussed, the Five would consider the suggestions that had been made during the past two days and would present SWAPO with certain revisions to the Western Five proposal. At Nujoma’s request, he briefly outlined the South African’s difference with the Five and explained Botha’s reason for returning to South Africa.
10. Nujoma expressed his appreciation for the help SWAPO has received from the United States over the years. He said that an independent Namibia would want to have diplomatic relations and trade relationship with the United States. There would be need for some adjustment, in that a new trading relationship would have to be on an quote equal basis unquote. He asked the Secretary to convey to President Carter his thanks for the arrangements which had been made for SWAPO during their stay in the United States.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780066–0016. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, and Cape Town. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Paris. Vance was in New York for the Namibia Proximity talks.↩
- See Document 80. ↩