351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa1

18587. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Further U.S.-South African Nuclear Talks. Refs: (A) 78 State 3270682 (B) 78 Pretoria 76653 (C) State 4052.4

1. Secret (Entire text)

[Page 1072]

2. Unless you perceive compelling reasons to the contrary, you should take appropriate opportunity in week of January 22 to seek from Brand Fourie or Pik Botha a decision from the SAG on whether to enter the nuclear settlement set forth during the June 1978 Smith talks.5

3. Suggested points to be made in your approach, revised from ref. A to incorporate your suggestions ref. B, follow:

—You will recall that in June both sides stressed the urgency of resolving the nuclear issues set forth in the Joint Minute and expressed the hope that the necessary decisions could be taken within two months of that time.

—The communication we received in September6 was inconclusive, did not lead to the implementation foreseen in the Joint Minute, and in fact raised issues we thought had been clarified earlier.

—Moreover, since September we have provided a team of your legal experts detailed briefings and documentation on all aspects of the Non-Proliferation Act, ancillary procedures, and administrative regulations. We have also supplied a draft text of a revised nuclear cooperation agreement. We have indicated our willingness to discuss further the technical aspects of an interim safeguards development program at Valindaba.

—My government is most concerned that our extensive exchanges over the past year have not brought about a nuclear agreement.

—We question whether substantial further delay would be in the interests of the U.S. or South Africa, and believe it could only aggravate international concern regarding South Africa’s nuclear intentions.

—In view of the above and since, as Ambassador Smith pointed out in the June discussions, time is of the essence in our nuclear proposals, we need very soon (FYI: we would have in mind a couple of weeks) your government’s decision on whether to enter the nuclear arrangements set forth in the Joint Minute.

4. FYI: On a contingency basis, we will be considering additional steps on our part which may prove necessary in light of the SAG’s response to the above approach. They will be refinements on and alternatives to the thinking we have already spelled out in the paper “Tactical Options on Valindaba Safeguards.” We will wish to draw heavily on your views and recommendations as we proceed.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0513. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town. Drafted by Allen W. Locke (PM/NPP); cleared by Gerard Smith (S/AS), Thomas R. Pickering (OES), Richard M. Moose (AF), Jerome Kahan (PM), Robert L. Gallucci (INR/STA), Charles N. Van Doren (ACDA/NP), William Salmon (T), and Gerald Helman (IO); approved by Vance.
  2. See Document 350.
  3. See footnote 6, Document 350.
  4. In telegram 4052 to Pretoria and the White House, January 6, the Department instructed the Embassy to postpone approaching the South African Government about nuclear talks until mid-January. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0521)
  5. See Documents 343345.
  6. See Document 348.