Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town¹

Washington, May 15, 1977, 0405Z

Tosec 40311/110991. Nairobi for Amb. Low, White House—Brzezinski. Subject: Our Response to Rhodesian Threat in Zambia. Lisbon for A Lake SP, with the Vice Presidents Party. Ref: (A) Lusaka 1303² (B) Lusaka 1300.³

1. We are repeating to you reftel (A), which contains text of letter from President Kaunda to President Carter, in which Kaunda expresses deep resentment of role played by British in informing him of threat from Ian Smith. Smith indicated in message to David Owen, which Owen passed to Kaunda, that Rhodesia might have no alternative but to mount preemptive strikes against ZAPU bases in Zambia to blunt major offensive against Rhodesia reportedly planned for late May.

2. You should seek appointment with Hawkins as soon as possible and pass to him the following points:⁴

A) President Carter has received a message from President Kaunda conveying the latter’s concern over the possibility of preemptive Rhodesian strikes against Zambia intended to blunt a reported ZAPU offensive.⁵

B) We want to tell you that we share President Kaunda’s concern. We would consider a strike against Zambia a very serious matter, indeed.

C) Escalation of the Rhodesian conflict across another international border carries grave risks of foreign intervention. Rhodesia cannot improve its prospects for future by such action.

D) We expect that the Salisbury authorities will refrain from any actions, such as a strike against Zambia, which will defeat the possibility of the present attempt to negotiate a settlement.

3. You should also seek an appointment with Brand Fourie to convey to him substance of the message you have given Hawkins.⁶ You should add the following points:

A) We hope that South Africa will work to prevent actions by Smith which will compromise our efforts to find a negotiated settlement, but which will gain little if any military advantage for the Smith regime.

B) Smith should be aware that threats of preemptive action may have effects that are the opposite of what he may intend.

C) In the delicate situation which exists in the region, South Africa should urge Smith to concentrate efforts on negotiations, which is the course which will offer the best hope for the kind of settlement which is in the interests of all the countries in the area.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–0273. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dennis W. Keough (AF/S); cleared by Schaufele and Brzezinski and in S/S; approved by Christopher. Sent for information Immediate to Lusaka, London, Nairobi, Lisbon, the Secretary’s delegation, the Secretary’s aircraft, and the White House.
2. In telegram 1303 from Lusaka, May 14, the Embassy transmitted a message from Kaunda, in which he expressed his “deep resentment” of the role that Owen played in informing him of Smith’s threat to mount pre-emptive strikes against ZAPU bases in Zambia. Kaunda warned that an escalation of the conflict would jeopardize the work of the Consultative Group. He urged Carter to pressure the British, South Africans, and Smith not to “encourage a situation whose consequences will be felt far beyond this region.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770171–0642)
3. In telegram 1300 from Lusaka, May 13, the Embassy reported on a May 13 meeting between Deputy Chief of Mission John R. Clingerman and Zambian Foreign Minister Mwale, discussing Smith’s threat of a preemptive strike into Zambia. Mwale noted that Kaunda would address the nation on May 16, “alerting the nation to the peril it faces.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770169–0978)
4. In telegram 787 from Cape Town, May 15, the Embassy reported that the points had been passed to Hawkins just after noon. Hawkins said that he would transmit the message to Salisbury and “get an official reply.” Hawkins told Deputy Chief of Mission Nelson that “Rhodesia would respond to an attack from Zambian soil; there would be no preemptory strike.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–0642)
5. See footnote 2 above.
6. See footnote 4, Document 155.