Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

40. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 8, 1979, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA

PARTICIPANTS

• Jonas Savimbi, Head of UNITA (Angola)
• Jerry Funk, Staff Member, NSC

SUMMARY

Jonas Savimbi met with NSC staffer Jerry Funk for 1½ hours Nov 8 in a private confidential meeting set up through the AFL–CIO. Savimbi makes credible claims to political and economic support from eight specified Black African countries, plus Saudi Arabia, France and China, and minimal cooperation from South Africa. He contends that the MPLA government of Angola is at a crucial stage, and in great need of U.S. recognition and the economic assistance which they have not gotten from the Soviets. He asks that we think in terms of pushing hard for a “global political solution”,—meaning that we could begin exploratory talks with dos Santos in terms of a package: we give recognition and economic assistance, and in return we insist on a significant reduction in the Cuban military presence and some genuine movement toward an MPLA–UNITA political reconciliation. Savimbi feels that such reconciliation is possible within the next year and would quickly lead Angola out of the Soviet/Cuban orbit. He recognizes that dos Santos is not yet his own man and may have some difficulty in accepting such a package.² (S)

Background to Meeting, Atmospherics

Savimbi is in the U.S. on a visit of about one week, under the aegis of the American Socialist Party, was received by the AFL–CIO, and given a forum in Washington by Georgetown CSIS, the Carnegie Face-to-Face meetings, and others. This private meeting with NSC was arranged by the AFL–CIO, after an earlier meeting was aborted when the ASP “handlers” in NYC “inadvertently” leaked the news of the earlier appointment to the press, and it was denied by Funk. The second meeting was more discretely handled, sans ASP. (S)

Savimbi, who is very security conscious, arrived for the meeting at the AFL–CIO (AALC) office, (where Funk was waiting), accompanied by his own security man and two D.C. uniformed police. (S)

Savimbi is an impressive man,—very intelligent, well-informed, pragmatic, articulate, sensitive, strong-willed,—no ego problems. He began by apologizing for the “amateurish performance” of his hosts in leaking the previous meeting date, saying that he wanted to establish genuine conversation with the U.S. government, and did not need that kind of publicity. He expressed gratitude for the ease with which he got his visa (in Dakar) and for Dr. Brzezinski taking the interest to hear him out. (S)

In the ensuing 1½ hours his emphasis was on finding a viable political solution to the Angolan problem. He was logical in his presentation and answered questions easily. (S)

View of the MPLA

Savimbi sees the MPLA government “at a crossroads”,—they are in deep trouble economically, their military and civilian logistics are in disarray, and the population and the leadership is frustrated with the Cubans. The MPLA leadership recognizes the need for U.S. and Western economic help, since it is not forthcoming from the Soviets/Cubans, and they feel an increasing danger of an uprising by the black population of the Luanda area. (S)

Savimbi sees dos Santos as a weak person, a compromise, interim president,—selected because he was black, generally inoffensive to most, and controllable. If a Congress is held next spring on schedule, dos Santos will not be re-elected, and the most probable successor is Lopo do Nascimento, former Prime Minister, who was removed by Neto last year because he had too strong a political base. Lopo, a black, is seen as strong, moderate and pragmatic by Savimbi, and “the true representative of the people of the Luanda area,”—i.e., the urban Kimbundu. (S)

Savimbi sees Lucio Lara (party theoretician) and Iko Carreira (Defense), both mullatos (and therefore not viable “presidential timber”), as the number one and number two strong men, who are using dos Santos to keep control. He is not certain if they will be able to work with Lopo, but if Lopo is pushed to the top, he will soon be his own man,—whereas dos Santos can never be. (S)

(Note: Savimbi was aware of rumors that Lopo do Nascimento, who had been “exiled” to be a high level functionary in the ECA, Addis, was going home. I could not confirm to him, for security reasons, that this was so. He is returning at the call of dos Santos, probably with the approval of Lara and Carreira.) (S)

Savimbi refused to claim that he was in direct contact with any top-level MPLA leadership, but said that he had many excellent sources of information which he could rely on. (S)

View of Cuban/Soviets.

Savimbi sees the Cubans as ineffective in guerrilla warfare, and certainly not enthusiastic warriors. (S)

More importantly, he sees a growing perception in the rank and file, and in the leadership of MPLA that the Cubans are inefficient, incompetent, increasingly arrogant, unhelpful “foreign intruders.” (S)

But he recognizes that Angola has become important to Cuba for its own political and economic reasons, and therefore he feels that they would be loath to leave Angola, even if asked,—and could well overthrow any MPLA government who leaned too hard on them. (S)

He sees the Soviets as generally content with the status quo,—an MPLA government propped up by the Cubans,—and not interested in a more direct role for now. But should the status quo be seriously threatened, they would try to encourage the Cubans to act to preserve it. (S)

View of SAG/SWAPO/Zaire.

Savimbi is critical of SAG’s internal politics, (“we share no values”), but willing to “do business” with them,—“much as the rest of the nations in the area do.” (S)

He says that he has few real differences with SWAPO, since they, (the Ovimbundu of UNITA, and the Ovambu of SWAPO) are very close ethnically and neither are “really concerned much with ideology.” Their occasional fights have been over serious tactical problems, such as life-and-death water-hole ownership in the desert. Generally, he says, “we simply try to avoid each other.” (S)

Regarding Zaire, Savimbi feels that Mobutu is quite understandably serious about his rapprochement with MPLA, but that he maintains contact with UNITA. Mobutu has cut aid to FNLA, but that Holden Roberto still remains a political force as leader of the Bakongo people. (S)

Mechanics of the War.

Savimbi says he is able to operate at will through more than one-third of the country, and could take urban centers for short periods of time, but could not now hold them without air support. (His description of the territory he holds squares with CIA maps.) (S)

He claims to have virtually total loyalty from the people of the area he controls. He says he is able to get much of his food and materiel from raids on MPLA units and stores. He has been supplied with Chinese arms (direct assistance), and has received food, fuel and light transport from SAG (on a commercial basis.) (S)

Savimbi states that the establishment of a DMZ on the Namibian border would present some problems for him, but none that could not be overcome. He feels he could continue with supply via isolated airstrips, and via coastal landings. (S)

Aid to UNITA.

Savimbi claims to be getting political and some economic aid from Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, and Liberia. He claims political and substantial economic aid from Saudi Arabia, France, and China, and the cooperation of South Africa. (S)

Of those African countries listed as friends, he seems particularly close to Senegal. He carries a Senegalese passport, and is returning to Angola via Morocco, and Senegal. (S)

Savimbi is also very close personally to Kaunda, who took personal care of Savimbi’s mother in Zambia for some time. (Note: Savimbi suggested that Kaunda could serve as a trusted channel of communication to him, as they are in close and regular contact.) (S)

UNITA’s Objectives.

Savimbi says that UNITA is firmly committed to a unitary state, and would not participate in the Balkanization of Angola. He says that there must be a strong central government, but one that can allow for some sort of regional autonomy to meet the needs of the “ethnic groups now excluded”,—i.e., the Ovimbundu of UNITA and the Bakongo of FNLA. (S)

He emphasizes that over the past four years, UNITA has clearly proven that they do in fact represent the legitimate political interests of the Ovimbundu, some 40% of the population, and that therefore there can be no viable government of Angola which excludes MPLA. (He makes a similar case for the inclusion of FNLA, though they represent a much smaller group.) (S)

He also makes a strong point that while he is a “democratic socialist”, he is first a nationalist, and shares “the basic human and political values with the U.S.” (S)

Potential for Solution—U.S. Role.

Savimbi believes that there can be no military solution—that there must be and can be a political solution. (S)

Since the MPLA needs U.S. and Western economic aid so badly, the U.S. is in a strong position to assist in finding a “global” solution.—by offering to move to recognition on a “package basis”. He says, we should offer to talk about recognition and aid, and in return demand a substantial reduction of Cuban military presence, and some movement toward internal reconciliation with both UNITA and FNLA. (S)

He makes the point that if we simply give recognition, we lose leverage. (S)

He also asks that we encourage the continued help he is now receiving from mutual friends, and quietly encourage others in Africa, Europe, and Asia. (S)

He feels that in order to bring MPLA along we would need to be able to put some coercive pressure on the Cubans and Soviets not to interfere in a settlement process. He also feels that the OAU could play a constructive role by providing some sort of “presence” to guarantee non-intervention by the Cubans, and to guarantee the security of UNITA and FNLA leadership during the “reconciliation period.” (S)

But, he emphasizes, the essential role can be played now by the U.S. if we have the political will to exchange recognition and aid for removing Cubans and internal reconciliation. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 110, Angola: 8/79–3/80. Secret. Drafted by Funk on November 13. The meeting took place at the AFL–CIO offices.
2. An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the right-hand margin and underlined the portion beginning with “He asks” and ending with “the next year” and the last sentence in the paragraph.