27. Memorandum From Tom Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

SUBJECT

  • Angolan Initiative

The Angolan request2 for a meeting to discuss the Cuban presence, especially with the hooker about US guarantees, presents us with an intriguing problem.3

First, we have to determine the accuracy of the report. I think Walt Cutler should go back to Mobutu to confirm the details and get any atmospherics that he can. [1 line not declassified]

Second, we then have to decide how to respond. I think the USUN channel (McHenry) is appropriate to acknowledge receipt and convey our yes or no.

Third is the issue of the content of our response. I see no alternative but to accept the Angolan offer and, indeed, see it as a golden opportunity. As I have mentioned before, I think Neto is running very scared on both economic and political grounds and genuinely wants to make his peace. It is of course in our interest to do so if reasonable conditions are met. (One caveat: the guarantees demand could simply be a way of putting the burden for expected failure on us. I don’t think this is the case, but we have to guard against it.) We would be foolish to hold out for evacuation of all Cubans; equally foolish to go ahead with [Page 55] normalization in the absence of any movement. I think we should look for a substantial initial draw-down with the promise of reasonably rapid movement towards an acceptable level,4 and then move to normalize. The issue of Angolan security should be answered in terms of Angola normalizing its relationship with Zaire (to which we will be a contributor) and getting the Namibia agreement sealed. Once these are done, the question of external security is moot. That will leave, however, the question of internal security and Savimbi—which the Angolans surely must have also had in mind. That is not going to be an easy choice of course, but on balance I think I would cut Savimbi off completely (and ask others to do so) if we were reasonably sure that we were getting what we want from Neto. Solution of his Savimbi problem, plus settlements with Zaire and Namibia, substantially remove the reason for keeping Cubans in Angola. This does not exactly solve our Savimbi problem in its moral or political dimensions. McHenry believes that foreign support is the obstacle to Savimbi-Neto negotiations; I fear that withdrawal of foreign support removes Neto’s incentive to negotiate at all.5 Nonetheless, I see no good reason to keep Savimbi in play unless we think he has reasonable near-term prospects of taking over. As far as I can tell, that is not likely.6

Fourth is the question of sending a delegation. We should do so—not too high-powered, but something more than just Don McHenry. I would recommend that David go along with Don; if that is impossible, then somebody else from NSC. Neto perceives a split between USUN/State on the one hand and the White House on the other. A united front will both enhance our credibility and reduce the danger of misunderstandings on the home front.

These are initial thoughts; State will be sending specific recommendations. (I don’t know what they will be but assume that they will not be too different from mine.) I am rather confident of my sense of timing. The Angolan question is a mixture of interrelated factors: the threat from Zaire; the threat from South Africa (Namibia); the threat from Savimbi; catastrophic economic situation; numerous problems with the Soviets and Cubans—all of these press Neto to compromise. Our failure to respond could make him swallow the last two and rely increasingly on the Cubans. A deal involving normalization and withdrawal of [Page 56] Cubans is his way of getting out from under and is precisely what we want. I see no guarantee that the terms of the trade are going to get markedly better.7

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78. Secret. Sent for information.
  2. An unknown hand drew a line from the phrase “The Angolan request” to the top of the memorandum and wrote a question mark next to it.
  3. See footnote 3, Document 26.
  4. An unknown hand underlined “substantial initial draw-down with the promise of reasonably rapid movement towards an acceptable level” and wrote “And some solution to Savimbi” in the left-hand margin.
  5. An unknown hand underlined “I fear that withdrawal of foreign support removes Neto’s incentive to negotiate at all” and wrote “Indeed” in the left-hand margin.
  6. An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences in the margin and wrote “Overdrawn: problem is how to use the Savimbi lever” in the left-hand margin.
  7. Dodson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Bob Pastor’s read it and concurs. CD.” An unknown hand also wrote: “1) The pressure is on Neto—not us: and his situation gets worse, not better, with time, even if not rapidly & markedly so. 2) We should not cut Savimbi off—rather, our first approach to Neto should include notion of negotiations with Savimbi (whom we should push, too): this is only way we can keep leverage alive and build basis for cutting Savimbi off if it comes to that. 3) Package has to include some reduction of Soviet presence, as well.”