209. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting Between President Carter and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
- Ambassador Stephen Low, United States Ambassador to Zambia
- Ambassador Donald McHenry, United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council
- President Kenneth D. Kaunda
- R.C. Kamanga, Member of the Central Committee
- Siteke Mwale, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- M.C. Chona, Special Assistant (Politics) to the President
- D.C. Mulaisho, Special Assistant (Economics) to the President
- M.J. Punabantu, Special Assistant (Press) to the President
- J.M. Mwanakatwe, Minister of Finance
- A.B. Chikwanda, Minister of Lands and Agriculture
- Putteho M. Ngonda, Ambassador of Zambia to the United States
After a few minutes alone in the Oval Office the two presidents entered the Cabinet Room and the meeting began at 11:13.
The President welcomed Kaunda and noted their shared goals. He presented two books to Kaunda including one of space photographs and offered our space services to Zambia if they desire. He suggested that the morning discussion be on international questions; bilateral issues could be taken up at Secretary Vance’s lunch, and tomorrow morning the two presidents could discuss remaining bilateral matters and international questions. He asked Kaunda to start with an assessment of the political situation in southern Africa.
Kaunda cited his high esteem for the President and his valuable leadership. He felt that problems could be discussed as among brothers. Kaunda reviewed the broad African independence struggle and his own role including his attempt in 1966 to convince Salazar that the [Page 617] Portuguese should give independence to their colonies to avoid a holocaust. He got no reply to this nor from a subsequent letter to Caetano. He also discussed his meetings with Vorster in broad outline.
Kaunda said South Africa claims to act in the interest of the West and in the name of Christ but in fact they do the opposite of his teachings. Carter’s stand on human rights has brought a new fresh air to these issues. Zambia senses the coming danger; it doesn’t take sides between East or West. Its policy is pro-man, the creation of God. He referred to his last visit here when he challenged the United States.2 He gives Kissinger credit for coming to him later and admitting that had America listened to Kaunda the Angola problem could have been avoided. Kissinger referred to Zambia as an ally; this was not accurate because he saw things in an East-West context while Zambia views it as a human problem.
Turning to Angola, Kaunda said that Neto wants to be non-aligned but another faction, which is gaining strength, wants to align with the USSR. He will discuss this in detail with the President in private. He thinks the situation in Mozambique is healthy.
Zaire creates security problems for Zambia; people cross the border to find food, etc. Kaunda has told Mobutu to find a political solution in Shaba. There is no economic development taking place there now and driving out the Katangans will not provide the answer. Mobutu must be helped to understand the problem better.
The President asked if the Katangans would have a future role if Mobutu would accommodate them.
Kaunda replied that it could become an East-West problem but the majority of Katangans are not interested in socialism.
The President asked if there was Angolan or Cuban support.
Kaunda replied that he did not know what the Cuban role was. In any case it is just an effect; the cause is within Zaire. Kaunda added that his relations with Mobutu are warm. Mobutu cannot reorganize Zaire without foreign help. The administration is corrupt. Kaunda had suggested that Mobutu study the Tanzanian and Zambian administrative systems but Mobutu did not do so.
In Rhodesia Kaunda assessed the situation as favorable. For the first time the US and UK agree with the UN, OAU, Patriotic Front and Front Line presidents. Only Salisbury stands aside.
The President asked if Mugabe and Nkomo would accept the Anglo-American plan.
[Page 618]Kaunda replied they would and the Dar Conference was a great success.3
The President agreed that the main problem is with the Salisbury Group but the Patriotic Front did raise difficulties in Dar.
Kaunda said that Sithole’s statement about accepting the Anglo-American plan is genuine. Zambia has some background on this. The churches in the United States should put pressure on Muzorewa whose hands will soon be bloody.
The President countered that Nkomo has never said he would accept the Anglo-American plan. His reservations cause us great concern. If Nkomo and Mugabe were to accept it we would have more influence on Muzorewa. Zambia can help us on this.
Kaunda said that the Patriotic Front accepts the plan as a basis for negotiation. He said it was a mistake to have meetings only at the Foreign Minister level; there should have been negotiating committees in constant session.
Secretary Vance cited the Low-Graham mission, but the Salisbury Group would not talk to us.4 Things may be changing now and we will try to bring the sides together at the working level.
Ambassador Low said he and Graham will seek to develop areas of agreement based on the Dar meeting.
Secretary Vance said that progress was made in Dar. The question of power-sharing has to be worked out around a table and maybe now is the time. With regard to the police, Nkomo is giving serious consideration to our idea for a three-man type of operation.
The President said that Muzorewa’s involvement with the American Methodists is close and perhaps we could encourage them to talk to him.
Kaunda said that the Western efforts were succeeding well in Namibia before the South African raid. After his return there will be a Front Line Summit to persuade SWAPO that the raid was a South African trick to break up negotiations and SWAPO should not play into South African hands. After that, Foreign Minister Mwale will be in further touch with the United States in New York. The United States should make a strong statement on Walvis Bay.
[Page 619]Secretary Vance described the US position and said it was very close to Zambia’s. We did not want to address the matter in legal terms however since South Africa has a better case.
Kaunda replied that Walvis Bay was a legal part of Namibia only since last year.
The President said we do not want to address the legal question. Sam Nujoma has been difficult to pin down and has not accepted proposals that he should have. He has given South Africa basis for creating an internal settlement. We condemned the South African raid but Nujoma must not use it as an excuse. We stand staunchly behind our proposal and hope Zambia will urge SWAPO to accept it.
Ambassador McHenry noted that the objective situation has not changed although the climate has. The need for movement and the fairness of the proposals remain. Some elements in SWAPO seem not to have studied the proposals.
Kaunda noted that there were many points of view within SWAPO but the important thing is a collective decision.
The President asked if SWAPO had agreed to meet the Front Line.
Kaunda said they could hardly refuse.
Secretary Vance noted that two weeks ago he had met with the Foreign Ministers of Mozambique and Angola and had useful conversations.5 He pointed out that a Namibia solution is especially important to Angola and the opportunity must not be allowed to slip by.
Kaunda said it was very good that Vance meets with the Angolans and is not held up by protocol.
The President said just don’t praise him publicly about doing it (laughter). What are the future chances for Savimbi to join the government and the Cubans to leave?
Kaunda suggested they could discuss that privately. Turning to South Africa, Kaunda reviewed his contact with Vorster in 1975 and noted the increasing trend toward bloodshed since then. A crisis is approaching. What is the role of the West in this unique historical situation? Carter’s firm stand is gratifying for majority rule is the only answer. The West must remove all support from the racist regime. Kaunda recognizes the limitations posed on Carter by the private enterprise system but capitalists should certainly see that the situation was a bad investment. It will explode and make the French Revolution look like a picnic. Western countries are now supporting South Africa in all critical areas. To diffuse the situation this support must be removed [Page 620] so that Pretoria will recognize that they stand alone. This cannot be done overnight but the West must do what it can to prevent an explosion.
No African leader takes a racial approch, Kaunda added, but this will become increasingly tempting. Racism is growing among South African blacks and the explosion will be compounded by an East-West element (Kaunda compared the situation to his warning to Salazar in 1966). In Rhodesia the Sino-Soviet dispute compounds the situation. We do not want to see that conflict fought out in Salisbury. Within South Africa there are also pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet tendencies. The West must move quickly in its own interest and, even more, on moral grounds. Zambia appreciates what Citibank has done.6 Others should be stimulated to do the same in America and Europe.
The President said he shares Kaunda’s analysis but has constraints on his action. He noted the arms embargo as an important pressure and said the South Africans treat him as a whipping boy which he considers to be an honor. We are trying to encourage business leaders to bring their influence to bear in South Africa; we have made some progress and some Europeans are joining in. This is not however the time for an all out attack. First we must resolve Rhodesia and Namibia; the South Africans know that they will be next.
Frankly there is a problem with US public opinion, notably concerning Rhodesia. There is much American support for the Internal Settlement based on the false premises that Smith is telling the truth. We unwaveringly support the Anglo-American plan and when the British falter we try to rebuild their support. There are limits to what we can do without public support. If the Soviets and Cubans become more detectably involved in Rhodesia there will be a strong growth of support here for the Internal Settlement. I would deplore that. I agree that we are making progress; Smith’s concessions result from the pressure of the Anglo-American plan and Front Line support for it. We should renew our efforts on Rhodesia and work with Muzorewa and Sithole within the bounds of propriety. We will work with the Front Line to get all parties to the table and we have a reasonable chance of success.
Speaking of Namibia the President is not pessimistic although our influence is limited. We need Zambia to urge SWAPO. We are seeking an end to all forms of apartheid. We will continue full efforts on Namibia and Rhodesia and keep pressure on RSA through implementing the UN measures and working through our private enterprise system. This will be possible as long as the American public does not [Page 621] think that Nkomo and Mugabe are communists and atheists. I think this is near your position.
Kaunda agreed that Rhodesia and Namibia must be taken on first but we should start planning now for the South Africa problem and do things like Citibank is doing.
The President reassured Kaunda that while some of his predecessors misled Vorster privately on our views on apartheid, he has never done so. This message was clearly carried by Vice President Mondale.7
Dr. Brzezinski said that Vorster’s hostile reaction to the President is the best evidence of this.
Vice President Mondale said ironically that he had a marvelous three days with Vorster.
The President noted that Kaunda was due to go to lunch and that they will have a private talk this evening. We are eager to help Zambia with its economic challenges (we have some similar problems at home) and we have studied what additional help we can give.
The President concluded by noting that Kaunda’s schedule in the United States is an excellent one and that his helpful and frank comments are much appreciated.
The meeting concluded at 12:30.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 5/78. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.↩
- Kaunda met with President Ford on April 19, 1975. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 103.↩
- Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel, and Khama met March 25–26 in Dar es Salaam, where they insisted that the United Kingdom and the United States convene a meeting to follow up on the January Malta talks. Vance and Owen met with Nkomo, Mugabe, General Prem Chand, Field Marshal Carver, and envoys of the Front Line States in Dar es Salaam April 14–16. See Documents 204–206.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 202.↩
- Vance met on April 30 with both Monteiro and Jorge.↩
- In early March, Citibank decided to stop loaning money to the South African Government and government-owned manufacturing and utility enterprises.↩
- See Document 278.↩