62. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2003. Capetown for Embassy. Subj: Namibia—Western Five Meeting With the SYG.
Summary: Western Five met with SYG Waldheim June 22 to pursue discussion of UN role in Namibian settlement. Waldheim and his staff argued that the UN role could not be defined until limitations on the role of the Administrator General was made clear. This reflected the views of African reps with whom he met June 21. Contact Group urged that concrete work start immediately on UN role. It was agreed that the group would meet with SYG again early next week. End summary.
1. Western Five Power reps met Wed morning June 22 with SYG Waldheim to discuss further the UN role in evolving Namibian settlement. In setting scene for meeting, Waldheim recalled briefing June 17 on the most recent Capetown talks2 by Group of Five and agreement to resume discussion following SYG’s study of the Capetown results and discussion with African members of Security Council and Chairman of African group (Senegal) June 21. He included in meeting Assistant Secretary General for Special Political Questions Farah, who he said would be deeply involved in developing the UN role.
[Page 154]2. Recapping his discussion with Africa reps June 21, Waldheim said they raised now-familiar points:
—Role of SYG’s Special Representative
—Special Representative’s relationship with Administrator General; Waldheim commented that the Africans had made very clear their view that the Special Representative’s power and functions must be at least equal with that of the Administrator-General, if not superior.
—Presence of South African troops; Africans insisted that elections cannot take place in the presence of South African troops. Therefore UN control must be made unchallengeably clear.
—Role of the Council for Namibia; Waldheim said Senegal, as the June Chairman of the African group, specifically mentioned this question. Involved is the African aversion to even implied recognition of the legality of South African presence in Namibia.
—SWAPO’s June 15 statement and SYG’s conversation with Nujoma during May conference in Maputo.
3. Waldheim outlined principal problem he saw in persuading Africans to support plan being developed through the discussions of Western Five. While all of the above points are now familiar, Waldheim said these African concerns must be accommodated in some fashion if the Africans are to be brought along. In summary, Waldheim characterized the African reaction to what they had learned of the Capetown talks as “rather skeptical.” He went on the comment that recent “leaks” to the press about the contents of the Capetown talks have not been helpful. Waldheim recounted Mauritian Perm Rep Ramphul’s complaint that he read about the latest Capetown efforts in the press before he received authoritative briefing from the participants.
4. Farah spoke in general support of the SYG’s capsulization of the encounter with the African group yesterday. He also suggested that, since some Africans (e.g. Benin) have complained that oral briefings are an imprecise basis for reports to govts, it would lend more weight to the Western initiative if the areas of agreement and disagreement with South Africa which have emerged thus far in the talks could be reduced to writing.
5. Farah went on to say that he would summarize the main concerns of the Africans as being the nature and form of the transitional authority in Namibia. Specifically Farah said that the Africans are concerned about the power of the South African appointed Administrator-General in relation to the SYG’s Special Representative. They suggested that the Administrator-General should be appointed by a disinterested third party, and should not be a South African appointed by the South African Govt. Members of the Contact Group responded to these concerns by explaining the approach the Westerners are attempting to talk [Page 155] out. Waldheim acknowledged this line of thinking and said the Africans are prepared to recognize the progress achieved by the Contact Group in relation to Turnhalle but they always come back to these other concerns. Some Africans have told him explicitly that they will follow the lead of SWAPO. The SYG said it therefore is crucial that SWAPO be persuaded on these points and he intends to undertake talks with Numoma in Libreville. He said the Africans fear that they will be drawn into an unwanted relationship with South Africa if the relationship between the Administrator-General and UN Special Representative is not clarified.
6. The Contact Group argued that rather than commencing with a clear legal definition of the limitation of the power of the Administrator-General, it is essential that, with the assistance of the SYG, they begin to develop concrete and detailed ideas about the role of the UN. Only in the context of such specific ideas can a sound perception of the required scope of powers and function of the Special Representative be developed. If we can describe what is required for the function and status of the Special Representative, in order to implement SC Resolution 385, the relationship between the UN Representative and Administrator-General will become clear. If the SYG believes his Special Representative must be granted more relative power than has thus far been ascribed to him in the general discussions with the South African Govt, the Contact Group will have to return to the SAG for further discussion of this point. It is crucial, however, that the SYG commence now with a concrete planning effort to define the UN role required for full implementation of Resolution 385.
7. Speaking in the course of this discussion, Farah continued to maintain that Africans have impression that the Administrator-General appointed by South Africa would continue during the transitional period to make all decisions. The role of the SYG’s Special Representative would appear to be merely observational. The Africans would strongly prefer that the UN Representative be made clearly responsible. Farah said therefore, in order to commence drawing up viable plans for the UN role, they must know the limits placed on the power of the Administrator-General and the nature of the function he is to serve. Farah also argued that it would be premature for the SYG to undertake detailed planning, or especially talk about it with any of the parties, until the outline of agreement on these central matters becomes clear.
8. Members of the Contact Group rebutted these arguments at various points, insisting that our first task is to develop ideas about the UN role, which can include clear notions of necessary limitations on the power of the Administrator-General. Ambassador Young described the difficulty of moving SWAPO and other African attitudes from armed struggle to wholehearted involvement in a free and demo[Page 156]cratic political process in Namibia. He said SWAPO, in a sense, has been thrown behind the pace of developments by the South African strategy of rapid concession in some key areas. He hoped the SYG would lend his weight to an effort to persuade the Front Line States, Angola and SWAPO, to participate in the kind of process we are trying to develop. Arguing legalities in effect plays into South African hands. We need now to move to consideration of practical ideas for defining the UN role and implementing Resolution 385.
9. After extensive discussion, the SYG said he found the clarification of Western Five thinking highly significant and helpful. He said he understood the notion that his staff should commence immediately to develop a plan defining the function of the UN Special Representative in all of its essentials required to implement 385. If his perception of the power that must be attributed to the Special Representative exceeds that which has been discussed with the South Africans, the Contact Group would undertake further discussions with South Africa. He also agreed that it would be useful to discuss the Namibian statement with Africans in Gabon with the purpose of reassuring all Africans that the Group of Five is playing fair. He acknowledged that the reaction of senior governmental leaders often is more understanding than that of their Rep at the UN.
10. It was agreed that the Western Five would meet with the SYG again early next week. Waldheim is scheduled to meet South African Foreign Minister Botha Friday, June 24, and he will consider further our discussion today and be prepared to go on with exploration of the problem.
11. Comment: The Secretary General’s response was disappointing. It appears clear that he is reluctant to be seen by the Africans to be supporting a Western initiative which the Africans may reject. While he resists moving until the Africans give a green light, they in turn are unwilling to give their approval before they receive a persuasive demonstration that the UN role in Namibia during the transitional period will carry unquestioned authority sufficient to guarantee an outcome free of South African control.
12. Next week’s discussion with him may clarify whether he is willing to push ahead with the necessary work to shape the UN role in the settlement. We believe we must come up with some of the ideas on which we can base a definition of the essential UN role. Without it, we will not be in position to talk persuasively with the Africans. It becomes all the more important, therefore, that the Pelcovits study be pressed forward as rapidly as possible.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 6/77. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Cape Town. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 1988 from USUN, June 21, the Mission transmitted the report of the June 17 Waldheim briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770222–0077)↩
- Reference is to a study on UN involvement in the Namibian electoral process, prepared by Nathan Pelcovits of Johns Hopkins University.↩