Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

210. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to Senator Robert C. Byrd ¹

Washington, July 14, 1978

Dear Senator:

Attached is a paper which summarizes the serious concerns we have about the Helms Amendment.² The situation in southern Africa is so delicate at this moment that we feel U.S. interests throughout Africa could be seriously jeopardized if the Senate were to reject the President’s policy.

I will take the liberty of sending you more detailed material as the issue develops.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

Attachment ³

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

Opposition to the Helms Amendment

—The recent Namibian development is a concrete demonstration of what can be accomplished through negotiations when our bona fides as an honest broker, seeking to end minority rule peacefully, are accepted by the parties.

—Acceptance by South Africa and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of our proposal for a peaceful transition to majority rule represents an historic step toward peaceful solutions in southern Africa generally, but the process is at an extremely delicate stage.

—Unilateral lifting of UN trade sanctions against Rhodesia now would be viewed as a major reversal of American policy and would seriously injure our interests throughout Africa. It would jeopardize the fragile Namibian settlement by seeming to indicate that we no longer are concerned about African opinion.

—In Rhodesia, even participants in the “internal settlement” are privately acknowledging the inadequacies of the March 3 Salisbury Agreement. The Salisbury Agreement has apparently not attracted wide popular support nor proven attractive enough to induce large numbers of guerrillas to give up their arms.

—Mugabe and Nkomo, as well as the internal nationalists, have accepted the principle of elections. Mugabe and Nkomo have accepted the essential features of the U.S.–UK plan, including free elections.

—The disagreement is over who will be in a dominant position during the elections. Each side seeks that dominance; our plan proposes a neutral transition authority.

—Lifting the embargo would destroy our credibility with the front line states whose support is essential if Mugabe and Nkomo are ultimately to participate in a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rhodesia. The front line states played a central role in the progress made in Namibia; we must not lose their cooperation at a critical time in Rhodesia.

—It would convince many that the U.S. has abandoned its consistent position of refusing to take sides with any of the parties to the Rhodesian dispute. Our credibility and effectiveness as mediators would be seriously damaged.

—It would make extremely difficult a negotiated end to the violence, with the consequence of escalation of fighting, perhaps involving Cuban, Soviet and South African forces, which would only increase and prolong the suffering, destruction and instability in the region.

—It would place the United States once again in the position of not complying with the legal obligations of adhering to UN resolutions which we have supported.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers of S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–January 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 16, Rhodesia/South Africa/Helms Amendment 7/78. No classification marking.
2. The Helms Amendment proposed lifting sanctions against Rhodesia and promoting the internal settlement.
3. No classification marking.