143. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter 1

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

6. Southern Africa: South African Ambassador Botha told the British and ourselves today that his government believes that Smith will negotiate seriously a transfer of power if the nationalists can agree on a single black leader for him to deal with. Botha suggested that a referendum be held to pick this African leader, and he pledged that South Africa [Page 389] would deliver Ian Smith if such a vote were held. This is in effect the “internal options” which we have previously rejected.

Neither the British or ourselves responded formally to Botha’s proposal but neither of us believe it is a proposal with which you should be associated. The referendum proposal has already been rejected by the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front.2 Such a vote would lead to a victory for Bishop Muzorewa who does not control the freedom fighters. It is likely therefore that a Muzorewa victory would lead to a civil war along Angolan lines. The British will be studying Botha’s proposal for several days, but I am convinced that we and the British will have to go to the South Africans very soon to tell them that we see no merit in pursuing such a course of action.3

This afternoon I received the British team that has been consulting with us over the past several days. I stressed the importance we attached to maintaining momentum in the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations. We expect to proceed in Rhodesia on the basis of general principles to reopen negotiations. Regarding Namibia we expect to pursue the 7-point program4 worked out last year leading toward a conference on Namibia which takes into account the needs of all parties. We expect resolutions to be underway in the U.N. Security Council next month on the questions of Namibia and apartheid. Rather than try to re-draft African resolutions we settled on the idea of drafting in advance our own resolutions. I trust that it will be possible for the British and ourselves to agree on a common draft although there have been some differences between us on how we approach certain aspects of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems.

  1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”
  2. At a meeting in Lusaka January 8–9, the Front Line Presidents gave their full support to the Patriotic Front as the group most involved in the struggle for independence. President Nyerere said that the importance of other movements would be “measured in relation to the struggle.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28202)
  3. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Consult w/me first.”
  4. See Tab 2, Document 264.