42. Memorandum From William Griffith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Afghanistan and Angola

Analysis (all supported by CIA analyses):

a. Savimbi’s revolt is gaining, not losing.

b. The Luanda government is weak and factionalized, largely between mulattos and blacks.

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c. The Cubans are doing badly in Angola.

d. Therefore, Luanda (especially the mulattos) cannot get rid of the Soviets and Cubans.

e. Savimbi wants to form a coalition without the mulattos, which would then get rid of the Soviets and Cubans.

The invasion of Afghanistan (and the above analysis) objectively outmode the Vance/McHenry proposals for U.S. unconditional diplomatic recognition of Angola. On the contrary, they require, under specific conditions, U.S. arms aid to Savimbi.2

U.S.

a. Until now I have been opposed to this, because Savimbi still has some ties with Pretoria—the kiss of death in black Africa. But Afghanistan changes the situation. Moreover, Funk’s conversations with Savimbi convince me that Savimbi does want a coalition.3

b. This is the best project for us to cooperate with [less than 1 line not declassified], and even [1 line not declassified], would probably support it, and [less than 1 line not declassified] is rapidly reviving ties with Angola.

c. Our precondition to Savimbi must be that he cut all ties with Pretoria and that he be supplied arms via Zaire and Zambia, and by sea. We should supply him, via [less than 1 line not declassified], with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.

RECOMMENDATION: That you have a SCC meeting on this soon and that a working group be set up to explore this with France and Portugal.4

Blackwill and Funk have read and concur with this memorandum.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: 1/77–1/81. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Brement, Blackwill, Funk, and Rentschler. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “DA, review in a mini-SCC. ZB.”
  2. Aaron bracketed this paragraph and underlined “U.S. arms aid to Savimbi.” At the end of the memorandum he wrote: “The trouble is that it is against the law.”
  3. See Document 40.
  4. In a February 6 handwritten note to Brzezinski, Aaron wrote: “ZB—I could explore on the margins of my meeting Friday. It is against the law for CIA to do anything on this. DA” Brzezinski initialed the note and wrote “OK.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: 1/77–1/81)