Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

61. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter ¹

Washington, June 11, 1977

1. Namibia Talks: Preliminary Assessment—Our preliminary reaction to the second round of talks on Namibia between the Contact Group and South Africa is cautiously encouraging. Although the South Africans initially proposed an administrative arrangement that would have included fairly heavy Turnhalle representation, they backed away from this in the face of Contact Group rejection and agreed to appoint a single Administrator-General to run the territory during the transitional period. They also appear to have accepted the Contact Group’s admonition that the Administrator-General should not employ any political grouping (e.g., Turnhalle) in an advisory or other institutional fashion and have indicated that the Administrator-General and his staff would be impartial. He will also, by virtue of the enabling legislation, have the authority to repeal or modify discriminatory laws and regulations, including laws previously reserved to the South African Parliament.

Of special significance, if the South Africans follow through, is their confirmation that in order to reach an internationally acceptable solution a UN Special Representative would at all stages have to be satisfied as to the fairness of the political process. The South Africans indicated that they would welcome a UN Special Representative as soon as possible after the appointment of an Administrator-General and said they could accept appropriate aspects of a UN presence for which there are suitable precedents.

The South Africans also indicated that they could accept a Panel of Jurists appointed by the Secretary General to settle disputes arising in the political process and consider distinctions between political and criminal prisoners. They also undertook to release Namibia detainees and move all Namibian prisoners to institutions in Namibian territory.

Many important elements of a final settlement package must still be developed, including details of South Africa’s phased withdrawal, the number and functions of UN staff, how to deal with financial questions, and—most importantly—how to bring South African officials into contact with the other principal parties, especially Waldheim and SWAPO representatives. However, Botha and Fourie told McHenry that they are willing to go anywhere at any time to meet again on Namibia.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”
2. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Good—Hold this together.”