—The steps which might be taken to help the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA)—for
which you requested further elaboration.
—Impact of such steps on the Cubans.
—Application of provisions of Hughes-Ryan and Tunney-Javits
amendments.
2. In brief, these steps would strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces active in the field,
but they are unlikely to tip the scale toward a victory by UNITA. They would help UNITA to tie up more Cuban resources in
Angola. The diplomatic moves and the program to provide limited
assistance in communications would carry slight risk, but they would
have proportionally less impact in tieing up Cuban resources than the
stimulation of further military aid. More substantial materiel help to
UNITA would require consultation
within the United States Government which would be difficult to keep
secret. Compromise of a program of even indirect American materiel aid
would work against UNITA. For
example, American help to UNITA would
be used to justify the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola.
3. Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great deal of controversy.
Thus, any new steps which verged on covert paramilitary activities
should be considered in the light of the anticipated reaction within
Congress.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency5
SUBJECT
- Aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
REFERENCE
- Memorandum from DCI to
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of 17
February 1978
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two years and without significant foreign assistance,
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, has prevented the
regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto in Luanda, from
consolidating its hold over Angola. UNITA has done this despite the presence of about
20,000 Cuban combat troops and massive Soviet and Communist Bloc
military and other assistance. The United States could help
Savimbi to make his
guerrilla activities more effective and to expand his influence in
the countryside by:
—Diplomatic steps to influence others to help Savimbi.
—Steps to improve UNITA
communications to [less than 1 line not
declassified].
—Covert political action to make his case better known abroad.
—Indirect materiel assistance.
These steps would not lead to an early Savimbi victory, but even modest steps could
noticeably increase the cost in men and materiel to the Cubans and
Soviets.
The obstacles to any American support of UNITA arise mainly within the United States. Exposure
of a secret American program to support UNITA would tend to offset many of the advantages of
the program. For example, the Cubans could justify their support of
the Luanda regime as a defense against an American-backed attack on
this regime. Furthermore, most of the steps contemplated would
require some form of consultation with Congress. The controversial
nature of the previous debates over support to UNITA would tend to make it harder
now to preserve secrecy in Washington about any renewal of the
support.
[Page 44]
II. SPECIFIC STEPS
A. Diplomatic
1. The following diplomatic steps would be significant:
a. Stop advising friendly governments through diplomatic channels
against aid to Savimbi.
b. Avoid recognizing the MPLA
regime in Luanda as the Government of Angola.
c. Stimulate a change in Portuguese policy by discreetly advising
President Eanes of American
interest in the Portuguese quietly assisting Savimbi.
2. As these steps are outside the intelligence and covert action
fields, further comment will not be made.
B. Communications
1. We could improve [less than 1 line not
declassified] by improving communications with UNITA at either of two levels:
a. A limited communications assistance program to provide radio gear
and training to permit communications from each of four UNITA provincial bases to [less than 1 line not declassified] to other
UNITA bases [1 line not declassified].
b. An enhanced communications assistance program to provide radio
gear and training for UNITA field
intelligence collection teams and to link them with the four UNITA provincial bases. This program
would provide training of UNITA
communicators, technicians and intelligence collectors. It would
provide upgrading of communications from UNITA in Kinshasa to UNITA headquarters—now in Mpupu in southern Angola.
([dollar amount not declassified])
2. We believe that such communications support to Savimbi would:
—Expand [less than 1 line not declassified] on
Savimbi’s activities, on
Cuban military operations, and on relations among the Soviets,
Cubans and Angolans.
—Enhance the security of Savimbi’s present radio communications and deny
intelligence to the Soviets and Cubans.
—Enhance Savimbi’s ability to
report significant developments to the outside world.
—Enhance Savimbi’s command and
control of his forces, improve his intelligence, and thereby improve
UNITA’s combat
effectiveness.
3. We believe that the impact on the Cubans would:
—Increase Cuban losses in men and Soviet-provided materiel.
—Cause Cubans to take steps to reduce casualties, withdraw to
populated centers, etc., but have only a marginal impact on the size
of Cuban forces in Angola.
[Page 45]
—Reduce range and frequency of independent Cuban combat patrols, but
stimulate Cubans to concentrate their forces and undertake
operations in larger units.
—Force the Angolan military into a more active role in combat
operations.
—Cause the Cubans to invest greater resources in training of Angolan
army and militia.
C. Covert Action
1. We could provide to UNITA
covert support along these lines:
a. Covertly provide assistance to Savimbi in making his case better known on the world
scene. (This would include working with UNITA to improve and expand its public information and
representational activities abroad.)
b. Disseminate information about UNITA’s struggle through our network of operational
contacts in the foreign press.
c. Bring Savimbi’s case to the
attention of foreign governments and political leaders through
cooperative foreign intelligence services and our agents of
influence.
2. Third Party Aid to UNITA
Since mid-1977 UNITA has been
receiving some covert assistance [2 lines not
declassified].
We could stimulate such third party support to Savimbi by committing the United
States to assist in a limited way. Specifically, we could take one
of the following courses:
—Provide funds directly to [place not
declassified] for its use, as it sees fit, in assisting
UNITA. We believe that
amounts of [less than 1 line not
declassified] dollars would be required to achieve a
significant impact.
—Provide funds directly to [place not
declassified]—but tied to the purchase of medical supplies,
clothing, food and other humanitarian aid for UNITA. ([dollar
amount not declassified])
—Provide funds to [place not declassified]
tied to the purchase of specific war-related materiel of European
manufacture for UNITA. ([dollar amount not declassified])
All three of the above programs are based on our current knowledge of
UNITA’s needs. We have not
discussed the subject with Savimbi or other UNITA officials. If authorized to do so, we would be
able to amend the above programs appropriately. We have selected
[place not declassified] as the
intermediary. [3 lines not declassified]
3. We believe that the above steps involving covert action and
indirect aid through a third party would:
a. Enhance UNITA’s combat
effectiveness.
[Page 46]
b. Buoy the morale of UNITA’s
adherents in Angola.
c. Lessen the effects of hostile propaganda and political
maneuverings against UNITA.
4. We believe the impact on Cuba would:
a. Make continued military presence more expensive for the Cubans;
increase losses in men and materiel.
b. Make Cuba uncomfortable by unfavorable publicity about Cuba’s
intervention in Angola.
c. Further exacerbate the morale problem among the Cubans in Angola
and the tension between the Cubans and Angolans.
d. Promote Cuban domestic knowledge of and dissatisfaction with
Cuba’s involvement in Angola.
e. Contribute to putting Cuba on the defensive in international
fora.
f. Weaken support for the MPLA in
international fora.
III. AUTHORIZATION
A. In early 1976 Congress put an end to covert paramilitary support
by CIA of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA by the Tunney-Javits Amendment
to the Appropriations Act for 1976. This reads:
“[dollar amount not declassified] none of
which, nor any other funds appropriated in this Act may be used for
any activities involving Angola other than intelligence
gathering.”
B. This applied specifically to the appropriations for Fiscal Year
1976 and has not been included in subsequent Acts. There is an open
question as to whether or not the Tunney-Javits Amendment reflects
continuing intervention on the part of the Congress to restrict
CIA support for the insurgency
movement in Angola. Before embarking on a covert action program
involving direct or indirect paramilitary support, it would be wise
to ascertain the sense of Congress.
C. The Hughes-Ryan provision (Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended) would not apply to those of the above steps
which are strictly diplomatic—without a covert action aspect—or
which are designed to improve intelligence collection and could be
funded out of our current budget. However, even the limited
communications assistance program would require consultation with
the House and Senate Oversight Committees. Other steps considered
above would require us to follow the Hughes-Ryan provisions.
D. Appendix A6 lists each of the proposals mentioned above and
what form of clearance it is judged would be required.
[Page 47]
IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are other points which should probably be kept in mind in
considering the above steps:
—Our diplomatic, political and indirect materiel aid to Savimbi is unlikely to match the
help which the Soviets and Cubans are giving the present regime in
Luanda. In other words, the above steps can strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces
active in the field, but they are unlikely to tip the scales toward
a victory by UNITA.
—The system of briefing widely in Congress tends to make it difficult
to carry out any covert action that does not enjoy virtually
unanimous backing in Congress.
—The support of the Tunney-Javits Amendment in 1975 and early 1976
came from:
—Congressmen who were opposed to any engagement of American
resources in a civil war in Africa.
—Congressmen who did not wish to consider a program that did not
offer promise of a quick and clear-cut victory.
—Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great
deal of controversy. Angola may be a poor choice as to the place
where we try to engage in some further covert paramilitary action.
An abortive attempt to reopen the issue of covert paramilitary
support of UNITA—even
indirect—could lead to damage to our capability and flexibility to
undertake any covert action in the future.