Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 17, 1978

SUBJECT

• Moose Mission to Luanda

Attached at Tab A are proposed instructions to the Moose mission to Angola which departs Saturday evening, November 18.² These instructions are based on our existing policy as well as the deliberations in the Mini-PRC.

The Moose mission will explore the possibility of a draw-down in Cuban forces in exchange for steps toward normalization. In this connection, we would offer to work with the Angolans on removing external threats to their security. We would not, however, indicate a willingness to discourage others from aiding UNITA. Rather, we would point out and seek to discuss the possibility that the UNITA insurgency could be terminated through the establishment of a government of national reconciliation and the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces.

The Delegation will also seek support for our efforts for a peaceful solution to the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia and will indicate our support for their efforts to improve relations with Zaire.

On the question of trade and aid, State would like to indicate that we “favor increased U.S. private sector involvement in Angola” and offer to “provide interested U.S. firms with what information and counsel we can by way of encouragement.”³ State also requests that the Delegation be permitted to mention the possibility of considering further ExIm credits (e.g., with the Benguela Railway) once Angola’s current arrears are cleared up.

Since the latter will be politically visible, we would like your guidance on whether the Delegation should go this far.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. Tab A, a November 17 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, is attached but not printed.
3. Carter underlined the phrases “favor increased U.S. private sector involvement in Angola” and “provide interested U.S. firms with what information and counsel we can by way of encouragement.” He also highlighted the last sentence and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin.
4. Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “(In brief, I want to avoid a repetition of the May experience, when all of a sudden we seemed to be courting Angola, without any tangible quid pro quo).” Carter wrote “I agree” next to Brzezinski’s note.