21. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

REFERENCE

  • Memorandum from DCI to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of 17 February 1978, Subject: Jonas Savimbi2

1. In response to your request,3 we attach a paper which discusses:

—The steps which might be taken to help the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—for which you requested further elaboration.

—Impact of such steps on the Cubans.

—Application of provisions of Hughes-Ryan and Tunney-Javits amendments.

2. In brief, these steps would strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces active in the field, but they are unlikely to tip the scale toward a victory by UNITA. They would help UNITA to tie up more Cuban resources in Angola. The diplomatic moves and the program to provide limited assistance in communications would carry slight risk, but they would have proportionally less impact in tieing up Cuban resources than the stimulation of further military aid. More substantial materiel help to UNITA would require consultation within the United States Government which would be difficult to keep secret. Compromise of a program of even indirect American materiel aid would work against UNITA. For example, American help to UNITA would be used to justify the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

3. Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great deal of controversy. Thus, any new steps which verged on covert paramilitary activities should be considered in the light of the anticipated reaction within Congress.

Stansfield Turner4
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Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency5

SUBJECT

  • Aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

REFERENCE

  • Memorandum from DCI to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of 17 February 1978

I. INTRODUCTION

For the past two years and without significant foreign assistance, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, has prevented the regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto in Luanda, from consolidating its hold over Angola. UNITA has done this despite the presence of about 20,000 Cuban combat troops and massive Soviet and Communist Bloc military and other assistance. The United States could help Savimbi to make his guerrilla activities more effective and to expand his influence in the countryside by:

—Diplomatic steps to influence others to help Savimbi.

—Steps to improve UNITA communications to [less than 1 line not declassified].

—Covert political action to make his case better known abroad.

—Indirect materiel assistance.

These steps would not lead to an early Savimbi victory, but even modest steps could noticeably increase the cost in men and materiel to the Cubans and Soviets.

The obstacles to any American support of UNITA arise mainly within the United States. Exposure of a secret American program to support UNITA would tend to offset many of the advantages of the program. For example, the Cubans could justify their support of the Luanda regime as a defense against an American-backed attack on this regime. Furthermore, most of the steps contemplated would require some form of consultation with Congress. The controversial nature of the previous debates over support to UNITA would tend to make it harder now to preserve secrecy in Washington about any renewal of the support.

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II. SPECIFIC STEPS

A. Diplomatic

1. The following diplomatic steps would be significant:

a. Stop advising friendly governments through diplomatic channels against aid to Savimbi.

b. Avoid recognizing the MPLA regime in Luanda as the Government of Angola.

c. Stimulate a change in Portuguese policy by discreetly advising President Eanes of American interest in the Portuguese quietly assisting Savimbi.

2. As these steps are outside the intelligence and covert action fields, further comment will not be made.

B. Communications

1. We could improve [less than 1 line not declassified] by improving communications with UNITA at either of two levels:

a. A limited communications assistance program to provide radio gear and training to permit communications from each of four UNITA provincial bases to [less than 1 line not declassified] to other UNITA bases [1 line not declassified].

b. An enhanced communications assistance program to provide radio gear and training for UNITA field intelligence collection teams and to link them with the four UNITA provincial bases. This program would provide training of UNITA communicators, technicians and intelligence collectors. It would provide upgrading of communications from UNITA in Kinshasa to UNITA headquarters—now in Mpupu in southern Angola. ([dollar amount not declassified])

2. We believe that such communications support to Savimbi would:

—Expand [less than 1 line not declassified] on Savimbi’s activities, on Cuban military operations, and on relations among the Soviets, Cubans and Angolans.

—Enhance the security of Savimbi’s present radio communications and deny intelligence to the Soviets and Cubans.

—Enhance Savimbi’s ability to report significant developments to the outside world.

—Enhance Savimbi’s command and control of his forces, improve his intelligence, and thereby improve UNITA’s combat effectiveness.

3. We believe that the impact on the Cubans would:

—Increase Cuban losses in men and Soviet-provided materiel.

—Cause Cubans to take steps to reduce casualties, withdraw to populated centers, etc., but have only a marginal impact on the size of Cuban forces in Angola.

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—Reduce range and frequency of independent Cuban combat patrols, but stimulate Cubans to concentrate their forces and undertake operations in larger units.

—Force the Angolan military into a more active role in combat operations.

—Cause the Cubans to invest greater resources in training of Angolan army and militia.

C. Covert Action

1. We could provide to UNITA covert support along these lines:

a. Covertly provide assistance to Savimbi in making his case better known on the world scene. (This would include working with UNITA to improve and expand its public information and representational activities abroad.)

b. Disseminate information about UNITA’s struggle through our network of operational contacts in the foreign press.

c. Bring Savimbi’s case to the attention of foreign governments and political leaders through cooperative foreign intelligence services and our agents of influence.

2. Third Party Aid to UNITA

Since mid-1977 UNITA has been receiving some covert assistance [2 lines not declassified].

We could stimulate such third party support to Savimbi by committing the United States to assist in a limited way. Specifically, we could take one of the following courses:

—Provide funds directly to [place not declassified] for its use, as it sees fit, in assisting UNITA. We believe that amounts of [less than 1 line not declassified] dollars would be required to achieve a significant impact.

—Provide funds directly to [place not declassified]—but tied to the purchase of medical supplies, clothing, food and other humanitarian aid for UNITA. ([dollar amount not declassified])

—Provide funds to [place not declassified] tied to the purchase of specific war-related materiel of European manufacture for UNITA. ([dollar amount not declassified])

All three of the above programs are based on our current knowledge of UNITA’s needs. We have not discussed the subject with Savimbi or other UNITA officials. If authorized to do so, we would be able to amend the above programs appropriately. We have selected [place not declassified] as the intermediary. [3 lines not declassified]

3. We believe that the above steps involving covert action and indirect aid through a third party would:

a. Enhance UNITA’s combat effectiveness.

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b. Buoy the morale of UNITA’s adherents in Angola.

c. Lessen the effects of hostile propaganda and political maneuverings against UNITA.

4. We believe the impact on Cuba would:

a. Make continued military presence more expensive for the Cubans; increase losses in men and materiel.

b. Make Cuba uncomfortable by unfavorable publicity about Cuba’s intervention in Angola.

c. Further exacerbate the morale problem among the Cubans in Angola and the tension between the Cubans and Angolans.

d. Promote Cuban domestic knowledge of and dissatisfaction with Cuba’s involvement in Angola.

e. Contribute to putting Cuba on the defensive in international fora.

f. Weaken support for the MPLA in international fora.

III. AUTHORIZATION

A. In early 1976 Congress put an end to covert paramilitary support by CIA of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA by the Tunney-Javits Amendment to the Appropriations Act for 1976. This reads:

“[dollar amount not declassified] none of which, nor any other funds appropriated in this Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering.”

B. This applied specifically to the appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and has not been included in subsequent Acts. There is an open question as to whether or not the Tunney-Javits Amendment reflects continuing intervention on the part of the Congress to restrict CIA support for the insurgency movement in Angola. Before embarking on a covert action program involving direct or indirect paramilitary support, it would be wise to ascertain the sense of Congress.

C. The Hughes-Ryan provision (Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) would not apply to those of the above steps which are strictly diplomatic—without a covert action aspect—or which are designed to improve intelligence collection and could be funded out of our current budget. However, even the limited communications assistance program would require consultation with the House and Senate Oversight Committees. Other steps considered above would require us to follow the Hughes-Ryan provisions.

D. Appendix A6 lists each of the proposals mentioned above and what form of clearance it is judged would be required.

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IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are other points which should probably be kept in mind in considering the above steps:

—Our diplomatic, political and indirect materiel aid to Savimbi is unlikely to match the help which the Soviets and Cubans are giving the present regime in Luanda. In other words, the above steps can strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces active in the field, but they are unlikely to tip the scales toward a victory by UNITA.

—The system of briefing widely in Congress tends to make it difficult to carry out any covert action that does not enjoy virtually unanimous backing in Congress.

—The support of the Tunney-Javits Amendment in 1975 and early 1976 came from:

—Congressmen who were opposed to any engagement of American resources in a civil war in Africa.

—Congressmen who did not wish to consider a program that did not offer promise of a quick and clear-cut victory.

—Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great deal of controversy. Angola may be a poor choice as to the place where we try to engage in some further covert paramilitary action. An abortive attempt to reopen the issue of covert paramilitary support of UNITA—even indirect—could lead to damage to our capability and flexibility to undertake any covert action in the future.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Angola: 1977–1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
  2. See Document 19.
  3. Not found.
  4. Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.
  5. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
  6. Appendix A, entitled “Authorization Required for Specific Steps Regarding UNITA,” is attached but not printed.