308. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House1

221539. For Dr Brzezinski only. Following repeat Pretoria 4813 Action SecState dtd 9/15/77.

Quote Secret Pretoria 4813. Subject: South African Nuclear Assurances. Ref: (A) State 221176,2 (B) Pretoria 4736,3 (C) State 218572.4

1. I delivered Secretary’s letter and aide-memoire to Pik Botha at 4 p.m. local time. After learning of subject of my visit, he immediately called in Brand Fourie. The 45 minutes which followed proceeded on two planes: (A) The nuclear issue, and (B) the deteriorating state of US-South African relations.

2. Botha’s attitude toward the aide-memoire was that it was “disappointing” and made him “very unhappy.” He said the PM in his August 24 speech5 had proposed a discussion of a variety of issues: NPT, safeguards, Safari I, Koeberg and problems relating to IAEA. Now instead of expressing a willingness to enter into discussions as equals, Botha said, you send us an aide-memoire telling us what is good for us, threatening us further on the Kalahari site and ending up by saying that if we do a series of things, this would allow you to supply LEU for Koeberg. This is a super power telling a small power what to do and it is not acceptable to us. We are a sovereign state, richly endowed [Page 934] and capable of defending our borders. We determine for ourselves what is good for us. Our PM has made a serious, balanced proposal to sit down and talk about various key aspects of the nuclear issue and you have ignored this in favor of telling us what to do.

3. Both Botha and Fourie spent considerable time attacking our stand on the Kalahari site. Both led off asking why we had thrown in the Kalahari issue. The PM had given all the necessary assurances. South Africa’s word was now being impugned. He objected to overflights with satellites and high altitude aircraft. He did not think this is legal and will eventually want to come back to us on this “unlawful spying activity.” Fourie said that we should know that the drilling at Kalahari will continue. Five holes have so far been sunk and in the months ahead our spy satellite will see them drilling seven more. He suggested we save our money because the pictures would not show anything inconsistent with South Africa’s assurances. Botha added that no nuclear material has been introduced into those holes or come near the site.

4. Regarding our relations, Botha repeated the same themes covered in our first conversation on Kalahari (Pretoria 4211).6 He regarded the aide-memoire as another effort to beat South Africa into submission. He claimed to have information that we had consulted our Embassies about the impact of cutting off oil to South Africa. Now you try to lay down the line we should follow on our nuclear policy. “If you persist in this course, then I see grave consequences for our relations.”

5. I tried to explain the mutual interest represented by our approach. I again stressed that our representation on Kalahari was not designed to strangle SA (as he claimed) but a move consistent with our world-wide policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capacity. I reviewed the advantages for South Africa in signing NPT and agreeing to safeguards. I again went over the importance of working together on Rhodesia and Namibia and taking meaningful action on full participation on the domestic front. He brushed all these arguments aside, repeating the earlier point that we had not addressed ourselves to the PM’s specific proposal for discussions on an equal basis.

6. In conclusion I said I assumed they would want to study the aide-memoire in the light of the Smith-Moose-Sole conversation. Botha observed that Sole is uninstructed and is not familiar with the subject. He stated that I should consider what he had told me as the reply. If there were any further comments they wished to make, they would call me in.

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7. My reading is that Botha will have little more to say. I do not anticipate a shift to a more forthcoming attitude. Their response to fuel for Koeberg was that if they saw some way of avoiding the 200 million rand penalty clause, they would drop the project right away and have told the French so. Further, they challenged me on why fuel for Safari I was not included. I told them I was uninstructed. I believe the only way we might break out of this impasse is through a meeting between Ambassador Smith and appropriate SAG officials like Dr. Roux and Brand Fourie. Perhaps this can be arranged privately somewhere in Europe for at least an exploratory round of talks even though the prospects are not encouraging.

Bowdler

Unquote.

Vance
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Perito. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770005–0688)
  2. In telegram 221176 to Pretoria, September 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to “deliver immediately to Botha, or in his absence and at your discretion Fourie,” the aide mémoire and message from Vance to Botha. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 108, 9/15–22/77)
  3. In telegram 4736 from Pretoria, September 13, the Embassy provided a draft text for a proposed letter from Vance to Botha: “Dear Pik: President Carter has asked that I convey our appreciation for the assurances given by Prime Minister Vorster regarding South Africa’s peaceful nuclear intentions. That action was an important beginning in reassuring the international community over the aims of South Africa’s programs in the nuclear field. Following up on the Prime Minister’s public statement on August 24, I think that it would be in our mutual interest to work together to deal with the remaining concerns surrounding South Africa’s nuclear plans. With this in mind, I would like you to know that Ambassador Gerard C. Smith will be contacting Ambassador Sole in Washington during the course of this week about consolidating the positive effect of the Prime Minister’s assurances. I trust that Ambassador Smith’s proposals will be given the most serious attention by your government. Sincerely, Cy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1802) The letter was sent as drafted.
  4. See Document 307.
  5. See footnote 5, Document 307.
  6. See Document 294.