153. Telegram From the Embassy in Cape Town to the Department of State1
751. Subj: Informing SAG and Rhodesian Rep of US–UK Agreement to Begin Joint Consultations on Rhodesia. Ref: State 104967,2 and 104966.3
1. Pursuant to reftels, I saw Fourie at 1700 local today, May 10, and Hawkins at 1830 to advise them of US–UK agreement on next steps in Rhodesian negotiating process. Both had been advised along similar lines by British Embassy over weekend.
2. Fourie expressed appreciation and hope for success but had no further comment. Instead he asked about fate of Rhodesia Fund in light of reports Congress had diverted requested appropriations to assistance for Front-Line States, which, he commented, “will of course serve the exact opposite purpose.” I said I would relay his query to Department.
3. Hawkins took careful record of talking points, saying “This is of particular importance and must be gotten right.” He hoped simultaneous US–UK announcement about entering into a phase of intensive consultations with the parties could be held until tomorrow, May 11, or at least for a few hours to allow him time to get his message through to Smith. Hawkins said it was important to make two points: (1) The new position appeared to be a move away from the co-sponsorship earlier discussed by Owen, a yielding to Nkomo. Smith will take some convincing. He is in a very delicate and difficult domestic political situation. It is dangerous to give the appearance of “treating him like a poor relation.” There is no predicting what a politician will do, but “to his credit,” Smith has been forebearing. (2) It is almost entirely ruled out that all the parties can be brought along by the US–UK effort.
4. Hawkins gave me a copy of Owen’s message to Smith (the British Embassy supplied a copy as well, and a copy of Smith’s reply. Texts follow.
[Page 417]5. Owen message to Smith (May 7):
Quote. I have been considering the matter we discussed when I saw you in Cape Town and Salisbury in the light of your own comments and of the reactions of the African parties involved. I have maintained the closest touch with the US Government and Mr. Vance and I today discussed the problem. We have concluded that the next step should be for us to enter into detailed discussions with the parties to establish if we can find common ground on the form of a constitution for an independent Rhodesia and on the transitional arrangements to bring it into effect. For this purpose we should be setting up a consultative group which will be setting off for Central Africa in the near future. Mr. Vance and I are in total agreement that this must be a joint operation. But if some of the parties find difficulty at this stage in talking to us together, we are prepared to see them separately, on the clear understanding that we shall nevertheless be operating jointly.
The British leader of the group will be Mr. John Graham. The US Government will be announcing their representative shortly. The party will be flying to Lusaka in the first instance and from there will be ready to meet the other parties at their mutual convenience. They will of course be visiting Salisbury but it is not my intention at this stage at any rate to set up an office there on a continuing basis. However, if later on this seems desirable I believe, as you told me, there would be no objection on your part.
An announcement to this effect will be made early next week but I wanted you to know in advance. I know that I can count on you to give Mr. Graham full co-operation and I hope we can indeed carry things forward to a successful conclusion. This is certainly my intention. End quote.
6. Smith reply to Owen (May 10):
Quote. Thank you for your message of 7th May. We shall certainly cooperate fully with Graham and his colleagues and I hope they will visit Salisbury at an early stage. I have noted your remarks about Nkomo’s attitude but I must say that your reaction to it does not seem to be in keeping with your forthright statements to me here and in Cape Town. The failure of Mr. Ivor Richard to stand up to the obdurate demands of the Patriotic Front was the cause of the collapse of the Geneva Conference. If the British and United States Governments keep on giving in to their demands the present initiative will have little chance of success.
We have reliable information of a considerable build up of ZAPU terrorists in Zambia on the north bank of the Zambesi and a clear indication of their intention to launch attacks into Rhodesia with the connivance of Dr Kaunda. If these should develop then, in the interest of [Page 418] our own security, we shall have no alternative but to mount preemptive strikes across the river against the terrorist base.
I have given you my assurance of our readiness to cooperate fully in your new initiative but the climate for this will be gravely impaired if there should be an escalation of terrorist incursions out of Zambia. I would therefore urge you, in the interests of the peaceful settlement we both desire, to use your good offices with Dr. Kaunda to prevent an escalation which would seriously jeopardise your initiative.
It is clear that Nkomo’s intention is to build up very quickly a ZAPU army operating from Zambia to match that of ZANU base in Mozambique. You will readily appreciate the long term dangers inherent in this development. End quote.
7. The “long-term dangers”, Hawkins commented, is an obvious reference to the quite possible existence of competing ZAPU and ZANU armies in Rhodesia after the transition to majority rule.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770164–1166. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. The primary location of the U.S. Embassy was in Pretoria, where the majority of the executive branch of the South African Government was located. The Chief of Mission and members of the Country Team relocated to Cape Town when the South African Parliament was in session. When Parliament was not in session the Embassy in Cape Town reverted to Consulate status.↩
- See Document 152.↩
- In telegram 104966 to Cape Town, May 9, the Department transmitted talking points for a meeting with Harold Hawkins, outlining the US–UK agreement on the Rhodesian negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770166–0248)↩