348. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1
5646. Subject: South African Response to US–SA Nuclear Talks. Ref: (A) Pretoria 3652,2 (B) Pretoria 3662,3 (C) Pretoria 3783.4
There follows below the text of an undated paper entitled “US/South African relations in the field of nuclear energy” handed to me by Secretary of the SAG Department of Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie on September 22, 1978. I had asked him a few days earlier about the status of the SAG reply to our talks of last June, and he said that he and Atomic Energy Board President “Ampie” Roux had prepared a draft which received ministerial approval with some amendments which were then being incorporated. He said the paper which follows thus represented government policy although it had not been shown to the Ministers again. He seemed momentarily uncertain whether to give me the paper at this stage—probably because of the fact the paper had not been reviewed again by Ministers and that there will be a new Prime Minister and possibly a shift of other Ministers before the end of next week—but expressed concern that we might misinterpret further delay. Since it is a basically favorable but still-qualified reply requiring additional clarifications and assurances, there is obviously still room for change by the new Cabinet. I will submit additional comment separately.5
[Page 1061]2. Begin text (confidential)
1. The South African Government has now had the opportunity to take note of the discussions which took place on June 26–28 between representatives of the United States of America, headed by Ambassador Gerard Smith, and representatives of the Republic of South Africa, headed by Foreign Secretary Dr B.G. Fourie and including Dr A.J.A. Roux, President of the Atomic Energy Board. In taking note of these discussions, the South African Government has had the advantage of being guided by the “Joint Minute” which was prepared by the two delegations.
2. The South African Government associates itself with the aim of finding ways and means to assure the renewal and continuation of cooperation between the two governments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Furthermore, the South African Government has taken note of the view expressed by the US delegation that such cooperation, from the point of view of the Government of the United States, cannot be achieved without South Africa’s accession to the NPT.
3. In this context the South African Government must reemphasize the fact that it has always actively supported the principle of non-proliferation and has over many years made its contribution towards the promotion of this principle in a positive way. In these circumstances, and provided agreement can be reached on the matters raised in this document, South Africa is willing to consider accession to the NPT on the assumption that the United States is prepared to give an undertaking ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel to South Africa as provided for in the existing US/South African agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy and the contract between the South African Electricity Supply Commission and the then ERDA. The South African Government feels that such an act would re-establish the mutual confidence which has existed for so many years in the nuclear field and which is an essential basis for future cooperation. This confidence was severely damaged by the unilateral action taken against South Africa without any prior warning by the US Government in recent years.
In regard to the supply of HEU for research reactors the South African Government fully shares the concern of the Government of the United States over continuing its supply to so many countries throughout the world and is prepared to cooperate with the United States to develop fuel for HEU reactors based on uranium enriched to no more than 20 percent. However, it feels that until this objective is achieved the United States should adhere to the inter-governmental agreement between the two countries and supply fuel for the Safari reactor as in the past, so as to enable South Africa to carry out its normal programme for which the Safari reactor was purchased from the United States.
[Page 1062]4. Furthermore, the South African Government must emphasize the fact that decisions in which it has had no say and which negated the validity of Article IV of the NPT, have had the effect of penalising South Africa, with its ability to produce enriched uranium on the basis of a process developed by itself, more than any other country in the free world. The question which therefore arises is whether the United States Government would be prepared to reconsider its attitude and thus to recognise the achievements of the South African Government and to consider assisting it in achieving its rightful objectives.
5. The United States Government is aware of the fact that the South African Government has always been concerned about protecting the sensitive enrichment technology on which the Valindaba plant is based. This protection is essential to South Africa’s national interests. Secondly, and of equally great importance, the spread of knowledge of uranium enrichment technology, through a safeguards system administered by the IAEA, could so easily completely jeopardize the objective of non-proliferation. However, in spite of this important consideration, the South African Government has taken serious note of the possibility discussed by representatives of the two countries at their recent meeting in Pretoria, of a safeguards system which would be based upon “periphery approach”. It is prepared to give further consideration to this approach provided it can be satisfied that the implementation of the safeguards system decided upon will not defeat the objective of non-proliferation. This aspect should be considered and dealt with as soon as agreement on the salient features of the re-establishment of the technical cooperation between our two countries in the nuclear field is in sight. In the meantime the South African Government would be grateful if, in an effort to clarify the situation further, the United States authorities could enlighten it on the technical details of the safeguards which the United States envisages for the plant which it proposes to place under safeguards.
6. During the Pretoria discussions between representatives of the two countries in February6 and again from 26 to 28 June 1978, the South African delegation was briefly informed of the salient features of the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.7 A study of the legislation which has since been undertaken has revealed that there are several material aspects on which South Africa still has no clarity. The South African Government would, in particular, wish to be sure that there is no doubt about the interpretation of the legislation and its implications. Accordingly, with a view to promoting progress [Page 1063] towards the target referred to in paragraph 5 above, the South African Government would be happy to send a specialist delegation to Washington to obtain absolute clarity on the United States legislation, as early as possible.
7. Furthermore, the South African delegation has been authorised by the government to proceed with the negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two countries, within the framework and spirit set out above and in the “Joint Minute” prepared following the June discussions.8
8. In conclusion the South African Government must re-emphasise the importance it attaches to the consideration of the consequences of a UN economic boycott should it be instituted, as indicated in the “Joint Minute”, it is the intention of the South African Government to raise this issue with the United States Government at an early stage. End text.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 9/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 3652 from Pretoria, June 29, the Embassy summarized the final session of nuclear talks held on June 28: “Amb. Smith said he wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding of the integral relationship between initiation of the safeguards project at Valindaba and our willingness to authorize limited shipments of HEU for the Safari reactor. He urged an immediate beginning of the technical exchanges preparatory to initiation of the actual safeguards exercise at Valindaba, in order to avoid unnecessary delays. He said that in order to enable us to authorize HEU shipments the safeguards project would have to have reached the point where there were US and/or IAEA personnel at the perimeter of the Valindaba site. The South Africans said they understood this.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2346)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 343.↩
- In telegram 3783 from Pretoria, July 6, the Embassy informed the Department of a July 3 note in which the South African delegation had no objections to the changes listed in the comment at the end of the text of the Joint Minute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2371)↩
- In telegram 5687 from Pretoria, September 25, Edmondson provided greater detail on his discussion with Fourie. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2285)↩
- See Documents 331 and 332.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 332.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 343, and footnote 2, Document 344.↩