48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town1

49696. Exdis—Cape Town for Ambassador from Asst. Secretary. Subject: South African Position on Namibia. USUN for Ambassador Young.

1. I submitted the following memorandum to the Secretary.

2. Summary. The South African Ambassador called on me on March 4 and said his government has not ruled out an internationally negotiated settlement for Namibia. Many of the Seven Points offer a framework for continued negotiations. However, the South Africans feel they are obliged to bring the Turnhalle Conference along in this matter and believe a way must be found to convince Turnhalle it has a stake in a negotiated settlement. Botha indicated he would be in touch with his government and agreed to continue talks next week. I urged him to remind his government of the importance of moving ahead expeditiously.

3. The South African position on a Namibian settlement. The South African Ambassador met me March 4 to continue our discussion on Namibia which we began on February 26.2 Botha, in reviewing the Seven Points, and speaking “personally,” indicated that many of the Seven Points offer a framework for continued negotiations.3 He allowed that the question of a United Nations relationship, however, would have to be considered carefully and asked what we meant by repeated references to the fact that the United Nations would convene a Geneva conference.

4. I reminded Botha that we had kept Waldheim informed of our consultations and expected at some point the United Nations would have to legitimize the negotiating process. Botha wanted to make sure we understood South Africa would not finance the costs of a conference. I told Botha that we had always understood this to be South Africa’s position.

5. Botha took great pains to defend his government’s position on Namibia. Reviewing United Nations criticism of the way South Africa had dealt with Namibia, Botha pointed out that his government had [Page 107] made substantial concessions. Apartheid was being brought to an end, and the country would not be subdivided into “bantustans”. A date of independence had been set and the South Africans meant to respect the date.4 South Africa had allowed the people of Namibia to decide the territory’s future.5 In response to my comment that the Turnhalle is ethnically based, Botha agreed, but said that the Turnhalle’s experience proved that the black delegates were prepared to work together on an inter-tribal basis. National leaders are emerging and the founders of SWAPO are returning to the territory to participate in the political process. Presumably referring to the three tier government structure being considered in Turnhalle, Botha said that once black majority rule has been achieved, the new government will be able to reshape arrangements for the territory in a manner satisfactory to the country’s needs. The South African Government would not be able to interfere and Namibia will no longer be an issue in South African domestic politics. The South African Parliament would not have six white members from Namibia.

6. With respect to Walvis Bay, South Africa intended to retain sovereignty which was its internationally recognized right. If a moderate regime emerged in Namibia, Botha, as Foreign Minister, would be prepared to negotiate a modification in Walvis Bay’s status.

7. South Africa could not turn the territory over to Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO. Nujoma does not enjoy majority support and if he took power bloodshed would ensue. The chances of radicalization would be great and Botswana would be threatened by its turbulent neighbor. Botha allowed that South Africa would then have a serious domestic political problem. The government would be seen to have turned power over to radicals and have permitted chaos.

8. South Africa had every reason to wish to settle with SWAPO. SWAPO had approached the South African Government to say that if power were transferred directly to SWAPO, it would allow South African troops to stay in the territory and would expect South African administrators to help govern. As attractive as this solution might have been, his government could not turn its back on the Turnhalle.

9. I told Botha that I would not take exception with his description of the internal situation in Namibia or the potential impact of Namibia on South African domestic politics. Nevertheless, South Africa had to be aware that the Namibian situation has been internationalized. Too many parties are involved in the issue for South Africa and the Turnhalle to ignore their say in the outcome. The United Nation’s authority [Page 108] in the matter is now a fact of international life and South Africa has to live with that fact. The Turnhalle itself must be aware that any government which results from its deliberations will have great difficulty in securing international recognition and, in all likelihood, will be subject to continuing international opposition. SWAPO’s external support would not diminish and violence would continue, possibly escalating. The United States has taken a stand in the United Nations and is under an obligation to seek an internationally acceptable settlement. Pressure can only grow on us if such a settlement is not reached.

10. Botha accepted my points and said that for this reason, he assumed his government was prepared to let the search for an international agreement continue. The problem which the South Africans face at this juncture is one of bringing the Turnhalle along. Some way, he suggested, must be found to convince Turnhalle that its interests would be served by international negotiations. Botha asked if we, the EC–9 or the United Nations might be prepared to help convince the Turnhalle delegates of the wisdom of this approach. I deflected Botha’s inquiry.

11. Botha raised the EC–9’s demarche of early February and said that all the points made by the EC–9 were acceptable to South Africa except the community’s reference to the United Nations. He suggested that we meet again after he has had a further opportunity to consult Cape Town and, in addition to a further discussion of the Seven Points, consider the questions raised in the EC–9 demarche. I agreed and expect to see Botha later next week to continue talks.

12. Comment. I am encouraged by the approach Botha took. Although he said he was speaking “personally,” he is too careful a diplomat to do so without reflecting official views. Without committing South Africa specifically, in effect, Botha appears to be saying his government is receptive to renewing the validity of the Seven Points. He is probing for some way to bring the Turnhalle delegates along, but we will have to be careful, since we do not wish to give the impression we will associate ourselves with the Turnhalle. In another round of talks with the Ambassador, I hope to be able to pin him down further and obtain sufficient assurance that South Africa is prepared to seek an internationally acceptable settlement so that we can reopen talks with the Africans.

Christopher
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0348. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Arthur Shankle (S/S); approved by Schaufele.
  2. See Document 46.
  3. See Tab 2, Document 264.
  4. December 31, 1978.
  5. Reference is to the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference.