Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

332. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State¹

Pretoria, February 21, 1978, 0645Z

951. Department please pass White House. Subject: South African Nuclear Talks: Ambassador’s Talking Points. Ref: Pretoria 0950.²

1. Following is text of talking points presented orally to Fourie and Roux mentioned reftel.

2. Begin quote:

Introduction

—The high level exchange of communications between our two governments since last August has been devoted to a considerable extent to issues relating to nuclear cooperation between our two governments.

—Your visit to Washington last November,³ Brand (Fourie), led to the idea of a team coming to South Africa in an effort to explore and find a new basis for that cooperation to continue.

—In this way their presence here would serve to build one of those areas of agreement mentioned by Prime Minister Vorster in one of his communications and in so doing open the way for resolving other differences.

—In your conversation with Joe Nye last November,⁴ Brand, you referred to two issues of concern to your government: (1) fuel for Safari I and Koeburg and (2) the nature of interim safeguards at Valindaba.

—Team is here specifically to present results of our careful consideration of these issues, one of which is a major element of our bilateral nuclear relationship and the other an outgrowth of our request that SAG take concrete actions in furtherance of your earlier assurances.

—Before turning to the team, would like to make three further general points.

Vorster grievances

—First, with respect to the PM’s October letter to President Carter,⁵ we have studied with care all the concerns raised there.

—While the team is not in a position to address in detail all of these concerns at this time, this does not mean that the U.S. would dismiss them or seek to imply that they are of no significance. We are willing to address all of them, but

—Some, as Joe Nye pointed out, are multilateral in nature, and beyond our ability to control.

—Those which we can deal with, clearly, can be dealt with most effectively in the more favorable climate that would be created by the SAG’s taking the actions we have proposed.

—It is our hope that through this team visit, we can develop a clearer picture of a continuing US–SAG nuclear relationship, and so establish a basis for your government’s consideration of NPT adherence and placing interim safeguards on Valindaba which in turn would make it possible to provide fuel for Safari I and Koeburg.

Kalahari

—Another point I believe needs to be referred to is the Kalahari site.

—As Joe Nye noted, progress toward a settlement would be greatly facilitated if you would clear up for us the nature of the site.

—I have to say, in all frankness, that our experts are unable to explain the site as other than a nuclear test site.

—Whatever settlement involving continued nuclear supply we eventually reach, we will have to assure the Congress, the NRC, and the public that we are not contributing to a program that is on the threshold of a nuclear test.

—I understand that your government may be extremely reluctant to divulge detailed information on the site.

—Nonetheless, it would be most useful to the settlement process if this question were clarified during the Washington team’s presence here.

Developments in U.S. nuclear policy

—Finally, I would like to review one or two aspects of our nuclear policy as they affect U.S.-South African relations in particular, and U.S. nuclear cooperation worldwide.

—The U.S. Congress has just passed new legislation,⁶ which the President will sign into law very shortly, that revises our nuclear export policy.

—We will be renegotiating our agreements for cooperation to bring them into line with new conditions required by the law. We have about two years to accomplish this.

—We can, if you like, offer some preliminary views on how the U.S.-South African agreement would be affected. The team has copies of the law and Mr. Locke would be happy to brief such persons as you designate.

—One provision I should note is the requirement in the law that a recipient have all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in order to qualify for continued receipt of U.S. nuclear materials and technology after the 24-month renegotiation period.

—One other policy consideration I should mention, although it is not a part of the new legislation, is the President’s decision in April that henceforth we will not supply highly enriched uranium unless two conditions apply: that the project for which the HEU is intended is “of exceptional merit”; and that it is not technically feasible to convert the project to use lower enriched material.

Presentation of team

—Now I would like to describe the team and what it has brought in the way of proposals.

—Allan Locke is Deputy Director of the Office of Non-Proliferation Policy in the State Department, and has worked closely with Joe Nye (whom you have met), as well as with Ambassador Gerald Smith and other concerned offices on our current nuclear policy initiatives.

—Joerg Menzel is a safeguards expert with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is thoroughly conversant with the IAEA’s efforts on enrichment plant safeguards and authored the proposal on Valindaba that we wish to discuss with you.

—Richard Lewis, with the Argonne National Laboratory, is one of our leading technical men in the field of research reactor fuels, most recently regarding development of lower enriched fuels for research reactors. He has looked closely into the Safari situation and would be able to present his findings on how Safari might opearate with lower enriched fuels supplied by the U.S., consistent with our overall policy direction.

—We can go through these proposals now in whatever detail you like, or the team members can leave with you preliminary written proposals for your study. We can spend more time discussing any of the points I have raised.

—If you believe that our proposals could contribute to the process of settling our nuclear problem, and merit follow-up discussion at the technical level, I would be glad to place the team at your disposal. End quote

3. Request Department repeat to USIAEA Vienna for Ambassador Smith and Embassy Stockholm for Oplinger, NSG delegation.

Bowdler

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 2/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 331.
3. See Document 320.
4. See Document 320.
5. See Document 311.
6. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, H.R. 8638, PL 95–242, signed into law by President Carter on March 10, imposed strict nuclear export controls.