22. Memorandum From Tom Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Relations With Unita
I was troubled by some of the discussion at the SCC on Unita2 and feel that I should respond to it in a purely personal and private way.
1. It misses the point to discuss whether two radio sets will do one thing or another. Obviously they are a symbol. But of what? No matter what we say, I do not see that Savimbi can see them as anything but an earnest of more support later if he does well. They are, after all, meant to encourage him to do things that will (if successful) require more sophisticated forms of support. Are we willing to take this next step—and there will be a next step, either forward, involving us more, or off to the side and backwards, effectively welshing on an implied promise. I think you see them as a token of nothing more than the political support (or blessing) of the United States for Savimbi’s undertaking. Frankly, I don’t think that is worth much any more. The French and Moroccans—and Savimbi himself—will do what they think necessary no matter what we think. What we are willing to do in terms of tangible support will embolden their decisions of course—and that is why they will read your radio sets as a symbol of more to come. They know what our “blessing” is worth and assume that we know it also. We should not risk any misunderstanding that we are prepared to do more than we are able to.
2. Vance’s question was a fair one—What do you want? Again, I am disturbed by an answer that seems to say: “Let’s roll the dice and see what happens.” One possible outcome is that Savimbi will read us the same way that Siad Barre did, stick his neck out too far and get it chopped off. This would be a political and moral disaster. We have already done this once in Angola. Also, it is by no means clear that a half-hearted move to support Savimbi will have the result of getting the Cubans out or tying them down very much. It is equally likely to give them an excuse to stay there. Unless Savimbi is extremely success[Page 49]ful and if he is, it will be little or no thanks to us it is not going to result in governmental rearrangements in Luanda that would reduce Cuban and Soviet influence. The Cubans will still have enough people to send some to Rhodesia if they want. The net result of a continuing insurgency is probably going to be continued difficulty for us in having useful relations with Angola. All of these things may well happen anyway—but what is the point of our being involved?
3. Now, the question of making the Cubans pay for their involvement in Angola. I am all for hanging them high on the propaganda petard but I gather that what you are aiming at is payment in physical terms. Expenditure of treasure does not bother me (nor, I suspect, does it bother the Cubans much either for the Soviets probably make most of it up). Since I am not a complete pacifist, I can also accept the idea of people being maimed and killed on occasion. But I cannot accept the idea that they get maimed and killed as part of a process that has no objective. Granted, our effect one way or the other may remain minimal—but why be involved on the side of greater slaughter when there is no pressing reason to do so? Is making an essentially secondary political point at the cost of human lives—Cuban and Angolan—morally acceptable?3
4. A final note. You seem to think that you have a new wave of support in Congress for an interventionist policy. Perhaps you do (although I have seen nothing of it). Remember, though, that Kissinger’s Angola actions were briefed to the Congress with extreme conscientousness and met no opposition. Once the going got rough, however, this support melted away leaving him—and our Angolan friends—high and dry.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 73, Africa: Box 2 [II]. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.↩
- Minutes of the SCC meeting on UNITA were not found.↩
- Aaron highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin and drew a line to his comment at the end of the memorandum: “This is why I want better intelligence! If we can really tie the Cubans down there & make Rhodesia significantly more difficult for them then we should do it. But we don’t know that because our intelligence is so poor. DA.”↩