185. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State1

133. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Summary of Afternoon Discussion With PF January 31.

Summary: In a three hour afternoon meeting with Nkomo, Mugabe and a restricted group, Owen outlined his improved proposal for a “governing council” and military advisory group for the transition period. In spite of encouraging indication at lunch that the PF was looking for a compromise they resisted our proposals and continued to criticize our refusal to accept their desire for a substantial and visible role in the interim government. End summary.

1. We met in small group with delegation leaders plus two, and UN reps. Although Angolan observers arrived this afternoon, Front Line reps were not included in session. Meeting lasted about three hours, devoted to revised US/UK proposals for transition period.

2. Owen began by describing our new proposal based on the desire expressed by the PF to assume greater responsibility during the transition period. He proposed a council made up of eleven members, two representing each of the five parties at Geneva with the Resident Com[Page 536]missioner as non-voting chairman. UN Rep would have observer status. “Swallowing hard”, Owen agreed to call the body a “governing council”. The Resident Commissioner would be obliged to consult on all matters except those relating to external affairs, defense and internal security and the recommendations of the electoral commission. He would have the authority to legislate but could be overruled by two-thirds of the council which by the same vote could also initiate and pass legislation which he had not proposed. (text by septel)2

3. The British also distributed another paper describing the two military advisory committees: The cease-fire maintenance committee and transitional military committee (text by septel).3 They pointed out that representation on the first of these would be limited to the military commanders (i.e. PF) while all parties would be members of the second, the function of which was to consider matters related to the formation of the independent Zimbabwe National Army.

4. Nkomo, Mugabe and their advisors questioned the Anglo-American delegations in detail about the proposals. They asked: Why representation should be based on Geneva and what special recognition was given to the fact that they, who had been doing the fighting, were responsible for bringing about the transition period. They complained that the proposal equated them with Muzorewa and Sithole who together with Smith would have a majority voice which they at most could only block. Nkomo complained that he could never sell such a proposal to the men who had brought about Smith’s departure. At one point he emotionally claimed that the proposals were aimed at the dismantling of his forces. Mugabe asked why so much power should be given to the Resident Commissioner. Young and Carver argued that the pressure of opinion exercised through observers in the press, the UN and the people of Zimbabwe would force the Resident Commissioner to act responsibly to prevent arbitrary and unfair action. He would be acting “under the public gaze”. The powers reserved to the Resident Commissioner were normal; they could not be exercised by a committee, they stressed how far we had gone in an attempt to meet PF demands.

5. There was a lengthy discussion of the police forces. Nkomo stressed that PF presence in the armed forces, police and judiciary is of enormous importance. He said that the police force could not be [Page 537] left as it exists. He and Mugabe claimed that they could provide their own men for the force and insisted that the matter could not be resolved unless we agreed to a mixed police force. They complained that most of the police were engaged in political repression; that it was a biased organization and that it would take much too long to correct its abuses. Owen and Carver explained the difficulties of dealing with an untrained force or one that had been hastily organized. They said that as soon as agreement was reached the future chief of police would study the force to eliminate political elements and those engaged in unacceptable activities.

6. Owen and Young each referred on different occasions to the broader parameters of the discussion. Owen said he would not take a proposal to the Cabinet which did not have the support of the Front Line, and in particular the neighboring countries of Zambia and Mozambique. Andy Young described the many advantages which would accrue to the PF if it accepted the proposals including: Smith’s departure, dismantling of the army, depolitization of the police, independence, one man one vote, end of discriminatory legislation and the right of legislative authority in specific areas. At another stage he noted that if agreement was not achieved and a military solution was pursued, the US would have to review its position. One of the things it could do was to strengthen the surrounding states.

7. Comment: While the PF showed no give during the course of the afternoon, there was an easy give-and-take and an exploration in greater depth than we have ever had before with them on the problems a transition government would face. It was frankly looking for some way to demonstrate to its own forces a visible and substantial role in the structure of the transitional government. Though Owen was willing to go further than he had ever gone before, his maximum position clearly did not satisfy them. Nevertheless, we believe they recognized that Owen was making a genuine attempt to listen to and take seriously their concerns. Clearly there is no basis for agreement visible at this stage. The PF can claim to its critics that it has given our proposals serious consideration but not that it is willing to accept anything less than control over the transition period.

Laingen
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046–0937. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Pretoria, Cape Town, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lagos, Gaborone, and Mbabane.
  2. In telegram 135 from Valletta, January 31, the Embassy transmitted Owen’s proposal for the governing council. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046–0987)
  3. In telegram 134 from Valletta, January 31, the Embassy transmitted Owen’s document on military advisers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046–0967)