Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

145. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, April 1, 1977

SUBJECT

• Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Secretary Vance
  • Mr. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Mr. Spiers, Charge D’Affaires, Embassy London
  • Mr. Schaufele, Assistant
  • Secretary for African Affairs
  • Mr. Seitz, Embassy London

• UK

  • Dr. David Owen, Foreign Secretary
  • Mr. Ted Rowlands, Minister of State, FCO
  • Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary, FCO
  • Mr. Philip Mansfield, Assistant Under Secretary, FCO
  • Mr. Ewen Fergusson, Foreign Secretary’s Office
  • Mr. Patrick Laver, Rhodesia Department, FCO

Rhodesia

The Secretary said that he had had the opportunity to read the draft brief which Mr. Owen would take with him to Africa.² Our initial impression is that the outlined strategy is encouraging and we are therefore positive about moving forward on Rhodesia. He asked what pitfalls Owen foresaw.

Owen said he would like to discuss his brief by attacking it. There are three main problems he sees with the proposed approach. First is the question of participation. Both the attraction and the danger of the paper is that it provides for progress towards negotiations without Smith. We have perhaps allowed Smith too often to obstruct progress, he said. We should genuinely encourage Smith to attend a conference while insisting that the conference is based on an assumption of majority rule in 1978. If Smith refuses to attend, then we will deal with the Nationalists. But, Owen said, if the UK is to conduct a conference only with the Nationalists, it would not want to be alone. An American role would be vital, for Britain would not want to be in the position of a single white participant negotiating with the Nationalists and holding the colonial ball.

The problem of participation also arises vis-a-vis the Nationalists, the Foreign Secretary went on. The conference could not go forward without Nkomo and Muzorewa. A conference could probably be arranged without Mugabe or Smith. If Smith did not attend, perhaps other Rhodesian whites could be invited. Owen here digressed to say he had an open mind about the suggestion that HMG establish a liaison office in Salisbury. He said information on developments in Rhodesia is limited and such an office could also provide a conduit to other whites inside the country. Owen said he recognized, however, that establishing such an office would be full of dangers and he is not inclined for the moment to make a decision one way or the other.

The second and perhaps central snag in the plan, Owen continued, is the possibility of some sort of success. If constitutional agreement can be reached without Smith, then the pressure will be enormous to impose the agreement. It is difficult to see how an agreement could be imposed, but pressure will then begin to focus exclusively on the US and the UK.

The third problem, Owen said, is that with little likelihood of an interim government, the eventual transition to majority rule might take place in circumstances of increased guerrilla violence and a collapsing white administration. The three month lead-up to independence could well be a period of disorder. The UK cabinet would therefore be reluctant to agree to a resident commissioner without some well organized peacekeeping force.

The Secretary asked whether the risks and violence would be measurably increased if Mugabe were not included in an agreement. The British side replied that much of what transpired would depend on the attitude of the front line Presidents. But if the agreement included Nkomo and Muzorewa, the security situation would likely be manageable. The Secretary expressed misgivings about a Soviet role in any effort to create or administer a UN peace-keeping force. He asked whether the Commonwealth might not be a more promising alternative. Owen replied that the Commonwealth might be inclined to play a role were the atmosphere in Rhodesia reasonably peaceful. The Nigerians would be crucial in this decision, he added. Schaufele stated that the white community would surely want something like Canadian participation which would only be possible in peaceful circumstances. Owen said that because of the Soviet presence in the United Nations the Commonwealth option remains a serious one.

The Foreign Secretary said that he would now like to address a broader problem bearing more directly on US/UK relationships. He said, assuming that we do in fact go ahead with the process and complete everything envisaged in the paper without Smith, and all the legal processes are completed, we would then face the problem of how to handle the inevitable pressure to bring down the Smith Government. Vorster is important but probably not crucial because he must operate within his own limits as well. The Foreign Secretary postulated that if the processes were successful then pressures in the United Nations for sanctions against South Africa would be great, perhaps coming to a head as early as next February. HMG could not become involved in this initiative if the only real result would be a chapter 7 finding in the United Nations.³ “It would be like loading the gun myself,” he said, “and then putting the gun to my head.” We must together decide on a sanctions strategy and particularly where we should draw the line to resist demands for sanctions. “If we do go into this broad strategy on Southern Africa issues,” Owen went on, “we must know that you stand with us. We cannot be left alone to veto sanctions resolutions and thereby expose ourselves to economic retaliation from the black Africans.”

The Secretary asked whether Owen was seeking an understanding that for at least a year or so the British could expect the Americans to follow their lead on sanctions resolutions in the United Nations. Owen replied negatively but said that Britain must know how far the US is prepared to go on these issues. Britain could never accept an overall “blunderbuss” resolution, and therefore it should be decided—hopefully with the US—exactly where to draw the line in the United Nations. Britain is not prepared to accept overall sanctions, Owen said, not only for the obvious economic reasons but also because such moves would likely be politically counter-productive. Michael Palliser added that sanctions would likely prove ineffective in any case. South Africa must be convinced that its own interests are involved in the peaceful and early solution to the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia. Owen said that Vorster must see that a short time scale is required in both these countries, and at the same time we must see that decades may be required for a satisfactory evolutionary process within South Africa. “We must make this distinction,” Owen concluded.

The Secretary said the President had recently told Ambassador Botha that the US would not expect overnight change in South Africa but that the process of change had to start soon.⁴ There must be a real beginning down this road, and the South Africans must be constructive on the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia if they are to win time for themselves. The Secretary added that he is presently studying a paper on South Africa and can therefore not respond precisely to Owen’s questions on the limitations of sanctions. He added that the President had not raised the question of Chapter 7 in his conversation with Botha but had referred to mounting pressures in the United Nations.

Owen said HMG would prefer not to cross the threshold of a Chapter 7 finding even if it applied initially only to arms. Surely Vorster can see the same danger, Owen continued, and logically should see the situation the same way we do. The West should not fire the gun now, he said, but rather hold it over Vorster’s head. Frankly, Owen continued, we in the government here are worried about what direction the US is going to take on this question. You will find the same anxiety in France, he said. Habib suggested that sanctions would not necessarily mean an across-the-board economic blockade; they could be applied selectively as may eventually be the case over Namibia. Michael Palliser pointed out that effective selective sanctions would not necessarily require action by the security council. Real pressure could be applied voluntarily, for instance a French threat to stop supplying spare parts.

Owen said that if events developed in such a way that the US split from the UK and France over the issue of sanctions, such a step was bound to have a very disturbing effect on Atlantic relationships. Such a division would have a major impact on long-term Western cohesion, with one possible consequence being the development of a SAG “Laager” mentality and eventually of a Nazi state in South Africa of horrible dimensions. Owen said that he was not expecting pledges from the Americans before Britain again launched itself down the Rhodesian road but it was important for the US to know about British concerns and that we together openly see the real problems this may lead to.

Owen then returned to the tactical questions of the new Rhodesian effort. He asked, referring to his brief, whether the US would be prepared to play a major role at a renewed conference. The Secretary replied that the US is ready to co-sponsor the conference and to field a strong delegation. We will attend plenary sessions and speak at the meetings. The Secretary reaffirmed that the US is prepared to go side by side with Britain in the current effort. Rowlands pointed out that the front line presidents might insist on a similar status but that this problem should not be regarded as a sticking point. The Secretary said that he believed the best way for the US to express its support of Owen’s trip would be through our ambassadors in the respective capitals.

The two parties agreed that Owen should tell Smith that the current effort foresees majority rule in Rhodesia in 1978. He will also tell Smith that the question of the franchise is something to be worked out among the delegations in the conference, but that we anticipate one man one vote would likely be the only acceptable conclusion. Owen said that in his discussions with black leaders he would want to put forward three or four points that might underscore US/UK cooperation. He will inform the black leaders that the US is prepared to co-sponsor the conference, that we are agreed the conference is based on the prospect of majority rule in 1978, that we are open on the question of the franchise, and that the Zimbabwe development fund remains a central ingredient for the settlement. Owen added that US endorsement would also make it easier for him to sell the plan to his cabinet colleagues.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Namibia

There then followed a brief discussion of Namibia. Schaufele said there is a possibility that the South Africans may look for a new negotiating framework between April and June when the South Africans will be considering in Parliament the results of the Turnhalle conference. Owen said we can expect growing pressure for a Chapter 7 finding on Namibia and Habib pointed out that the legal arguments for Chapter 7 are stronger in the case of Namibia than in the case of South Africa.

Owen concluded the meeting by referring to recent allegations of sanctions breaking by BP and Shell. He said that HMG may shortly decide to investigate the charges which among other benefits might show the South Africans a tougher attitude. Schaufele said that we might also consider making coordinated demarches to other countries urging them to tighten up sanctions enforcement, a suggestion with which Owen agreed.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1977. Secret. Drafted by Raymond G. H. Seitz and approved on April 26 by Twaddell. The meeting took place in the morning in the Foreign Office. Vance was in London to brief Callaghan on meetings with Soviet leaders.
2. Reported in telegram 5342 from London, March 31. The brief was divided into three parts: a strategy section on restarting the Rhodesia negotiations; Annex A, which outlined a possible constitution for an independent Rhodesia; and Annex B, which was a timetable. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 120, Zimbabwe: US/UK Consultations: 4/77)
3. A Chapter 7 finding in the United Nations allows the Security Council to determine if a government’s actions constitute a threat to peace or an act of aggression, and stipulates what actions, up to and including military force, can be taken to restore peace.
4. See Document 269.